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ABSTRACT

PIERRE HADOT’S PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATION

By
Jonathan Rawson Crist
May 2020

Dissertation supervised by Pat Arneson, Ph.D.
Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication attends to the health of the self and
community through practice of spiritual exercises for the transformation of one’s entire being,
working at the nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos. The task is ever-incomplete, works in an
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all
communication” (Butchart 136). This is responsive to the present moment experiencing
disjointed experience of time and space, increased anxiety, underdeveloped capacity for
attention, and cultural forms that privilege stimuli over reflection. These conditions make it
difficult to recognize and form responses to fundamental questions: How do I live a good life?
What does death mean? What purpose is there in this life? This dissertation works through the
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major themes in Hadot’s work and demonstrates how it offers insight into adopting and adapting
ancient philosophical attitudes, working toward inner peace in shifting existential conditions,
gaining perspective by taking ‘a view from above’, and fostering a love of humankind all born
through the understanding that we are fundamentally in relation with others in human
communication.
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CHAPTER 1
Hadot on Interpretation: Or, the Revealing of Ancient Philosophy
It is through Hellenistic and Roman thought,
particularly that of late antiquity, that the
renaissance was to perceive Greek tradition. This
fact was to be of decisive importance for the birth of
modern European thought and art. In another
respect contemporary hermeneutic theories that,
proclaiming the autonomy of the written text, have
constructed a veritable tower of Babel of
interpretations where all meanings become
possible, come straight out of the practices of
ancient exegesis. (Hadot, Way of Life 67)
The centrality of interpretation in Pierre Hadot’s work goes hand in hand with the
primary question that guides his writing: “Can modern man understand and even live by ancient
texts?” Hadot places ‘understanding’ as central to this project: “For all kinds of reasons, of which
chronological distance is not the most important, our understanding of ancient works has grown
more and more dim” (Citadel vii). While there are extant translations and printings and
introductions of ancient philosophical works (e.g., Platonic dialogues, Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius, the Enneads of Plotinus, Aristotle’s Nichomechean Ethics)—what grows dim are our
understandings of how the text in front us has come to be and the conditions under which it was
originally produced.
Michael Chase and Luc Brisson write that Hadot contributed to understanding philosophy
in the present historical moment, “by reforming philosophical discourse to a way of life and
resituating it within its original economic, social, political, and religious context—Hadot
promoted a way of conceiving philosophy that was both very ancient and very new” (439).
Hadot’s philosophy is ‘new’ in that it runs counter to a conception of ‘doing philosophy’ as the
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specialized activity of a professional group of people writing and teaching in universities.
Hadot’s conception of philosophy has roots in his life experience.
The first section outlines Hadot’s intellectual background including his formative years
spent in seminary and the priesthood of the Catholic Church and his philological training. The
second section turns to the major phenomenon in Hadot’s work, philosophia. The final section
reviews the practices of exegetical philosophy, specifically in the Neoplatonist tradition. This
brings Hadot to focus on the centrality of interpretation and “creative mistakes” in understanding
ancient philosophy and the task of the reader in the present historical moment (Way of Life 71,
75).
Intellectual Background
Hadot’s development in his formative years, his primary education, and his interest in
mysticism situated him uniquely to observe and address for his time and for ours the “great
cultural event of the West, the emergence of a Latin philosophical language translated from the
Greek” (Way of Life 54). This section introduces Pierre Hadot’s intellectual background with
attention to his education with Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle.
Hadot was born in 1922 in Reims, France. He was born the youngest of three sons. His
education began at an early age. He was directed toward the Catholic priesthood from the age of
ten starting with his entry to the minor seminary in Reims. Hadot’s early interactions with
religious education and philosophical instruction would provide lasting direction for his life and
scholarship. Hadot was the youngest of three sons to stay at home. His mother and his father
worked at a champagne production business. He was exposed to a rigorous Catholic environment
and social structure with the parish priest as the “absolute master” in the geographical area of the
parish (Hadot, Happiness 1). Hadot anecdotally recalled this structure on display in his parents’
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relationship; following his birth his mother had suffered an illness that would no longer allow her
to have children. The parish priest told his parents they could no longer sleep together in
accordance with the Church doctrine that procreation was the only purpose of conjugal relations.
Without the possibility of conceiving children, Hadot’s father grew apart from the Church and
discontinued going to Mass for numerous years (3). Hadot’s mother remained stalwart in the
faith so much so that she restricted the vocational choices for her sons all of whom were to be
ordained as priests. Hadot was then sent to the minor seminary in Reims when he was ten years
old (4).
Hadot entered the Grande Séminaire in Reims at 15 where he was exposed further to
Thomism as well as the heralded mystical authors of the Catholic Church such as Teresa of Avila
(1515-1582) and Thérèse of Lisieux (1873-1897). At the time, Hadot also began his long interest
in the work of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), whom Hadot said “had a considerable influence on
the development of my thought, insofar as his philosophy is focused on the experience of a
bursting forth of existence, of life, that we experience in ourselves in willing and in duration”
(Happiness 9-10). Following Bergson, Hadot’s conception of philosophy was less the
construction of a rational system of discourse and more a way of life brought about through inner
transformation (Happiness 10). Hadot situated his interest in Bergson at the time as part of the
larger intellectual environment in 1939 that was grappling with the “problem of the essence of
philosophy” (Happiness 10).
Hadot was ordained in 1944 at the early age of 22. This was due in part to the
convergence of several factors. First was that the Grande Séminaire needed a philosophy
teacher. Second was the discovery of a heart murmur that made him unfit for parish life. And

3

third was his noticeable intellectual development whereupon Hadot was sent to complete
concurrent degrees at both the Sorbonne and the Institut Catholique (Hadot, Happiness 19).
Paul Henri (1906-1984) was a Jesuit and scholar working at the Institut Catholique at the
time Hadot was a doctoral student there. Henri’s focus was on the thought of Plotinus and on the
development of Neoplatonic influences in Western thought, and heavily influenced Hadot’s
interpretation of ancient texts. Hadot notes from his time working with Henri on a critical edition
of Victorinus (published 1960) that Henri served “as a model of scientific method” in
investigating the meaning of texts (Hadot, Way of Life 51). Through Henri, Hadot explored the
work of Plotinus (204-270 CE), who was a major influence in the flowering of Neoplatonic
thought and practice. Hadot learned the rigors of the critical philological work of translation and
commentary from Henri.
Henri and Hadot also worked together on a project providing commentary on the works
of Marius Victorinus (Way of Life 279-280). Victorinus (early 4th century CE) was a Neoplatonic
philosopher who was known as a translator of Aristotelian works from the Greek into Latin and,
following a late conversion to Christianity, had considerable influence on the work of Augustine
of Hippo. In this work on Victorinus, Hadot attributed a section of that work to Porphyry of
Tyre, a prominent student of Plotinus and teacher of Victorinus’s particular form of Neoplatonic
spiritual and exegetical practices. This connection allowed Hadot to provide a context for another
emergent Western cultural phenomenon at the time, the presentation of Christianity as a
philosophy or way of life (Way of Life 280).
Pierre Courcelle was another colleague, mentor, and friend who also helped train Hadot
in the scientific approach to interpretation and the comparison of texts (Hadot, Way of Life 50).
In Hadot’s inaugural lecture to the Collège de France, he remarked on Courcelle’s influence on
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his own approach to comparing ancient texts: “[A] text should be interpreted in light of the
literary genre to which it belongs” (Hadot, Way of Life 52). Courcelle was the first to put this
approach forth in the philological community. In this way Courcelle traced the formation and
development of common phrases associated with the western intellectual patrimony such as
“know thyself” (52).
The influence of Courcelle in placing the text in its literary genre and conditions of
writing comes across in the whole of Hadot’s body of scholarship. On Courcelle’s influence
Hadot wrote,
It was surprising to see a philologist [Courcelle] attack problems in the history of
philosophy, showing the key influence exercised on Latin Christian thought by Greek and
pagan Neoplatonism, not only Plotinus but—this was an important detail—by his disciple
Porphyry as well. Even more surprising, this philologist based his conclusions on a
rigorously philological method that did not rely solely on shining light on analogies.
(Hadot, Way of Life 51)
Courcelle’s writings proved to be an important impetus for Hadot’s work. Hadot read ancient
philosophical discourse in light of the genre and the environment, finding that the received canon
of philosophical texts, primarily oral in construction and intent, is a support for the ‘art of living.’
The future of Hadot’s scholarship was thus set forth.
The period from 1949-1960 proved to be fruitful for the direction Hadot’s life and
scholarship. Several events led Hadot out of the Church: the “Oath Against Modernism” he took
on his ordination, Humani Generis; the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption of Mary
(1950); and his own growing love for the woman who would become his wife for the next 11
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years. He stepped further into his academic work at the Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique (CNRS) where he was researching the works of Victorinus.
After leaving the priesthood, Hadot was a student at the Sorbonne for a year. He
eventually graduated from the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes. During Hadot’s years as a
university professor he published his dissertation Porphyre et Victorinus (Fr. 1968); and
Plotinus, Or the Simplicity of Vision (Fr. 1963, Eng. 1993). Hadot was appointed directeur
d’études of the fifth section of the École in 1964 as the chair of Latin Patristics where he
remained for twenty years. He was then nominated by Michel Foucault to a chair in the College
de France and was elected in 1982 to the chair of History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought.
He retired from that chair in 1991.
In addition to Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (1981), a collection of essays
translated into English as Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995), Hadot’s major works were written
after his retirement when he was finally free “to write books that have been waiting for years to
be written” (Hadot, Happiness 51). These works include The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of
Marcus Aurelius (French, 1992, English 1998), What is Ancient Philosophy? (French 1995,
English 2002), and The Veil of Isis (French 2004, English 2006).
Hadot was exposed early to the Catholic intellectual tradition in the form of the
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Hadot’s own work manages to be clear, detailed, and accessible
to a broad range of readers. He credited his own writing style in part to his early exposure to
Thomism as a rigorous, clear, and systematic philosophy (Hadot, Way of Life 277). Amid his
education in the Catholic tradition of 1930’s France, Hadot began to undergo experiences that he
later identified as outside the Christian foundation (Hadot, Happiness 8). These experiences
occurred in a pre-2nd Vatican Council environment and explanations or descriptions of these
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experiences would previously have been found only in the mystics such as Therese of Lisieux or
John of the Cross. In other words, having an experience that did not fit within his Christian
worldview or knowledge was disturbing not only to him but also to the Church.
Hadot drew upon the work of Romain Rollard to describe the experience as “the pure
happiness of existing” or “oceanic feeling” (8); “the oceanic feeling, as I’ve experienced it—
which is different from the sentiment of nature—is foreign to Christianity because it does not
involve either God or Christ. It is something situated at the level of the pure feeling of existing”
(8). Hadot’s experiences were an “immersion in the ‘whole’” (9). The reoccurrence of this
experience in various forms encompassed and directed Hadot’s personal and professional life in
encounter and scholarship (6).
Philosophia as Starting Point
Philosophy as an embodied practice uproots our current assumptions about philosophy as
the result of “theoretical activity” (Ancient Philosophy 3). A current and prominent view of
studying philosophy is that one stores up knowledge of different systems of thought—NeoPlatonism, Scholasticism, Utilitarianism, Empiricism, Logical Positivism—and then leverages
the relevant knowledge-pieces of the system that one has chosen to respond to questions that
emerge such as What is a good life? What is death? How should I act in this situation? What
laws am I bound to? What responsibility do I have toward others; toward this other? Hadot
characterized this dominant theoretical version of ‘doing’ philosophy as a rarified activity
reserved for the professional philosopher. Philosophy as a professional activity is primarily
carried out under the aegis of universities, has a highly technical language, is transacted in print
and at boutique conferences, and addresses issues (e.g., ethics, virtue, language) and their
resolution as the problem of constructing a system that will hold in all circumstances. Hadot’s
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interpretation of the ancient phenomenon philosophia resonates with Alasdair MacIntyre’s
questioning of the tasks of philosophy.
MacIntyre is interested in what occurs when existential questions are asked outside of the
professional context of philosophy. Uttered in different contexts, the questions What is it to live
a human life well or badly? or What law, if any has authority over us? or What is the significance
of death in our lives? take on different significance (MacIntyre 125). In a social setting the
questions are usually asked with a certain amount of passion and anguish that elicits an awkward
silence or quick attempt by the other person to move to something else in the conversation (125).
Uttered in the context of a professional setting in tones appropriate to an academic lecture hall
the questions “no longer sound naïve, they no longer evoke embarrassment” (125).
MacIntyre further characterizes professional philosophical questioning and action as
“self-alienating” (127). The activity of questioning only arrives with our figuratively stepping
back from the immediate circumstances that instigated the questioning. What follows after
attaining this distance shapes the activity. MacIntyre identifies two different routes a person may
take after posing questions: first, the question and search may become a diversion along
Pascalian lines, giving the illusion of activity; or second, the question demands a response by
throwing the reader out back into one’s life to confront the issue. MacIntyre points to John Stuart
Mill and Thomas Aquinas as examples of philosophical discourses that throw the reader back
into the existential exigencies that prompted the questioning (128, 131). When philosophical
questioning and writing leads the reader down the second route, the technical points of writing
and professional philosophical activity are subordinated to the ends of the conversation at hand
with another person (130-131). MacIntyre suggests that “perhaps the point of doing philosophy
is to enable people to lead, so far as it is within their powers, philosophical lives” (132).
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Hadot’s scholarship traces an understanding of philosophia as a way of life that comes
about as an existential choice to carry out designated spiritual practices. A person’s existential
choice to practice philosophia is a response to a particular “vision of the world” (Hadot, Ancient
Philosophy 3). The execution of the practices work with one’s intention to change or “transform”
how the practitioner orients oneself the lifeworld (3). This choice and these practices precede the
learning and mastery of the texts. In other words, philosophic discourse—the received texts and
fragments of the ancient world—is inextricably intertwined with the formation of the practitioner
in philosophia.
The primary purpose of philosophic discourse for Hadot is to support one’s existential
choices and one’s view of the cosmos, not necessarily the construction or defense of a coherent
system (Hadot, Ancient Philosophy 3). “Theoretical philosophical discourse is thus born from
this initial existential option, and it leads back to it, insofar as—by means of its logical and
persuasive force, and the action it tries to exert upon the interlocuter—it incites both masters
and disciples to live in genuine conformity with their initial choice” (Ancient Philosophy 3,
emphasis added). Hadot reopened a reading of ancient texts as he reshaped our understanding of
the context and relationship between philosophic discourse and practitioner. What emerges when
the received texts of ancient Western philosophy are placed in their literary tradition and in the
context of their origins is a picture that privileges the needs of the practitioner in one’s continued
re-orienting of oneself in the lifeworld in accordance with a particular view of the cosmos that
utilizes both rhetorical and logical means for one’s chosen purpose. In other words, Hadot
opened afresh the way in which ancient works are interpreted, read, and encountered by a
contemporary reader.
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Exegesis of Philosophical Texts
During Hadot’s inaugural address on the occasion of his election to the chair of the
History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought in the College de France in 1982, he gave a brief
excurses on excurses. Beginning with the Alexander the Great’s excursion and advent of
Hellenistic culture, Hadot illumined the “historical distance” between 1) Greek culture and
thought and Hellenistic thought, 2) Roman engagement with Greek texts, and 3) contemporary
readers and of both of the preceding phenomena (Way of Life 53).
Hadot explained, “We need to recognize from the outset that almost all of Hellenistic
literature, principally its philosophical productions, has disappeared” (Way of Life 53). With the
exception of several fragments from the 700 works of Chrysippus (c. 279- c.206 BCE), literature
from that era has been lost to time (53). Due to this loss and historical distance, accessing ancient
Greek thought requires “exploiting existing texts” of Greek philosophy and is inseparable from
learning of the philosophical schools—Stoicism, Epicureanism, Platonism/Neoplatonism—
through the Latin authors, such as Cicero, Lucretius, Marius Victorinus, Augustine, and
Boethius—that preserved Greek texts by copying them and liberally quoting from those now lost
sources (53). In other words, the phenomenon of Greek and Latin philosophy that comes through
the Medieval period to the dawn of the Renaissance and the birth of “modern European thought
and art” emerges through a complex web of environmental and interpretive conditions (67).
Hadot’s understanding of this now distant event of original interpretation and translation,
as well as subsequent interpretations of the phenomena philosophia and the texts of ancient
philosophy, follows two broad interdependent lines. One is understanding the conditions of
production of the phenomena. This includes an understanding of the life, teaching, and practices
of the major schools as well as the exegetical practices that were to dominate Western
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philosophy to the conclusion of the 16th century (Ancient Philosophy 55-171; Way of Life 71).
Interwoven with the process of exegetical practices is the emergence of what Hadot terms
“creative mistakes” (Way of Life 71, 75).
Creative mistakes emerge as a result of the process of interpretation, translation, and
transcription by hand in copying and transmitting texts. These practices, combined with the
ravages of time and circumstance (e.g. repeated fires in the Alexandrian library, the sacking of
Athens by Sulla in 86 BCE), account for the emergence of mistranslations and deformations of
the authoritative texts of a school and practice in both structure and meaning (e.g. Marcus
Aurelius’s Meditations). Likewise, those same mistakes were the creative gap through which
came “the development of fresh ideas . . . new concepts, categories, arguments, and conclusions”
(Way of Life 5).
With an understanding of philosophy as a way of life—philosophia—Hadot reshaped an
understanding of the exegetical practices of the ancient schools of philosophy which then
reopened “our image of the history of philosophy” (Ancient 95). Exegetical exercises in the
practices of philosophy in late antiquity, through Medieval Scholasticism, and up through the
mid-18th century began with an authoritative founder of the school. In the case of the Athenian
schools, Plato founded the Academy and Aristotle founded the Lyceum, Epicurus founded the
Garden and Zeno founded the Stoa. The schools took on the names where the masters and
students met for instruction and to engage in the way of life demonstrated by the participants
including the “spiritual exercises” of attention, meditation, dialogue, consideration of death and
physics (Ancient 98-99). Exegesis and commentary on the texts of the founder of the school,
Plato or Aristotle for example, are primary exercises of the school in supporting the ongoing
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confirmation and choice of a way of practicing a way of life in congruity with a vision of the
cosmos.
“Each philosophical or religious school or group believed itself to be in possession of a
traditional truth, communicated from the beginning by the divinity to a few wise men” (Way of
Life 74). The texts of the founder and their authority serve as the foundation of wisdom and that
on which all other teaching in the schools is based (72). First and foremost, exegesis is an
argument from authority. Not unlike a syllabus, there are references to a specific order in which
the Platonic dialogues should be read by students so as to best prepare the way toward leading
the life of the sage-exemplar (72). To that end the primary mode of instruction took place as
commenting on the texts of the masters (72).
‘Truth’ was thus considered to be accessible in and through those texts considered by
authorities to be authentic (Way of Life 73). Commentary on the texts of the founders had a
specific intent: to reveal the ‘truth’ that is encapsulated in the works of the masters albeit they
might not be stated explicitly. The sometimes obscure “authentic” texts were thought to be a
deliberate technique of a master to point at the vast content of the truth that could be glimpsed in
and through their specific formulation (74). In this exegetical tradition so long as an
interpretation was considered coherent with the doctrine thought to be that of the original teacher
or sage it was considered “authentic” in that it illuminated the pre-existing ‘truth’ in the text (74).
So which texts—or authoritative translations of texts—are authentic?
Works by Plato and his student Aristotle (referred to as the Philosopher by Thomas
Aquinas) were the most prominent philosophers in antiquity. By the sunset of antiquity this list
grew exponentially to include those scholars who offered works of revelation for pagans,
Christians, and Jews—the Chaldaean Oracles, the Bible, and the Torah respectively. “Both

12

Judaism and Christianity sought to present themselves to the Greek world as philosophies; they
thus developed, in the persons of Philo and Origen respectively, a biblical exegesis analogous to
the traditional pagan exegesis of Plato (Way of Life 72). Hadot here aligned the textual
commentary of Medieval Scholasticism with exegetical practices of the ancient philosophical
schools.
With the intention of finding the pre-given truth in a text, exegetical philosophy considers
how the problems arising from those texts were posed. As an example, Hadot provided his own
translation of the problem of evil as posed by Plotinus in his first Ennead: “We must try to find
out in what sense Plato says that evils shall not pass away, and that their existence is necessary”
(Enneads I 8; Way of Life 73). Plotinus’s response to the question of whether evils pass away
proceeds from the first principles of Neoplatonism, namely that of the preeminence of the Good
and knowledge through the ideal forms, to work through the truth based on the ‘truth’ already
contained in the works of Plato. The structure of question and response working through and
from the authentic texts is paralleled in the structure of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, a
representative text of Medieval Scholastic philosophy.
Within a milieu of exegesis, errors in exegesis—those that were outside of the pale of the
doctrine of the founder—were taken to be the result of “misunderstandings and mistranslations”
of the authentic text (Way of Life 74). According to Hadot, modern scholars of the history of
philosophy have been correct to critique “arbitrary systemizations” that ancient commentators
would construct from the out-of-context passages from a single author or even the different
and/or contradictory ideas from different schools. In the first example, Hadot points to one
instance when a “four- or five-tiered hierarchy of being was extracted from various dialogues of
Plato”; in the second example, there is evidence that in an exegesis of Aristotelian texts
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commentators were employing notions from Stoicism and Platonism (75). What Hadot finds
most interesting and most fruitful is when these ‘mistakes’ in translation supply the opening for
new ideas to emerge.
Hadot’s description of “creative mistakes” is a primary contribution to the understanding
of philosophia (Way of Life 71, 75) In paving the way for the examples in this section, it is
important to first situate Hadot’s interpretive approach. The crux of his approach is what he
terms a “coincidentia oppositorum,” that is, being beholden to two opposing demands that are
equally incumbent (Nietzsche 76). The opposing interpretive demands involve objectivity and
subjectivity. The interpreter, in coming to an understanding of the texts and the “historical
reality” that comes in the encounter, is responding on one hand to the need for “a conscious and
complete engagement of the ego, and, on the other, a complete detachment from the ego, a
deliberate effort at impartial objectivity” (76). In this crux an “existential meaning” can be given
(76).
In his writing, Hadot placed this position in the historical context of 19th and 20th century
history and hermeneutics in an introduction to Nietzsche: Attempt at Mythology Nietzsche:
Attempt at Mythology (1918/2008). Ernst Bertram’s (1884-1957) influential study on Nietzsche
was originally published in 1918, was republished in French in 1990 with Hadot’s introduction,
and then translated into English in 2008. In his introduction, Hadot outlined his hermeneutic
approach to texts.
Textual translation was a topic that dominated the discussion of the circle of scholars
around Stefan George (1868-1933). Hadot characterized the George Circle’s approach to
historical research as a response to 19th century scholarship that privileged objectivity in the
sense that the historian performing the research could remove themselves, their situatedness in

14

the lifeworld, from the historical picture they were putting on display (Nietzsche 74-75). The
George Circle, which included Hans-Georg Gadamer, swung the pendulum back the other way
by eschewing historical objectivity entirely (75).
The kind of “historical vision” that emerged from the George Circle is for the purpose of
edification that acknowledges the historian’s situatedness in the present moment (Nietzsche 7475). An approach to history that searches into the past is a formative experience for the
historical/interpreter. This is not a novel approach. Hadot highlighted the Lives of Plutarch (46
AD-c. 120 AD) and the works of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Johann von Goethe
(1749-1832) as representative of this understanding. Formative ‘histories’ written in this vein can
and did veer into hagiography, as in the versions of the lives of the Christian saints that
emphasize the stories of miracles with the purpose of highlighting a specific practice or virtue,
the imitation of which would be edifying to the emulator. Hadot characterized the 19th century
development of a “rigorous historical method” as a response to the hagiographical tendency
(Nietzsche 75). The pendulum thus swung back with the hermeneutic theories and practices of
Nietzsche, George, Martin Heidegger, and Gadamer’s response to the “withering positivism of a
purely scholarly attitude” (76).
Quoting Bertram’s Nietzsche, Hadot identified the phrase “One and the same text permits
innumerable interpretations—there is no ‘correct’ interpretation” as the starting principle of the
George Circle (Nietzsche 76). Identifying a starting point where historical objectivity is not
possible, Hadot observed that methods of interpretation can lead to “genuine aberrations” by the
dismissal of authorial intention (76). This is important for understanding and ignoring the
situatedness of the text within its historical moment and conditions of production. Sharing the
good intentions of his response to the developing historicism of 19th century historical critical
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method, Hadot warned against dangers. “Nietzsche was wrong. We must firmly maintain the
opposite principle: ‘the same text cannot license all interpretations. There are valid
interpretations and inadmissible interpretations’” (76). Hadot situated his own position of the
coincidentia oppositorum as a position that acknowledges the position for a philological and
historical rigor when one interprets and comments on texts. In Hadot’s volume on the
Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, he briefly summarized this fluid starting point.
To be sure, it is fashionable nowadays to affirm that, in any case, we cannot know
exactly what an author meant, and that moreover, this does not matter at all, for we can
give the works any meaning we please. For my part, and without entering into this
debate, I would say that before we discover ‘unintentional’ meanings, it seems to me both
possible and necessary to discover the meaning with the author intended. It is absolutely
indispensable to go in the direction of a basic meaning, to which we can then refer in
order to uncover, if we should so wish, those meanings of which the author was perhaps
not conscious. It is true, however, that this reconstitution is extremely difficult for us,
because we project attitudes and intentions proper to our era into the past. (Citadel ix)
A reader cannot ‘know’ what the author meant, which allow creative unintentional meanings to
arise in the interpretation of a text.
Hadot likened the project of interpretation to that of the Stoic spiritual exercise of
considering a representation and then making a judgement and then ascribing value to a text
(Happiness 68). The first requirement for Hadot is coming to an “adequate and objective
judgment” of the text. This is achieved by having objectivity as a goal (68). Once an objective
judgment is made, any meaning that may be found in one’s subjective life can then be discovered
and applied to the text. Thus, “one can speak of a return to subjectivity, a subjectivity that,
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moreover, attempts to elevate itself to a universal perspective” (68). The act of interpretation
then becomes a spiritual exercise that is intended to transform the self. Using objectivity as a
goal and placing the ancient text back in its originating “praxis” there emerges the possibility of
revealing authorial intention (68). Hadot makes an important distinction between authorial intent
and the revelation of an “historical psychology” (65).
Hadot’s framework ascribing an “historical psychology” to the works of an author
emerged from his study of the Renaissance. In the Renaissance a work of art—a novel or
painting for example—could be considered an unbounded expression of the ‘real’ individual
(Happiness 65). Especially with regard to understanding ancient texts, ignoring the literary
context in which the work was produced thus ignores the constraints placed on an author by the
literary genre in which he was writing. The literary genre reveals those constraints and the
purpose for which the author was writing.
In ancient philosophical schools there were rigorously codified rules for the presentation
and use of terms in different literary genres. The author’s intention could be gleaned through the
“way in which he has been able to play with all the rules that imposed themselves” on the author
and his use of language (Happiness 65). One such constraint is the intimate intertwining of the
written word and the efficaciousness of the spoken word with primacy given to the latter (Way of
Life 61). In the case of the de Rerum Natura by Lucretius—a representative work in the
Epicurean tradition—Hadot explained that the oral constraints of rhythm and meter prevented the
full use of the technical vocabulary of the school that would otherwise have made an appearance
in his work (Way of Life 62). This distinction in conjunction with the interpretive approach of
coincidentia oppositorum and an understanding of creative mistakes locates the Meditations of
Marcus Aurelius in their originating praxis as well as open the possibility of new meaning.
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Hadot’s work The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius can be understood
as a book length exposition of a series of creative mistakes involving the reception of the content
of the text, locating the literary genre in which the content was written, and the subsequent
interpretations of the text. 1 The opening chapters of that work gives a glimpse into the operation
of placing a text into its praxis, in turn paving the way for Hadot’s understanding of creative
mistakes.
In the opening chapters of the Inner Citadel Hadot categorizes the ways in which the
present day reader faces difficulties in approaching the texts of antiquity. Before the printing
press, texts were transcribed by hand. Through this copying words have been miscopied and
sections lost. Fortunately, there has been a long continuous work to catalog ‘errors’ in the
process. In the specific case of Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations Hadot recounted the full recorded
history of the text, the title and structure, and dominant assumptions of the literary genre up to
the present moment. The text as contemporary readers have come to know it is broken into
chapters. In the earliest extant text there are no divisions (Citadel 23).
In addition, the title Meditations was a later attribution, not one given by Aurelius. The
work has been referenced by various titles throughout history including “Exhortations,”
“Writings Concerning Himself,” “Private Writing,” “About Himself and to Himself,” “Notes
which He Wrote for Himself,” “Moral Thoughts,” “To Myself,” “Conversations with Himself,”
and “Paths toward Himself” (Citadel 24-25). Hadot located the literary genre of Marcus’s
writings as hypomnēmata, or notes taken for himself. In this ancient literary genre, notes of this
sort were to be on hand for regular use in exhorting oneself. In the Stoic tradition, these notes

1

The bulk of Hadot’s work on Marcus will be treated in the chapter on spiritual exercise.
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were written according to formulas and language that were provocative and used the three part
Stoic system for conditioning one’s inner discourse. By this way then Marcus aimed,
to strive to always have the essential rules of life present in one’s mind, and to keep
placing oneself in the fundamental disposition of the philosopher, which consists
essentially in controlling one’s inner discourse, in doing only that which is of benefit to
the human community, and in accepting the events brought to us by the course of the
Nature of the All. (Citadel 31)
One can benefit oneself as well as the all of humankind by controlling one’s inner discourse in
the face of daily occurrences.
While written to adhere to a Stoic system, hypomnēmata as a literary genre assists the
philosopher practitioner in cultivating an inner attitude and an external response to the existential
demands of life in the manner of the school and its cosmic vision. Thus classified, Hadot pointed
out the mistake of approaching the apparently disorderly texts as either broken fragments in what
otherwise would have been a systematic treatise, or as a recording of the “outpourings of one’s
heart,” an interpretation prominent to 19th century Romanticism (Citadel 25-27). Replacing the
texts within their literary genre, especially with regard to ancient texts, reveals what an author
was constrained to say by the rhetorical rules and intentions of the genre.
Hadot placed the utmost importance on understanding that the ancient literary rules of
production were much more codified than a modern reader’s current approach. Arnold Davidson
succinctly summarizes Hadot’s approach:
Hadot’s studies of the history of ancient philosophy and theology have always included
the analysis of ‘the rules, the forms, the models of discourse,’ the framework of the
literary genre whose rules are often rigorously codified, in which the thoughts of the
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ancient author are expressed. Such analysis is necessary in order to understand both the
details of the work, the exact import of particular statements as well as the general
meaning of the work as a whole. Literary structure and conceptual structure must never
be separated. (7)
Situating the text in its original praxis in conjunction with a rigorous philological approach to
texts brings Hadot to identify creative mistakes.
Translation errors occurred in exegesis. Mistranslations and misunderstandings emerged
through a number of factors, both environmental and exegetical. Having completed the rigorous
work to establish that errors occurred in translation and exegesis across historical moments,
Hadot’s question became How do we understand the interpretations and exegesis that follows
from those errors? Hadot characterized his position in response to a dominant attitude in
historical research that considered all exegetical thought to be rooted in mistakes. However,
rooted in misunderstanding, the exegetical edifice built from a mistake does not meet modern
standards of reasoning (Way of Life 75). Based in error the exegesis could be dismissed as faulty.
Regardless of the judgment, Hadot reasoned the researcher is also “forced to admit one fact: very
often, mistakes and misunderstandings have brought about important evolutions in the history of
philosophy. In particular they have caused new ideas to appear” (75). One such new idea
emerging from Neoplatonic exegesis is the development of the distinction between an infinitive
“being” and participle “being” (75).
Hadot traced this distinction to Porphyry of Tyre’s (a student of Plotinus) exegesis of
section 142b of the Platonic dialogue Parmenides.
Plato had asked: ‘if the One is, is it possible that it should not participate in being
[ousia]?’ For the Neoplatonist Porphyry, the One in question here is the second One. If

20

this second One participates in ousia, he reasons, we must assume that ousia is prior to
the second One. Now, the only thing prior to the second One is the first One, and this
latter is not in any sense ousia. Thus, Porphyry concludes that, in this passage, the word
ousia designates the first One in an enigmatic symbolical way. The first One is not ousia
in the sense of ‘substance’; rather, it is being (être) in the sense of a pure, transcendent
act, prior to being as a substantial object (étant). L’étant, then, is the first substance and
the first determination of l’être. (Way of Life 75)
The consequences of this exegesis by Porphyry would reverberate throughout the Middle Ages
in Scholastic theological exegesis on the nature and ‘substance’ of the Trinity and the Eucharist.
Heidegger would then again take up the question of being in the monumental volume Being and
Time (1927). Hadot devoted his final book to another fruitful creative mistake, the Heraclitan
fragment “Nature loves to hide.”
The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature (Fr. 2004, Eng. 2006) was
Hadot’s final published volume. In that work he traced interpretations of the Heraclitan aphorism
“Nature loves to hide” through historical moments. This became the jumping off point for
Hadot’s description and analysis of the two broad attitudes that humankind has taken in relation
to nature, the Promethean and the Orphic. In broad strokes the Promethean attitude understands
nature as a keeper of secrets. The secrets are those that undergird the operation of the cosmos.
The means to discovering these secrets is through experiments that force nature to disrobe
herself, thus revealing the logic of its operations. These operations are thought to be a repeatable
logic that can be expressed in mathematical or mechanical terms. The logic of nature can then be
harnessed for humankind’s use. The Orphic model understands the secrets of nature to be best
understood as a song, discourse, poem whose proper reception comes by way of contemplation.
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Integral to this final work is Hadot’s execution of the principle of ‘creative mistakes’ in
interpretation. An illustrative example of this comes in a chapter on the personification of Nature
in imagery of Isis and Diana of Ephesus (Veil 233). Hadot noted that the statuary of Nature has
been adorned with what appear to be multiple breasts. He elaborated,
According to some modern scholars, what the ancients took to be breasts might in fact,
like the rest of the goddess’s attributes, be the sculpted reproduction of the clothes and
decorations with which the goddess’s state was adorned. The statue would have been
made of wood and covered with adornment. It was the custom in Asia Minor and Greece,
to dress goddesses; in fact, this was an essential part of daily worship. On this hypothesis,
the form of the statues corresponds to the sculpted representation of the adornments that
covered the wood statue. What had been assumed to be breasts would thus be jewels, or
chains with pendants. Alternatively, they could be the testicles of bulls offered to the
goddess on the occasion of the sacrifices that took place in her honor. It would thus be a
mistaken interpretation—once again, a creative misunderstanding—that led people to see
a personification of Nature in Artemis of the many breasts. (Veil 235)
Hadot’s interest was with how interpretation is framed by assumptions within a particular
historical moment.
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the life and work of Pierre Hadot. Hadot asks the question,
“is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity, and live according to them” (Way
of Life 278). As we have seen, Hadot’s formative years in the Catholic culture and seminary
coupled with his later philological training under Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle uniquely
situate Hadot to ask and pose responses to the question. Through this education Hadot was
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exposed early to the systematic work of Thomas Aquinas and the great mystics of the Catholic
Intellectual tradition. This put him in a position to read ancient texts within their own context to
revisit the phenomenon of ancient philosophy, or philosophia.
The second section introduced philosophia the central phenomenon of Hadot’s
scholarship. Philosophia is an embodied way of life, lived out in community of practitioners, that
has attendant spiritual practices for the intention of forming the “inner attitude” and orienting the
practitioner in the life-world (Way of Life 59). This way of life is an existential choice and is
rooted in a particular understanding and view of the cosmos (Ancient 3). In the present historical
moment, the texts that have come to be understood as the texts of philosophy were produced for
the support of this initial choice of a way of life and living by it in response to the many and
various existential exigencies of the day. Hadot finds therefore that ancient philosophical texts
are not constrained by the purpose of the creation of a fully coherent system of thought. Rather
they serve in the always ongoing formation of the human being.
Central in responding to the primary question is his inquiry into the received texts of
ancient antiquity. The final section detailed Hadot’s re-shaping of our current understanding of
how the current forms and interpretations of ancient philosophical texts have come to be. Hadot’s
understanding and practice of interpretation affirms the goal of working toward objectivity in the
process of interpretation. A person engaging with the text is certainly situated in their own
moment, however they can, with rigor, place the text in question back in its literary genre,
environment, and culture in working out what the author intended to convey. Approaching this
becomes more possible, Hadot explains, because the rules of production for ancient authors are
rigid, much more so than the contemporary moment. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius being
a significant example. Placing it in context exposes the various additions (such as the familiar
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chapter division) and errors in translation of the Meditations throughout the years. Replacing it
in its literary genre and context of Stoic philosophia displays the Meditations as hypomnēmata or
a support in exhorting Marcus to live by the tripartite Stoic life of ethics, physics, and logic.
While some mistakes are errors there are some that have been shown to be fruitful in
opening up gaps for new meaning. Hadot regards these errors as “Creative mistakes” (Way of
Life 71, 75). are those mistranslations, misinterpretations, and deformation/losses of the texts
that, while mistakes, are what allowed for the emergence and work of exegetical philosophy
(Way of Life 71, 75). Perhaps the most consequential example of the result of a creative mistake
is the emergence of the distinction between infinitive “being” and participle “being” from Plato’s
Parmenides (Way of Life 75).
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CHAPTER 2
The Philosopher and the Sage
“In Greece, the Archaic and Classical periods
instead marked a time when training was broad,
when arts were intricately interwoven, and when
mind and body moved and thought together.”
(Hawhee 4)
In her book Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece Debra Hawhee works
on the premise that a mind-body division is a lens later placed on understanding the habits and
practices of ancient Greek rhetoric, athletics, philosophy and politics. Hawhee’s project and
Hadot’s project run parallel with one another in outlining the interconnections of the arts—
philosophy, rhetoric, athletics, politics, drama, poetry—in Ancient Greece for the purpose of
practicing the good as a member of a city and community. This chapter gives attention to how
Hadot traces the shifting understanding of wisdom, knowledge and the figure of the person of
wisdom and the seeker of wisdom, the sage and the philosopher respectively, in the overall
project of unearthing philosophy understood as a way of life.
Hadot’s understanding and interpretation of sophia and sophos has reconnected the
received texts of philosophical discourse and the way of life as practiced within a philosophical
school. This way of life is habituated through spiritual exercises in accord with a vision of the
cosmos. Common to the various schools this meant living in accord with universal Reason or
Logos. Hadot brings his readers to question what is being highlighted and learned in reading the
ancient discourses. If the reader is taking philosophical discourse as a dialogic mode of
expressing a system of thought that is coherent, constructed in the abstract, and can withstand
scrutiny of all circumstances, then what will be brought to the foreground is the conceptual
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content of the interlocutors. In other words, the content and actions of the participants in the
dialogue are separated wherein each could be treated as separate entities. Working out of the
construct that philosophia is a way of life that is practiced in the “customs and conventions of
everyday life” Hadot traces philosophy as embodied action oriented toward achieving a state of
wisdom (Way of Life 58).
Working through a detailed explication of Socrates as he appears in the Platonic
dialogues and other descriptions by Xenophon and Plutarch, Hadot brought out the inextricable
nature of conceptual conversation and dialogue embodied in the interlocutors. In the actions,
words, and content of the dialogue is highlighted the primary purpose of philosophia: to
transform the “inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). This, in turn feeds from and
forms the spiritual exercises (dialogue is a common spiritual exercise in the Greek schools) and
engaging with the existential exigencies that confront personal and communal life. In this
explication we see Hadot practicing philosophy as a way of life as he brings in a regular object of
everyday life in his own historical moment in describing the movement of theory and existential
choice—the lamp on a bicycle:
Theoretical reflection goes in a certain direction as a result of a fundamental orientation
of inner life, and this tendency of inner life is specified and takes shape as a result of
theoretical reflection. . . In the night one needs a light that illuminates and allows one to
guide oneself (this is theoretical reflection), but in order to have light, the generator has to
turn by the movement of the wheel. The movement of the wheel is the choice of life. . . In
other words, theoretical reflection already supposes a certain choice of life, but this
choice of life can progress and specify itself only as a result of theoretical reflection.
(Happiness 104)
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Hadot’s work contributes to an understanding of philosophy as fundamentally communicative
involving philosophical discourse, individual formation, and primacy of human communication
between practitioners for effecting the conversion of the self.
The first section introduces Hadot’s clarification of the ideal of the sage and the
generative relationship with the situatedness of the philo-sophos in everyday life. The section
also reviews his discussion on the words sophia and philo-sophos or lover of wisdom. The
second section turns to the figure of Socrates as the pre-eminent model of the philo-sophos in the
Western Intellectual Tradition. Through irony, dialectic and erotic, Socrates brought about the
birth of a consciousness awake to its present state of lack of wisdom and innate desire toward the
good. The final section situates Hadot’s distinction between philosophy and philosophical
discourse in an environment of primary orality.
The Philosopher and the Sage
The Heraclitan fragment “Men who love wisdom must be good inquirers into many
things indeed,” according to Charles Kahn, may be the first utterance of philosophos or “men
who love wisdom” (105). In Kahn’s seminal interpretation and commentary on the fragments he
elaborates: “philosophoi andres admits a secondary reading: ‘men who want to become sages’ . .
. . It would be in character for him [Heraclitus] to introduce the theme of wisdom in the
compound philo-sophos, as the object of ardent desire” (105). As something desired, wisdom is
not yet achieved and may not be achieved in the lifetime of the practitioner (Way of Life 58). The
desire and practice toward wisdom is what sets the philosophers in tension with the “customs and
conventions of daily life” (58). ‘Wisdom’ or sophia in Hadot’s account of philosophia does not
admit of a strict delineation between theoretical and practical aspects of life (Ancient Philosophy
18; Way of Life 60).
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Hadot ties philosophia to a pre-Socratic notion of paideia. Paideia is the “desire to form
and educate” and, according to Hadot, is “a fundamental demand of the Greek mentality”
(Ancient Philosophy 11). The lover of wisdom is atopos: disconnected from the common habits
of the everyday, “strange, extravagant, absurd, unclassifiable, disturbing” (Ancient Philosophy
30). Each philosophical school identified an ideal way of living in this productive tension with
the everyday. This way of life was exemplified in the figure of the sage. The sage takes on
different characteristics depending on the school – Socratic, Neo-Platonic, Stoic – of which one
is a part. Though in slightly different ways the commonalities of the sage across schools include
cultivating an inner disposition and living in a state in accord with the creation-principle of that
school, e.g. Stoic Reason. These raise the sage out of subjection to the “customs and conventions
of daily life” (Way of Life 58).
Throughout his body of work Hadot produced two book-length studies on individual
practitioners in the model of the philo-sophos in different schools with variations in the model of
the sage toward which they practiced: the Neo-Platonist Plotinus (204–270 CE) and the Stoic
Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121–160 CE). The Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius is indebted to
Epictetus (50–135 CE) who exampled and exhorted a way of life that holds the choice of the
moral good as absolute (Citadel 73). For the Stoic, choosing the moral good would put a person
in complete accord with Reason and the Cosmos (Way of Life 58). For Plotinus, the sage is the
one that progresses through the levels of reality by means of ascetic physical and spiritual
practices toward becoming the Intellect (Ancient 166). Once reached the practitioner is fully
transparent and subsumed back into the All from which all distinctions initially derived. “To
become Intellect is thus to see ourselves, and all things, within the totalizing perspective of the
Divine Spirit” (Ancient 166). Common to both the Stoic and the Neo-Platonist is that the sage
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rarely occurs if at all. The Stoics thought that perhaps there were one or two sages that appeared
(Citadel 76). For Plotinian Neo-Platonism the state of identification with the All is a rare and
fleeting experience (Ancient 160). Both schools admitted to this possibility of achieving this
state, thus allowing for the possibility of progress toward wisdom. Being on the path is the
middle way of the philo-sophos, not a sage but awakened to their lack of wisdom and their desire
to live a life in practice and preparation toward wisdom. Socrates is the pre-eminent example and
influence of the middle way of the philo-sophos in the Western Intellectual Tradition.
Common to both models of the sage and associated ways of life is the figure of Socrates
and the coincidence of virtue and knowledge. Hadot’s research into the figure of the sage, that is
those that have reached the ideal form of life, as in living in complete accord with the logos,
leads immediately to the figure of Socrates wherein the model of the sage, the wise-person,
becomes consistent with the philo-sophos, a person who is lacking wisdom, knows they are
lacking wisdom, and desires toward wisdom. As part of understanding the notion of the sage and
the philosopher, Hadot traces the development of the concept and occurrences of sophia (Ancient
17-20). Hadot brings to life a picture wherein practices in knowledge in all fields—politics, art,
music, nature, cosmos, biology—are combined efforts in practice toward wisdom. In other
words, knowledge for the sake of knowledge was a goal only insofar as it assisted the person and
community in being good. The fundamental philo-sophos as sage in the Western tradition is the
figure of Socrates.
Of “knowing how to do good” Hadot asks:
Was the person who was Sophos one who knew and had seen many things, had traveled a
great deal, and was broadly cultured, or was he rather the person who knew how to
conduct himself in life and who lived in happiness? . . . these two notions are not at all
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mutually exclusive. In the last analysis, real knowledge is know-how, and true-know-how
is knowing how to do good. (Ancient 18)
In What is Ancient Philosophy? Hadot goes further in discussing the type of knowledge and the
change this presents to the understanding of sophos. In particular, the shift expands to include the
Socratic imperative on moral intent. Knowledge is intrinsically tied to moral action, which
includes human communication, which is the goal and desire of the philo-sophos. This comes out
in the spiritual exercises practiced by the schools of philosophy. More will be said on the
spiritual exercises in later sections.
Hadot wrote that the call of philosophy is misunderstood generally and particularly in the
figure of Socrates. The desire to live a life in accord with the logos and the response are the
central and flourishing tensions of the way of life that is portrayed as the philosophical life. The
desire for wisdom assumes one does not have wisdom. The sage—the ideal life that admits of
varying levels of attainment across the schools—is removed from the burdens and conventions
of daily public life. The philo-sophos on the other hand remains continually in the world aware
of the desire to be outside of it. The “call and possibility” of Socrates to step aside and examine
oneself could, to a portion of Athenians, therefore be considered a decision to disengage from
public life and the duties of a citizen, and worse, encourage the youth to do so as the accusers of
Socrates do in the Platonic dialogues (Way of Life 162; Ancient 37). Coming from the atopos
figure of Socrates who stands seemingly outside the city, Hadot ventured, “Might not Socrates be
the prototype for that image of the philosopher—so widespread, yet so false—who flees the
difficulties of life in order to take refuge within his good conscience” (Ancient 37)? The figure of
Socrates brings out the question, are the pursuit of wisdom and care for the public life,
separated?
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Hadot returned to the words and actions of Socrates in showing that these two pursuits
are not mutually exclusive. “Care for the self is thus, indissolubly, care for the city and for
others” (Ancient 37). On the eve of the emergence of Socrates onto the Greek stage the words
sophia and sophos indicate an array of meanings (Ancient 18-19). Prior to the emergence of
Socrates, Hadot outlined two approaches to knowledge, identified as aristocratic and democratic.
By the aristocratic variety Hadot painted a picture of knowledge and wisdom as possessed or
accessed by only a select few people and was decidedly separate from and set against the
ignorance of the “mob” (Ancient 26). Associated with the aristocratic variety are fragments such
as those of “Parmenides, Empedocles, and Heraclitus” (26). On the other hand, the Sophists were
associated with the democratic approach to knowledge in that it was available and able to be
taught to anyone that could afford the fees, collectively represented by the Sophists (26). As was
the custom, to witness wisdom meant to associate with a master and begin participating in the
physical and spiritual exercises of the community (school) that formed around the master.
In each school, students are striving and practicing toward that ideal form of wisdom that
is modeled in the figure of the sage (Way of Life 57). Students work toward a life defined by the
ideal of wisdom as expressed by the sage. “Each school . . . has its corresponding fundamental
inner attitude . . . and its own manner of speaking. . . But above all every school practices
exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of
reason that will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a
medical cure” (Way of Life 59). “Knowing how to do good” is the constant theme Hadot
identifies as the goal and practice of philosophia.
Through his recovery of the philo-sophos Hadot repeatedly brought his readers back to
the interdependent modes of the theoretical and the existential reflection in the dialogues and
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actions of ancient authors. Philosophia indicates a mode of life and the practices, physical and
spiritual, that a practitioner strives to achieve in a productive tension amidst the “customs and
conventions of daily life” (Way of Life 58). That ideal life was given shape in the model of the
sage, particularly the influential and mythical figure of Socrates. “It is true that this transcendent
ideal will be deemed almost inaccessible” (Way of Life 57). As previously mentioned, for some
schools sagacity is an achievable moment that is both fleeting and rare, for other schools those
who have achieved it have been limited to one or two, and then in other schools, no one yet has
lived the ideal (Way of Life 57).
Socrates as Model Philo-sophos
The sage who fit no model of the sage before him was Socrates. When referencing
Socrates, Hadot is doing so not to call attention to any so-called historical Socrates but instead to
the image of the sage as received in the Platonic dialogues and other descriptions set forth in the
discourses such as Xenophon and Plutarch (Ancient Philosophy 22). As the Western model of the
sage Socrates refuses to be classified into a specific category, e.g. sophist, poet, dramatist, and as
Hadot points out, even the sage. “Although philosophy is a tearing away from this everyday life,
it nevertheless remains inseparable from this everyday life” (Happiness 179). As the preeminent
image of the atopos philo-sophos in the Western philosophical tradition, Socrates is intimately
enmeshed in the everyday life of the city. Philosophia and the philosopher are immediately
identifiable by a way of life that sets them apart but is definitely a part of the community.
Philosophy is a way of life that is both practice of and preparation for wisdom (Ancient
Philosophy 4).
At the crux of philosophia is the practice of a life that is integrally communicative in
nature. A later chapter will delve into Hadot’s tracing and understanding of the spiritual
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exercises associated with the different schools. Preparing the way for that discussion is an
understanding the role of the figure, or myth, of the sage and the way in which ‘philosophical
discourse’ is understood within the context of philosophia. At the core of the Western tradition
of philosophy lies the myth of a man that never wrote anything down and whose historical figure
remains elusive yet enduringly impressed as an event in Western thought. Hadot comes to an
understanding of the sage as philo-sophos that seizes on the example of his life that comes
through what is received as the myth of Socrates (Happiness 124).
Hadot often points to Plutarch’s illustrative description of Socrates. This description
highlights the relationship between wisdom, the philosopher, and the “customs and conventions
of daily life” (Way of Life 58).
“Socrates at any rate was a philosopher, although he did not set out benches or seat
himself in an armchair or observe a fixed hour for conversing or promenading with his
pupils, but jested with them, when it so happened, and drank with them, served in the
army or lounged in the market-place with some of them, and finally was imprisoned and
drank the poison. He was the first to show that life at all times and in all parts, in all
experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy.” (Plutarch 26d)
In the example of Socrates in the Apology responding to a question about the morality of acting
in such a way that put him in danger of death he responds that this is of no matter because he is
not in a position to know about the goodness or badness of death. Not knowing about death,
Socrates does know about actions, “committing injustice and disobeying my betters, whether
God or man, is bad and shameful. Therefore, I shall never fear or flee something whose badness
or goodness I am ignorant of, as opposed to those evils which I know are bad” (Apology 29a-b in
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Ancient Philosophy 33). What one does not know one cannot fear; when one knows one can, and
perhaps should, fear.
For Hadot, Socrates’ position on wisdom accepts first that all people are capable of
wisdom, and second that all humans have a desire to wisdom or to do the good. The “innate
desire” for wisdom in and through good actions in the “Socratic mission” within each person
must be cultivated. This cultivation brings meaning to life; “at the basis of Socratic knowledge is
love of the good” (Ancient Philosophy 34). This love of the good simultaneously forms the
“inner attitude” of the practitioner and identifies that toward which the practitioner strives. As
the case of Alcibiades in the Symposium the choice to do good is one that can be ignored while
attending to the work of everyday affairs. This is also a question that afflicts him bodily and
intellectually when he encounters Socrates (Symposium 216a-c). “And there is only one good and
one value: the will to do good. This implies that we must not avoid constantly and rigorously
examining the way we live, in order to see if it is always guided and inspired by this will to do
good” (Ancient Philosophy 35). In wisdom—considered as “knowing-how-to-do-good”—moral
intent is brought to the forefront.
The relationship between the theoretical reflection and the existential choice to do good
in the face of the demands of everyday life is interdependent with the way in which one acts in
the face of existential demands, including death. In the Phaedo as Socrates is nearing the time to
drink the hemlock Crito asks what arrangements should be made regarding to his children and
other affairs and especially, “What can we do that would please you most?” (Phaedo 115b). To
which Socrates responds,
Nothing new, Crito . . . but what I am always saying, that you will please me and mine
and yourselves by taking good care of your own selves in whatever you do, even if you
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do not agree with me now, but if you neglect your own selves, and are unwilling to live
following the tracks, as it were, of what we have said now and on previous occasions,
you will achieve nothing even if you strongly agree with me at this moment.” (115b-c)
Socrates exhorts his death-bed companions to continue to live as they have—conversing,
drinking, wrestling, soldiering—and to continue to take care of themselves. Hadot puts front and
center that taking care of oneself is caught up in the constant rigor of questioning the self. The
choice of a life must be renewed. Taking care of oneself, that is continuing to make the
existential choice to live by a certain way of life, involves nothing new and is an ever present
event. Socrates as the model philo-sophos demonstrates philosophia as an inextricable
intertwining of reason and passion, life and death, Dionysus and Eros.
Socratic irony is at play for understanding the figure of Socrates as the primary and
generative model of the philo-sophos in the Western philosophical tradition. Hadot undertook to
describe Socratic irony, dialectic, and erotic, and their relation to the “movements of
consciousness” in dialogue with Socrates’ dialogue partner. The figure of Socrates as a lover of
wisdom seems at once at odds with his buffoon-like physical appearance and his repeated claims
to ignorance (Way of Life 148). “It is a paradox of highly Socratic irony that Socrates was not a
sage, but a “philo-sopher”: that is, a lover of wisdom” (147). In other words, the premier
example of wisdom is a figure who was aware of the fact that he knew nothing, who looked like
a buffoon, talked about earthly subjects, and refused to answer questions. This is a radical
reshaping of knowledge in Greek culture at the time (Ancient 26).
In Hadot’s reading this reshaping moves the abstract understanding of concepts to the
background of what is understood as being knowledgeable. Prior to Socrates, the idea of
knowledge foregrounded the shaky foundations for actions or practical knowledge in the
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everyday life of the city—administering justice, honoring the gods (piety), educating the youth—
and the poor state of the interlocutor and his need to address himself in order to administer public
life. The figure of Socrates altered this understanding. He worked as a mediator and midwife at
the only place where knowledge—that one is aware that one knows nothing—is rooted, in
reflection on the self and constant choices one makes about what one knows and how one acts.
The irony of Socrates is at play in the generation of the soul of his interlocutor.
Hadot described Socratic irony as a rhetorical speech strategy that is at work in the
dialogue within the soul of the interlocutor themselves, as well as the vehicle of coming to
wisdom—becoming aware that one knows nothing—for the interlocutor (Way of Life 153-154).
Eironeia is the Greek word for the rhetorical figure of irony. Hadot characterized eironeia both
as a psychological mood and as a discursive action. Socratic dialectic irony combined “false”
self-deprecation and making the argument of one’s opponent for him (Way of Life 152). The
direction of Socrates in his ironic engagement of others through questioning is to bring them to a
conversation wherein one would be forced to confront their own ignorance. Hadot pointed to
Alcibiades in the Symposium as expositor of this disturbing yet attractive experience. “I was in
such a state that it did not seem possible to live while behaving as I was behaving. . . . He forces
me to admit to myself that I do not take care for myself” (qtd. in Ancient 31). Rather than
achieving a certain literary effect or an intentionally false position-taking to achieve some sort of
upper hand in the dialogue, Socratic irony is a form of humor that cuts to the core of Socrates’
mission. This irony is in play in the language and topics of discussion Socrates used in a
dialogue. Socrates investigated the highest of ideals such as courage and justice through the
actions of earthly forms of action, such as soldiering, tanning, blacksmithing, shoemaking, and
cooking (Ancient 31). This is just one way in which the figure of Socrates and his actions
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resemble or are used as a mask to conceal his true purpose—talking with others the principles of
living a good life and Socrates’ mission to bring his interlocuter to awareness and desire for
wisdom.
Alcibiades compared Socrates to the image of the Sileni (Way of Life 148). According to
Hadot, the Sileni were emblems of the opposite of civilization. They appeared in a buffoon-like
manner and were concomitant with acting in accord with the instincts in opposition to reason
(148). Likened to the Sileni, Socrates is a disturbing sight and dialogue partner. But, just like the
small figures of these creatures which once broken through revealed a smaller statue of a god,
Socrates’ humor and questions were also a mask. “Socrates pulled off his enterprise of
dissimulation so well that he succeeded in definitively masking himself from history. He wrote
nothing, engaging only in dialogue. All the testimonies we possess about him hide him from us
more that they reveal him, precisely because Socrates has always been used as a mask by those
who have spoken about him” (Way of Life 148). Socrates goes after the interlocutor, someone
who is beautiful as in the case of Alcibiades in the Symposium, and is at first shown to approach
the interlocutor as a lover would approach a beloved.
Socrates is a figure that clearly does not fit with any of the Greek models of beauty,
whether physical and/or heroic, that were sung about in poems or immortalized in speeches. And
it is exactly his atopos, his disconnection from everyday life, that is attractive and desirable and
draws the interlocutor to Socrates both intellectually and physically. Hadot identified Socrates
the philo-sophos, as presented in Platonic dialogues most notably in the Symposium, with the
characteristics of Eros and Dionysus. Hadot marked the importance of noting that the love
presented is homosexual love as fits in the context of being a formative love (Way of Life 158).
The relationships between older men and younger men remained in Socrates’ setting as an
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institution formed in “archaic warrior education” (158). This kind of “virile friendship” took
place in order to teach the young man the noble virtues (158). Hadot pointed out that the masterdisciple relationship of the Sophist period is also modeled on this same example and similarly
described erotically (158). In the dialogues Socrates is displayed as seeking after love and
wisdom from his youthful and beautiful interlocutor. Eros is at play on the levels of both a
personal relationship and in the form of dialogue as in the case of dialectical irony.
Through his questioning and refusing to answer questions Socrates remains seductively
just out of reach of the interlocuter (Way of Life 149). Simultaneously the interlocuter remains in
the dialogue and grows more disquieted by the path down which he is being led (Way of Life
149). The interlocutor is slowly led to the point of crisis—the point in an illness after which the
body moves toward health or toward death. The interlocutor becomes bereft of confidence and
the dialogue is in danger of moving toward decline. In this moment, the crisis point, Socrates
becomes the mask for the reader. Socrates takes on the mantle of following the path and thus the
responsibility of keeping up the dialogue. Through Socrates the interlocuter receives a picture of
oneself. Socrates takes up the doubts and hesitations thereby returning the interlocuter to
“confidence in the dialectical research and in the logos itself” (149). The primary purpose is not
to ‘win’ the dialogue or even to be right but to continue and further the practice of an
interlocutor’s way of life and continue to bring them toward health, i.e., practicing the
philosophic life in private and in the community thus confirming or improving their initial way
of life.
As seen in the previous segment, dialectical irony involves a splitting of the self for the
purpose of reflecting on the self. Socrates comes in as one that will take on the risk and
responsibility of continuing the questioning; in other words, he takes on the role of the self of the

38

interlocutor questioning one’s own self. The dialogue partner thus hides behind Socrates as the
investigation into one’s way of life and the reasoning on which this way of life rests. Once one’s
own ignorance is revealed Socrates as mask is removed. Once the dialogue partner is converted
to Socrates’ understanding of wisdom and love, the interlocutor finds oneself not in love with
Socrates himself but with the same lack of knowledge and pursuit of wisdom in which Socrates
is engaged. The roles of lover and beloved have shifted so that the beloved is now the lover. As
lover the interlocutor becomes keenly aware of his lack as they simultaneously suffer the pangs
of desire for the beloved. As Hadot summarized, the interlocutor’s beloved is shown to no longer
be Socrates, but wisdom:
“He suffers from being deprived of the plenitude of being, and he strives to attain it.
When other men fall in love with Socrates/Eros—that is, when they fall in love with love,
such as Socrates reveals it to them—what they love in Socrates is his love for, and
aspiration toward, beauty and the perfection of being. In Socrates, they find the path
toward their own perfection” (Way of Life 162).
As in dialectic irony so too in erotic irony; Socrates as the mask and lover steps aside revealing
the state of being of the interlocutor. Socrates brings his dialogue partner to the point of love
with the pursuit of wisdom and the way of life that best fits his partner (Way of Life 163).
The process—the practice of dialogue—is what is creative and generative for those
engaged with Socrates. Much less important is the construction of a coherent system of thought
than the formation of the “fundamental inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). This
philosophical life is not separated from the body and the irrationality of desire, which carries
with it not only the desire to attain the beloved but also to participate in generation of a philosophos (Ancient 55). The identification of Socrates and Eros acknowledges the inextricable
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nature of the irrational element in existence. This element, which Hadot identified as the daimon
or the demonic or passion finds a description in Johann von Goethe as the “motor force
indispensable for all creation; it is the blind inexorable dynamic which we cannot escape, but
must rather know how to use” (quoted in Way of Life 164). In the figure of Socrates, the
generation of wisdom is of a way of life.
The daimon is inextricable and of itself is neither good nor ill. In describing the daimonic
element in Socrates, Hadot winds his way through the works of both Friedrich Nietzsche and
Goethe in contextualizing the daimonic as an “ambiguous and ambivalent” element (Way of life
164). Without being of intrinsic value, the individual must take action in response to the
existential communal demands of a life that give outline to this otherwise irrational element.
Hadot brings into view the “absolute value of moral intent” of Socrates as philo-sophos (Ancient
32). Forming moral intent is then what becomes the primary pedagogical operation of the irony
of Socrates/Eros.
The moral intent must be generative in the way of life of the practitioner. The point, then,
is not to be able to define what justice/piety/love is or is not in language, but for the person to
experience and practice justice/piety/love. At this point Hadot marks out the limit of language in
philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and philosophical discourse (Way of Life
155, Ancient 173). At a certain point in Socratic questioning, “The individual thus finds himself
called into question in the most fundamental bases of his action, and he becomes aware of the
living problem he himself represents for himself” (Way of Life 155). The dialogue as a spiritual
exercise must bring the interlocutor through the play of dialectic and erotic irony to the
awakening of their inherent desire toward the good. The interlocutor is formed in dialogue, in
and through speech: “at the end of the discussion, he has experienced true activity of the mind.
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Better yet, he has been Socrates himself. And Socrates is interrogation, questioning, and stepping
back to take a look at oneself; to take a look at, in a word, his consciousness” (Way of Life 154).
Acting as a midwife Socrates guides the interlocutor as the interactants split into two and reflect
on their current approach to life and actions and recognize what should be guiding their actions.
In closing this section I quote Hadot at length and follow the lead of Arnold Davidson who
introduced Hadot to the English speaking world, as a lifelong friend and dialogue partner in
Hadot’s final published volume of interviews. In the introduction to Plotinus or the Simplicity of
Vision Davidson resorts to quoting Hadot at length “because they [his writings] brilliantly
articulate the major concepts and stages of Plotinus’s spiritual itinerary” (Davidson, Introduction
to Plotinus 5). The following lengthy quote is no less brilliant in portraying the middle way of
the philo-sophos:
“[The philosopher] knows that the normal, natural state of men should be wisdom, for
wisdom is nothing more than the vision of things as they are, the vision of the cosmos as
it is in the light of reason, and wisdom is also nothing more than the mode of being and
living that should correspond to this vision. But the philosopher also knows that this
wisdom is an ideal state, almost inaccessible. For such a man, daily life, as it is organized
and lived by other men, must necessarily appear abnormal, like a state of madness,
unconsciousness, and ignorance of reality. And nonetheless he must live this life every
day, in this world in which he feels himself a stranger and in which others perceive him
to be one as well. And it is precisely in this daily life that he must seek to attain that way
of life which is utterly foreign to the everyday world. The result is a perpetual conflict
between the philosopher’s effort to see things as they are from the standpoint of universal
nature and the conventional vision of things underlying human society, a conflict
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between the life one should live and the customs and conventions of daily life. This
conflict can never be totally resolved” (Way of Life 58).
The philosopher’s efforts are guided along by a teacher and lived and practiced within a
community of practitioners. The philosopher also had the aid of philosophical discourse, and the
writings and notes regarding the way of life of philosophy that aids in re-confirming and
justifying the existential choices of his way of life. The two are not the same nor are they able to
be considered apart from one another.
Philosophical Discourse and Orality
Hadot again and again brought his readers back to the existential choice and consequent
way of living as the definitive mark of a philo-sophos who is atopos, that is outside the order of
everyday life. There are numerous examples of people recognized as philosophers that wrote
little or nothing. In addition to the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition, Hadot identified the
Cynics, Roman statesmen Cato of Utica, Rutilius Rufus and Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex,
Marcus Aurelius (this was before his Meditations had come to be widely circulated), and
Plotinus (Ancient 173). Hadot borrowed the Stoic distinction between philosophy and
philosophical discourse as example of the general understanding of the relationship between the
“incommensurable and inseparable” phenomena (Ancient 172).
The Stoics had a three-part system of ethics, virtue, and logic. These three parts had
corresponding discourses written in question and answer format that were presented to students
in a particular manner—of which there were several theories—that was thought to be the best for
taking on the habituation of these practices by the student (Citadel 80-81). Discourses written on
the theories tended toward explanations about the movement of the cosmos (physics) and of
proper conduct in life (ethics) that were carried out in dialogue (logic) and with the use of
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abstractions. The latter were examples of “discourse concerning philosophy” (Citadel 81,
original emphasis). “In philosophy itself . . . the exercise of wisdom, physics, ethics, and logic
are mutually implicated within and interior to one another, in that act—at once multiple and
unique—which is the exercise of physical virtue, ethical virtue, and logical virtue” (Citadel 82).
Theory production was put at the service of acting when circumstances called for a
communicative response. Primary orality as the environment of production helps further
highlight the purpose of philosophy and the supportive role of philosophical discourse.
Eric Havelock (1903-1988 CE), a Cambridge trained classicist, along with Walter Ong
(1912-2003 CE) and Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980 CE), is one of the foundational scholars
associated with the field of media ecology. Havelock’s work gives emphasis and clarity to the
organizational capacity and force of orality in ancient Greece. His writing opens the way and
supports Hadot’s distinction between philosophy and philosophical discourse.
Eric Havelock in Preface to Plato (1963) describes the extent to which the experience of
orality was organized and embodied. Orality, being the primary carrier of tradition and of Greek
experience, required the ‘content’ of the tradition and the act of teaching/learning to adhere to
established forms of rhythm and meter which privileged regularized categories of organization
(e.g., hero, orator, blacksmith, shipbuilder) for easy recall. Havelock identified this process with
the poetic. Transmission of the tradition called for mimesis, which required full bodily and
physical capacities to be taken over or hypnotized, in order to be able to take on and recall
(imitate) the content for future performances (Havelock 26-27). Havelock points out, through
Plato, that the poetic requires a disposition of mind and body that could not provide the
consistency necessary for scientific precision in any field, be it technical or moral ( 6-27).
Running parallel to Hadot’s work, Havelock characterizes the emergence of Socrates as a
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philosophos and model of wisdom in the Republic as a “shock” (281). Havelock described this
person in similar terms as Hadot, “Phil- is the label of a psychic urge, a drive, a thirst, an allconsuming desire. The ‘philosoph’ then is a man of special instincts and energies” (281). Sophia,
that which is sought after, is “a cognition of those identities which ‘are’, and ‘are forever’, and
are ‘imperceptible’; these are the Forms” which requires a different psychological method
utilizing a capacity for abstraction (282). Havelock’s account of Socrates only adds to his atopos
nature (302-303).
Socrates required his interlocuters to think in constructs so as to respond to questions
such as ‘what is justice?’ In Havelock’s description, Socrates’ method is both stretching the
Greek psychological activity into abstract thought while simultaneously remaining “fully
embedded in oral methodology, never writing a word so far as we know, and exploiting the give
and take of the market place” (Havelock 303). The primacy of orality in learning and forming the
practitioner is the central distinction for Hadot in clarifying the relationship between philosophia
and philosophical discourse. Hadot moved written discourse to the background, considering how
philosophical discourse, or the received writings and fragments of Antiquity, fit within the goal
of living a way of life and interior formation in preparation for wisdom.
Hadot recalled that his initial engagement with this subject began as a question of
coherence. “Why do ancient philosophical writings generally give the impression of being
incoherent? Why is it so difficult to recognize their plan” (Happiness 59)? Having located the
genre and environment of production of the texts in question, the questions open onto the
relationship of orality and written discourse. Hadot remarked that in the current understanding of
philosophy dominated by philosophical discourse “there is the partial but very real loss of the
conception of philosophy as a mode of life, as a choice of life, as a therapy as well. We have lost
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the personal and the communal aspect of philosophy” (Happiness 56). The therapeutic, the
personal, and the communal aspects were all an inherent part of philosophy as it was carried out
in the spoken word.
Responding to this question then Hadot focused on two points. First, that orality is
privileged in learning and practice and, second, that the philosophical experience cannot be
expressed in words. The conversion and ongoing formation of the “inner attitude” is the primary
purpose of practicing philosophy (Way of Life 59). Hadot is influenced in his understanding of
the movement the practitioner takes in that formation as he is influenced by John Henry
Newman’s notion of “real assent”—a movement of one’s whole being in agreement to a
proposition in such a way that one’s way of life would be changed (quoted in Happiness 58).
As Socrates showed in words and action, the formation of the inner attitude is akin to
birthing the soul, involving the inextricable workings of both logical reasoning and irrational
passionate desire. Instruction in the ways of philosophy were primarily oral, for it is only through
oral speech that the dialogue is possible. As in the model of Socrates, the irrational embodied
desire is inextricable with the reasoned question and answer process. Only the spoken word in a
living conversation brings dialogue to its full pedagogical potential (Happiness 54). The spoken
word is living and is part of an extended conversation between the teacher and his auditors, who
could respond in a manner consistent with the doctrine of the school. The interlocutor’s reply is
also a situated response, which could be more or less vivid according to the needs of the
practitioner (Happiness 53-54). For Hadot, then, philosophical discourse is tied to the question
and answer format and is written with the presumption of an ongoing living conversation. This
approach helps to explain parts of ancient texts (Way of Life 62). Quite often the work proceeds
by the associations of ideas, without systematic rigor. The work retains the starts and stops, the
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hesitations, and the repetitions of spoken discourse. Or else, after re-reading what he has written,
the author introduces a somewhat forced systematization by adding transitions, introductions, or
conclusions to different parts of the text. (Way of Life 62) Hadot, in explicating the Stoicism of
Marcus Aurelius, pointed out the inherent orality in the composition of written discourse, which
extends even to temporal considerations. Presenting and teaching the discourses on a particular
point of theory (ethics, physics, logic) took a period of time. Arguments were posed, questions
were asked, and chains of reasoning reviewed; this all took place in “logical time” (Citadel 80).
However, the goal was the inner formation of the practitioner and the shaping of his life in
accord with Stoic ethics, logic, and physics. Hadot remarked that this stage of learning brought
into consideration the student’s “spiritual progress” (80). This time was different for each student
as he took on “inwardly and spiritually” the doctrine at hand. Hadot referred to this time as
“psychological time” (80).
Philosophy in antiquity upends the contemporary historical moment’s understanding of
the relationship between philosophical discourse and the distinctive activities that mark one as
being a philosopher: choosing and following a way of life and taking part in the accompanying
spiritual exercises. In several examples Hadot showed that the experience of philosophy runs up
against the limits of language in which philosophical content can be expressed. Following in the
manner of Socrates in the Symposium the purpose of studying philosophy was to prepare the
student to live a way of life in preparation for an experience of wisdom that was incommunicable
in language. For example, the Plotinian unity with the One and Phaedrus’ viewing of the forms.
Setting aside the primacy of orality in all of ancient discourse, Hadot identified two
trends that could be understood as two opposing poles of philosophy (Happiness 60). At the one
end is the activity of creating and continuing philosophical discourse for the sake of itself
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(Happiness 56). This takes the shape of a discourse that aims at “originality” or the production of
a novel system of thought (56). This pole of philosophy has become increasingly formalized and
specialized (Ancient 260). For an illustrative example of this pole Hadot observed this formality
especially in the current state of philosophy in university education. This course of study
involves the preparation for a narrow set of skills to be utilized in a narrow range of careers: “to
train them [university students] for careers as clerks or professors—that is to say, as specialists,
theoreticians, and retainers of specific items of more or less esoteric knowledge” (Ancient 260).
Similarly, the Sophists in antiquity sought to make themselves known through elegant displays
of their capacities in order to attract paying students (Happiness 60). The other pole is
philosophia and the way of the philo-sophos wherein “pleasure in talking” can happen but is
rather oriented toward the end or goal of choosing and practicing a way of life (Happiness 60).
Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the distinction between those who love wisdom (philosopher) and
those who have achieved a state of wisdom (sage). Hadot revealed this distinction in two booklength studies of philosophers; Plotinus (Neoplatonism) in Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision
(1993) and Marcus Aurelius (Stoic) in The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius
(1998). For Plotinus the sage-experience is fleeting and rare. For Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics
sage status had been achieved but only by one or maybe two people. However, both schools
admitted that achieving the wisdom of the sage was possible and so likewise was spiritual
progress. The person on this middle way between ignorance and wisdom could be readily
identified by their existence as disturbing or outside of the conventions and customs of daily life
(Way of Life 58). In the state of desiring, one is aware of his lack and his desire to attain to
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wisdom. This middle-way of lack, desire, and atopos way of living is most vivid in the received
figure of Socrates.
The figure of Socrates as the prototypical philo-soph in the Western intellectual tradition.
The historical Socrates eschewed writing, choosing rather to be both embedded in the everyday
life of the city—fulfilling obligations, the religious rites, soldiering, drinking, and being in
conversation with friends as Plutarch’s definition attests. As an individual, Socrates’ actions and
ideas were considered dangerous for the development of the youth, leading them astray from
care of the city. Hadot drew attention to Socrates’ words and actions to show that care for the
soul and care for the public life are not mutually exclusive tasks. Care for the soul takes place in
the conversations that happened at celebrations and in the markets of Athens that occurred in the
usual realm of conducting life in the city. Socrates’ search for wisdom was to engender souls that
were awake to their own lack of knowledge. The figure of Socrates is revealed and hidden in the
play of dialectic and erotic irony. This irony is at play in bringing the soul of the interlocutor to
life.
For Hadot the figure of knowledge that comes through the descriptions and dialogues of
Socrates is that the desire for the good; to perform the good is a latent possibility for all people.
A defining role of Socrates then is to act as a midwife and help birth the soul into awareness by
reshaping knowledge that foregrounds one’s reflection of self. The use of irony in conversation
was a mask and a vehicle for bringing the soul to its latent desire for the good and to perform the
good. Hadot showed irony at work in the execution of the dialogue along a logical line of
reasoning and in the impassioned seduction that Socrates builds and finally re-directs in his
speech and actions. As dialogue partner, Socrates takes on the role of risk and responsibility of
continuing the questioning at the point of crisis. In the erotic sphere Socrates shifts from being
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the lover pursuing the young boy, to the beloved as the boy chases after him. In both cases the
interlocutor hides behind the mask of Socrates as both pursuits continue simultaneously. At the
point of revelation, Socrates stepped aside, revealing at once the interlocutor’s lack of knowledge
and their love for the pursuit of wisdom (Way of Life 162).
The dual identification of Socrates with Eros and Logos points to the inextricable nature
of reasoned speech and irrational bodily desire. The irrational plays a role in the primary purpose
of forming the “inner attitude” of the practitioner (Way of Life 59). Hadot introduces the daimon
or the demonic as the creative and generative force at play in the figure of Socrates and the
dialogue. The daimon force is neither good nor bad and cannot be ignored (Way of Life 64).
What gives shape to the daimonic force is one’s moral intent. Thus, Hadot brings us around to
the formation of the moral intent motivating one’s actions and words via dialogue and seduction
as Socrates’ primary pedagogical mission. Working through Hadot’s understanding of the
mission of Socrates as aimed at the transformation of one’s whole being opens up a distinction
between philosophia and philosophical discourse that is fundamental in Hadot’s work.
The final section reviewed Hadot’s understanding of primary orality in antiquity and the
structure and format of written philosophical discourse. Hadot noted in an interview with Arnold
Davidson that he had approached the problem from a literary perspective, wondering why it is
that philosophical writings appeared to be incoherent and lacking a specific plan (Happiness 59)?
Placing the fragments back in the context of the demands of the structure and forces of primary
orality and in the context of the overall purpose of practicing a way of life, Hadot’s work could
then be said to reframe the question as follows: how does philosophical discourse serve the
purpose of the formation of the “inner attitude” and actions in preparing for wisdom (Way of Life
59)? Words make dialogue possible, but the experience cannot be fully contained within the
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limits of language. There is a presumption of an ongoing and living conversation between
teacher and students. This helped explain the question and answer format, word choice, and
temporal considerations. The final part of this section introduced Hadot’s analogy of two
opposing poles to identify two trends in the history of philosophy. On one side is the
formalization of philosophical writing and discourse done for the sake of itself or that aims at
originality or the explicit production of a new system of thought (Happiness 56). Hadot ventures
that formalization enters in the 17th and 18th centuries in the Western world. On the other side is
philosophia and the way of the philo-sophos and the aim of living a way of life in concert with a
vision of the cosmos (Happiness 60).
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CHAPTER 3
Spiritual Exercises
“Ancient philosophers thus developed many
varieties of therapy of the soul, which were
practiced by means of various forms of discourse:
exhortation, reprimands, consolation, instruction. . .
philosophical spiritual guidance utilized rhetorical
techniques in order to provoke conversion and
bring about conviction.” (Ancient 217)
The purpose for practicing spiritual exercises is to transcend the “egoist self” and cohere
with the universal principle and/or residing in and/or experiencing the state of wisdom as defined
by that school (Happiness 86). Guiding the practitioner toward wisdom is the ideal embodied in
the figure of the sage. The existential choice of a way of life that responds to and with a vision of
the cosmos is lived out in and through the spiritual exercises. A life of ‘exercise’ is a life of
philosophy.
“Equanimity of soul, absence of need, and indifference to indifferent things” are habits
common to the various models of the sage that mark him as acting in accord with logos or
Reason (Ancient 222). As recounted in the preceding chapter the middle way of the philo-sophos
and the life of exercise is exemplified in the myth/figure of Socrates. This way calls upon both
reason and passion and begins in the simultaneous realization that one both lacks wisdom and
carries an innate desire for the good (Ancient 34). The life of the philo-sophos is lived in a
productive tension between desiring to live out the life of the sage while remaining enmeshed as
member of the city taking part in its daily life and habits (Way of Life 58). Pierre Hadot
repeatedly turned to the description of Socrates as given by Plutarch as exemplar of the philosophos.
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Socrates took part in functions of the city, even to the point of submitting to the
judgement and sentence of death by the city but was also recognized by all as outside the city, or
atopos. The philosopher is both embedded and atopos. He is part of the city but also strange and
“unclassifiable” (Ancient 37). The strangeness of Socrates was in part due to the adherence to a
regime of spiritual exercises. Identifying the habits of the philosopher as atopos also points to
those phenomena with which the philosopher wrestled: The habituated fabric of city-life, the fear
and anguish that can come from the uncertainties of war, political upheaval, natural disasters,
worry over the future or the past, etc. with which each person struggles (Way of Life 221-222).
This is contrary to a tendency to view ancient society as less fraught and uncertain than the
present one. Hadot remarked on this tendency: “It does seem, then, that the Greeks paid
particular attention to the present moment. This, however, does not justify us in imagining—as
did Winckelmann, Goethe, and Hölderlin—the existence of an idealized Greece, the citizens of
which, because they lived in the present moment, were perpetually bathed in beauty and
serenity” (Way of Life 221). Hadot subtly but firmly applied a corrective in conceptualizing
ancient societies—the Greeks and Romans in particular—while explicating the phenomena of
the spiritual exercise of attending to the present moment. This corrective coincides with his
striving for objectivity in coming to re-situate philosophical discourse within the environment
and genre of its production. Hadot did not advocate that contemporary readers should “slavishly
imitate” the “spiritual itinerary” of the ancients (Plotinus 113). Rather, the combination of
interpretation and explication of philosophical discourse and spiritual exercises are attentive to
the “original economic, social, political, and religious context” of the historical moment that
opens up the possibility for a contemporary reader to encounter and engage the resources of
ancient philosophy in preparing to meet and respond to the untimely and disturbing questions of
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meaning such as ‘What is the significance of death in our lives?’ (Brisson and Chase 439;
MacIntyre 125).
This chapter fills out a picture of the practice of philosophia that weaves together body
and the spoken word, the irrational passions and reasoned logos, internal and external discourse,
and the personal and communal. This first section in this chapter reviews Hadot’s definition of
the spiritual exercises, their therapeutic function, and brings further emphasis on their being
embodied exercises lived through internal and external discourse and dialogue in the assumption
and interactions of community. The next section is a review of the major common points of
spiritual exercises across all the schools. Throughout Hadot’s scholarship the phenomenon of
spiritual exercises has been presented with variations that serve to emphasize different aspects of
the general phenomenon.
Hadot’s most recent organization of the spiritual exercises presented them as two
“opposed but complementary” ways of training the soul: “concentration of the self” and
“expansion of the self” (Ancient 189; Citadel 118). For example, exercises such as examination
of conscience and meditation has as their focus bringing attention to the self. Exercises such as
contemplation of death, and physics expanded the soul to be able to move beyond themselves
toward a union/immersion with the cosmos (Ancient 193). Each of the common ‘movements’
assume and assist the practitioner’s progress via exercise of the other. For example, examination
of conscience and meditation—concentration movements—are also preparatory exercises for
attaining a cosmic viewpoint. In turn, this “cosmic consciousness” nourishes one’s exercise of
meditation as it brings an increasingly clearer picture of oneself and it’s integral and humble part
of the cosmos. Striving toward objectivity in understanding ancient phenomena itself becomes a
task
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Spiritual Exercises
Hadot has given several versions of the definition for spiritual exercises: “voluntary,
personal practices intended to cause a transformation of the self” (Ancient 179-180), and again,
though slightly different in The Present Alone is Our Happiness, “voluntary, personal practices
intended to bring about a transformation of the individual, a transformation of the self,” (87), and
“By this term [spiritual exercises], I mean practices which could be physical, as in dietary
regimes, or discursive as in dialogue and meditation, or intuitive, as in contemplation, but which
were all intended to effect a modification and a transformation in the subject who practiced
them” (Ancient 6) and another variation on the theme, “But above all every school practices
exercises designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of
reason that will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a
medical cure” (Way of Life 59). And, from Philosophy as a Way of Life, “the word ‘spiritual’ is
quite apt to make us understand that these exercises are the result, not merely of thought, but of
the individual’s entire psychism” (82). Arnold Davidson gives a poignant summary that relays
the totality of the phenomenon:
“Spiritual exercises were exercises because they were practical, required effort and
training, and were lived; they were spiritual because they involved the entire spirit, one’s
whole way of being. The art of living demanded by philosophy was a lived exercise
exhibited in every aspect of one’s existence.” (Introduction 21, original emphasis)
Spiritual exercises are undertaken out of an already-made choice to live a certain way of life,
they privilege the spoken word, they are embodied and the practitioner had the intention to
undergo a transformation of the self. The exercises were undertaken for the purpose of the
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formation of the whole self, they were to continue to bring the person to ‘health’ and to
constantly practice the philosophical way of life on the model of the sage.
Associated with the figure of the sage are the possibility of mystical experiences. This
experience was generally considered to be one of transcendence beyond the boundaries of the
self, such as in Platonic transcendence to the vision of the forms, Plotinian union with the
Intellect, or Stoic coherence of human reason with universal Reason, played a role in orienting
the path of the philo-sophos (Happiness 81; Citadel 73; Way of Life 59). Aware that one
simultaneously lacks wisdom and desires it, one practices spiritual exercises in working toward
wisdom which on may potentially communicate to others. Situated as a North Star, a mystical
experience may occur or be attained but it is not the experience by which one’s progress is
validated. “If . . . [mystical/ecstatic experiences] occur, in one form another, it is true that they
can open perspectives on the mystery of existence for the philosopher, but they cannot be an end
in itself, and seeking to provoke them would be useless” (Happiness 82). In Neoplatonism the
state of wisdom is not sustainable and in the Stoic and Epicurean philosophia the vagaries of life
in the body and in the sensible world will draw one’s reason away from coherence with universal
Reason. The life of self-consciousness and engagement of the exercises was the path of the
philo-sophos (81).
One’s striving to live the philosophical life can be frustrated by the physical, cognitive,
social, political vagaries part of the human condition. With “equanimity of soul, absence of need,
and indifference to indifferent things” as a general mark of the sage who has achieved perfect
coherence with the Intellect or Universal Reason exhibiting thereby identical judgements, desires
and actions of the same then the things which bring potential for “suffering, disorder, and
unconsciousness” needed to be guarded against (Citadel 76; Way of Life 83). The soul could be
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disturbed through external and environmental interactions such as city politics, war, and sickness
(Way of Life 221). However, the primary causes of disturbance were generally considered the
passions which manifested in overgrown desires and fears (Way of Life 83). Regular practice of
spiritual? exercises helped to bring the soul back to health.
In Philosophy as a Way of Life Hadot has provided a list of the various spiritual exercises
practiced in the ancient world combined from several ancient references to the practices. They
include the following:
“research (zetesis), through investigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis), listening
(akroasis), attention (prosoche), self-mastery (enkrateia), and indifference to indifferent
things. . . reading, meditations (meletai), therapies of the passions, remembrance of good
things, self-mastery (enkrateia), and the accomplishment of duties.” (Way of Life 84).
“Beneath this apparent diversity, however, there is a profound unity, both in the means employed
and in the ends pursued. The means employed are the rhetorical and dialectical techniques of
persuasion, the attempts at mastering one’s inner dialogue, and mental concentration” (Way of
Life 102). Hadot has identified the common undergirding characteristics of the exercises
constituting philosophia. In ancient philosophy they are cultivating attention (prosoche),
meditation, conditioning of inner discourse, dialogue, contemplation of death, and focus on the
present moment. In considering the interconnection and interrelatedness of these elements in
practicing a life, it is well to keep in mind that the contemporary vantage point retains resonances
of Cartesian dualism. The separation of the mind and the body had not yet occurred as
contemporary readers understand it. As Debra Hawhee notes, the “arts were intricately
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interwoven, and when mind and body moved and thought together” (4). 2 So too Hadot
repeatedly points out that philosphia comes to full pedagogical efficacy in the embodied
interaction of reason and passion carried out in and through the spoken word (Ancient 56). In this
interaction and spoken word the “inner attitude” is conditioned (Way of Life 59). Through the
embodied spoken word the practitioner gives one’s full “real assent” to the originary choice of a
way of life through the always ongoing process of transformation (J. H. Newman qtd. in
Happiness 58). The spiritual exercises were situated in this context as they called upon the
resources of reason as in the case of dialogue or logic, sensibility in the case of lived physics, and
imagination as in the case of meditation, and the practice of considering one’s death (Way of Life
82). For the purposes of this project the next section discusses the underlying elements as
resources that work together for the purposes of conditioning the practitioner to meet the
precipitous moment in each of “life’s difficulties” (Way of Life 85). In an attempt at a
contemporary analogy we could think these exercises in a similar fashion of emergency
service/military/fire personnel carrying out ‘live’ training exercises for the purpose of existing in
a state of ‘readiness’ to meet the ‘call’ if and when it arrives.
As Hadot reminded his readers, the existence of the spiritual exercises in ancient culture
presuppose that each person lives in “a state of unhappy disquiet” or a condition of “alienation,
dispersion and unhappiness” before one makes the existential choice of living out the
philosophical life. This condition has its roots in the common embodied human passions of life.

Albeit Descartes’ Discourse on Method is generally referred to as the entry point in the Western tradition of the
mind/body split Hadot asserts the same text was constructed in the form of a spiritual exercise akin to the ancient
philosophical practices (Ancient 264). Additionally, Hadot had found the understanding of philosophy as involving a
choice of a way of life in Descartes’ Letters to Princess Elisabeth insofar as they exhibit “spiritual guidance”
between a master and a student (Ancient 265).
2
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“The origins of the soul’s worries can be highly diverse. For Plato it is the body, which
through its desires and passions, brings disorder and worry to the soul. Yet there are also
the cares of private life, and especially of political life. Xenocrates is supposed to have
said that ‘philosophy was invented in order to erase the worries that caused the cares of
life.’ The Aristotelian contemplative life, which remains far from the business of politics
and the uncertainties of action, brings serenity. According to Epicurus, people’s worries
are caused by vain terrors…” (Ancient 224-225).
The overabundance of the passions and the exaggeration of fear and worry that fueled the
formation of inadequate value judgments through inadequate representations lead to living an
inauthentic life that is “darkened by unconsciousness” (Citadel 101, 54; Way of Life 83).
Philosophy was the “method” by which one’s fears and desires could be regulated (83). These
could be regulated through the spiritual exercises as their practice effected “a profound
transformation of the individual’s mode of seeing and being” (Way of Life 83). In this way the
practice of the spiritual exercises are considered to be a form of therapy.
The Epicureans and the Stoics likened the exercises, especially meditation, to a “healing
of the soul” (Way of Life 87). As we have seen, philosophia is an intricate intertwining of body
and speech, reason and passion, the internal and external, and the personal and communal. Hadot
has pointed out that this also shows up in the language and approach of the spiritual exercises in
ancient philosophia. The name of the school founded by Plato, the Academy, was adopted from
the location where they met, the gymnasion. For athletes the transformation of body was
achieved through continual conditioning of the body through training exercises for the purpose
of completing the specific task—wrestling or running, for example—with increasing mastery
built on the foundation of habit (Way of Life 102). So, too, the practitioner of philosophy engages
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the spiritual exercises wherein he, “develops his strength of soul, modifies his inner climate,
transforms his vision of the world, and, finally, his entire being” (Way of Life 102). Just like
Socrates at the end of the Symposium whom without sleep and having bested all of his
companions in drinking proceeds, “into the Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just as
he always did, and only then, as evening was falling, went home to rest” so too does the
philosopher spend their days as Socrates by continuing to awaken self-consciousness through the
practice of spiritual exercises (Symposium 223d).
Attention and Meditation
Various practices have been classified by Hadot as constituting a concentration on the
self, as the first movement of consciousness. Hadot used the term examination of conscience as a
general umbrella term of which attention and meditation are the primary exercises (Ancient 198).
This term is a familiar concept in Christian spiritual progress that was borrowed from ancient
philosophical exercise. Examination one’s conscience is the exercise perhaps most associated
with Socrates – looking at oneself and coming to the awareness that one knows nothing – and is
the starting point for philosophy as a way of life (198). In the healing process it is easy to focus
on what remains to be accomplished to return to health, however, as the exercises of meditation
and attention show, they are also to be used to become aware of one’s progress (199).
Meditation works in conjunction with the cultivation of one’s attention to the present
moment, and is a common spiritual exercise connected to ancient philosophy as a way of life.
“The exercise of meditation is an attempt to control inner discourse, in an effort to render it
coherent” (Way of Life 85). Attention to the present moment was a way to liberate one from fear
and worry of the past and the future (Way of Life 85). These two ‘times’ should not worry us;
neither are dependent upon us. However, the, “minuscule present moment, which, in its exiguity,
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is always bearable and controllable” (85). The mode of attention (prosoche) was a pillar for both
the Stoic and the Epicurean way of life. In ‘attention’ the practitioner was ever self-conscious
(87). Hadot pointed out a critical distinction within the definition of ‘present moment’ for the
Stoics. In one sense the present moment could be theorized to function as a line of demarcation
between the future and the past (Ancient 192). The second approach is experiential and ties the
present moment to “human consciousness; it then represented a certain thickness and duration,
corresponding to the attention of lived consciousness” (192). ‘Attention’ as a spiritual exercise
should be carried out in this second approach. The Epicurean exercise of attention is also taken
up in relation to the exaggerated fears and desires in regard to phenomena that should not be
feared and “desiring things which it is not necessary to desire, and which are beyond their
control” (Way of Life 87). For the Epicurean, attention is brought to bear on distinguishing the
desires in their categories as natural-necessary, natural-unnecessary, or not-natural-notnecessary. This would bring one back to the present moment and the pleasure of existing in that
moment (87).
Thus, attuned to the present moment the philosopher is able to form “appropriate”
responses to life’s situations by keeping the fundamental Stoic principle of distinguishing
between what does and does not depend on us “constantly in view” and always “at hand”
(Citadel 35; Way of Life 84). This knowledge, as discussed in chapter two, is “knowing how to
do good” (Ancient 18). With the attempt to transform one’s “personality,” the exercise of
keeping this knowledge to hand recruits all those techniques of reason, logic, and rhetoric to
form the whole being (Way of Life 85). This recruitment happens in the exercises of meditation
(melete) and memorization (mneme) (85).
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In the practice of meditation (praemeditatio malorum) the practitioner presents to himself
the various sufferings of life such as flooding, disease, social/financial/family ruin, poverty, and
death. All of these events can happen and when they do, they will occur as part of the regular
course of universal Reason, as is everything in the Stoic system. Bringing these to mind
habituates the self to practice choosing how it will present the event and how it will choose how
to judge, desire, and act (Way of Life 85). To change one’s vision of the events occurring to them
a Stoic will call on the use of “striking maxims” in the form of dogmas (85). Dogmas are
shortened and imaginative formulas of the fundamental principle(s) of a school (Citadel 37).
Bringing these maxims or dogmas to bear on the imagined situation guides one in achieving an
“adequate representation” of the situation, thus attuning one’s judgement of it, desires for the
situation, and one’s responsive actions (101). Memorization and meditation combined to train the
person to understand the fundamental principles of the school and to bring them continually to
hand for the purpose of transformation and preparedness for the moment of existential need.
Hadot turned to the formulations in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius are representative:
“From all eternity, all things have identical contents, and pass through the same cycles
(II, 14, 1).
Everything is of the same kind, and of identical contents (VI, 37).
From all eternity, all things are produced with identical contents, and for all infinity there
will be other things of this kind (IX, 35).
In a sense, a man of forty—if he is not devoid of intelligence—has seen all that has been
and all that shall be, once he recognizes that all things have identical contents (XI, 1, 3).”
(qtd. in Citadel 41, Hadot’s translation)
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Here Aurelius has taken the fundamental principle of the eternal return of the universe – that all
things in the universe and the universe itself are brought into being, unfold in existence, and
return to the originary fire in period cycles – and formulated several different versions of dogmas
that are striking and bring to hand the way in which he should live his life in the moment he is
confronting (Citadel 41).
The exercises of reading/listening, research and investigation were supportive exercises
as they nourished the meditation and memorization (Way of Life 86). Reading/listening was an
umbrella term that could cover the practices of private reading (typically done aloud) of
supportive philosophical discourses and the practice of listening to an exegesis from a master on
a certain point. The two terms of research and investigation covered practices of employing the
language of the school in the act of describing phenomena, e.g., Aristotelian biology and the
description of the cosmos in the Timmeaus (Way of Life 85; Ancient 82-83). The exercises were
prescribed for the purpose of daily practice for one’s concentration on the self. With attention to
the present moment the inexhaustible value of the present moment begins to lead one to “cosmic
consciousness” (Way of Life 85). The expansion of consciousness in the cosmic vision allows
one to bring their vision in line with nature or the universal view (Way of Life 85).3 The
“opposed but complementary” movements are also exercised through inner discourse and
dialogue.
Dialogue and Internal Discourse
“To find a very simple example of discourse, it is enough to remember an essential point
for the Stoics: there is no good but moral good, and there is no evil but moral evil. . .

This is closely linked to physics, understood as a spiritual exercise, and will be covered in more detail in the next
chapter.
3
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Once [these formulas] . . . are received [in external discourse], however, they must be
realized and applied, and this is where internal discourse comes in. The goal was to
interiorize or to assimilate the teaching. To achieve this, it is not enough to remember that
there is no good but moral good, and no evil but moral evil, but this formulation must
really become attractive, so that it induces one to say, for example, ‘I am suffering, but it
is nothing compared to moral evil; it is not an evil compared to moral evil.” (Happiness
180).
Living out the Stoic philosophical life the maxims and dogmas initially embodied in the
instructional conversation between master and student were intended to be regularly re-embodied
in the student’s training. The best-known examples of a student’s training via the spiritual
exercise of re-embodying speech are the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.
In the published interviews conducted near the end of his life, Hadot confirmed and
clarified the essential intertwining of philosophical discourse, spiritual exercises, and living out
an existential choice of a way of life in concert with a vision of the cosmos. “In fact, all of
philosophy is an exercise—instructional discourse no less than the inner discourse that orients
our actions” (Happiness 88). In Hadot’s rendering of ancient philosophy ‘inner discourse’ is
understood simply as the internal dialogue of an individual—the words said to oneself. Inner
discourse is associated with the spiritual exercises through which one acts on oneself, such as
short maxims or dogmas that are repeated to oneself to habituate one’s disposition (Happiness
88; Citadel 38). Hadot has located the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius in the literary genre of
hypomnēmata or notes to oneself (Citadel 31).
Hadot pointed out that ancient dialogue, philosophical discourse, and exegesis were much
more codified than with what contemporary readers are familiar. The model and the language of
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the school were beholden to the argument from authority, tradition and the requirements of
primary orality. Hadot pointed to the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius as a primary example – the
oral and the poetic play as much of an important role in forming the discourse that the Epicurean
technical vocabulary could not be employed to its furthest extent (Way of Life 62). In other
words, the formation toward a way of life was the dominate purpose in the formation of the
models and use of language. “Each logos [discourse/performance of a discourse] is a ‘system,’
but the totality of logoi written by an author does not constitute a system” (Way of Life 105,
original emphasis). Written philosophical discourse always assumed the requirements of
embodied conversation between author and reader, the tempo, tone, context and specific
relationship of author and audience (105). This is reflected in the formulaic construction of Stoic
dogmas in the Meditations.
In Hadot’s explication of the Meditations he asserted, with the exception of the first book,
(I) the entire work is dedicated to the imaginative, striking, formulaic repeating of the
fundamental principles of living the Stoic life. Each rendering is concise and imaginative and “in
the form of a simple proposition” (Citadel 37). Marcus’ formulations presume that in the course
of his philosophical instruction that the truth and efficacy of the dogmas have been sufficiently
demonstrated. The contents of the Meditations were constructed so that the psychagogic effect of
that demonstration could again be evoked, not necessarily the demonstration itself (37). For
instance in Book II, I, 3, “The nature of the good, he says there, is moral good (to kalon); while
that of evil is moral evil (to aischron)” Marcus during the act of writing itself is evoking within
himself again the “resolution to do good” (38). While Aurelius could not choose what occurs in
the course of the unfolding of the universe, he could choose his intention to judge, desire, and act
in coherence with universal Reason. The choice of working to bring one’s own human reason in
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coherence with Universal reason, of which human reason is a part, is the uniquely human
exercise for the Stoic: “voluntary accord with oneself coincides with the tendencies of universal
Reason, which not only makes each living being into a being in accord with itself, but makes the
entire world as well a being in accord with itself” (Citadel 75). As with Socratic dialogue or
Aristotelian “discussion of problems” the Stoic process of formulating and writing out the
dogmas were considered more efficacious than any of the perceived results of the dialogue. The
purpose was in practicing, thus forming the intention to do good (Ancient 88).
The exercise of dialogue was an experience itself as it was an embodied participation in
the logos carried out in the spoken word as well as the practice of reasoning itself. The general
prescriptions of dialogue in the schools were:
“(1) recognize the other’s right to self-expression; (2) to recognize that if something is
obviously true, one gives one’s assent to it, which is often difficult when one is wrong;
and (3) recognize the norm, above the interlocutors, of what the Greeks call logos—an
objective discourse, or at least one that aims to be objective.” (Happiness 89)
Attention, meditation, dialogue, and the formation of inner discourse overlapped in the practice
of a fundamental attitude of being in “authentic presence, to oneself and to others” (Way of Life
91). For authentic self in dialogue was only possible for someone who could be authentically
present to themselves, i.e., cultivates attention and meditation. Hadot has noted that meditation
was considered as “dialogue with oneself” (91). Conversely an authentic encounter with oneself
was only possible for the person who could bring authentic presence to dialogue with an
interlocuter (91). Socrates again serves as the example of the relationship between internal
meditation and external dialogue. He arrived late to the party in the Symposium having been
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caught up in himself in meditation on the neighbor’s portico fully present to himself. He then
entered and is the honored guest and speaker fully present to his interlocuters.
Authentic embodied present was essential for the practice of dialogue. Ancient
philosophia acknowledged and leveraged the efficacy of the spoken word in the formation of the
“inner attitude” (Way of Life 50). Insofar as Socratic and Platonic dialogue was an “itinerary of
thought” with “circles, detours, endless divisions, digressions, and subtleties,” dialogue
eventually comes together on a single track of guiding the interlocuter to the cultivation of an
attitude (92). Socrates often brought his interlocutors to a point of crisis in coming to the point
where his dialogue partner consented to look at themselves and their positions such as Alcibiades
“[Socrates] makes me admit . . . I am neglecting all the things that are crying for attention in
myself” (Symposium qtd in Way of Life 90). Socrates gave help by stepping in as a mask, yet for
the essential change to occur the dialogue had to function as a dialectic. As mentioned above for
dialogue, as for all the other spiritual exercises, to be efficacious the transformation must occur
at the level of being, it cannot be ‘forced’ from a distance (92, 93). The interlocutor must give
consent – must “desire” – the change from within. Externally, or with another person, one is
“battling” the soul of the interlocutor. This also took place within the soul of the individual. The
philosopher brings attention to his soul and meditates, or rather dialogues, thus doing battle with
himself (91-92). The movement toward wisdom in the Socratic and Neoplatonic tradition was the
separation of the soul from the body, separation of the eternal and incorruptible from the
temporal and corrupt. A criticism of the Neoplatonic tradition is that it is a philosophy of escape
from the duties and obligations of daily life. Yet, Hadot has severally noted that the model of
wisdom in each school – the sage – is shown through his actions to be more intensely present in
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dwelling with others (Plotinus 111). The ‘death’ constituted by this separation is another exercise
in “lucidity” and expansion of the self.
Training for Death
In both the Platonic and Neoplatonic context contemplation of death brings clarity. Death
is the detachment of the soul from the body. Contemplating this moment accomplishes the
Socratic task of bringing the philo-sophos to a realization of all to which he is currently attached.
Those attachments are what keep the soul from realizing oneself. The exercises of attention to
the present moment, to others, to the self, meditation, and dialogue in the Platonic and
Neoplatonic context are also concurrently a spiritual exercise of contemplating death. The
spiritual exercise of death was also practiced to re-align one’s soul to the ever-fruitful value of
the present moment (Ancient 190-191).
Contemplating death was also a practice in liberation from two attachments already
mentioned, worry of the future and worry of the past. For the Stoic and the Epicurean, though
differently, the only time in which we live is the “infinitely small” present (Meditations qtd in
Ancient 192). “…[O]ne instant of happiness is equivalent to an eternity of happiness, and that
happiness can and must be found immediately” (Way of Life 222). To evoke the possibility
heightened the “value and seriousness” of each moment (Ancient 193). The Stoic overlapped the
exercises of attention, meditation (dialogue with oneself) and exercise of death in the form of a
constant tension or vigilance of one’s actions. For the Stoic the soul was a part of the cosmos and
was birthed, existed, and returned to the original fire (Veil 25-26). The activity of choice was to
voluntary exercise the soul to cohere in and with the universal Reason. For the Stoic, then,
happiness resides in the present moment, because in all of the cosmos it is that which “depends
upon us” (Way of Life 227). In other words, the Stoic was liberated from the dual worries of past
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and future through the exercise of the choice in the present moment. “Act, speak, and always thin
like one who might depart from life at any moment” and “Accomplish each of life’s actions as if
it were your last, keeping yourself far from all frivolity” (Meditations qtd in Ancient 193). The
Epicurean philosophy of ‘pleasure’ also engages the exercise of death in heightening awareness
of the present moment.
For the Epicureans liberation from the worries of future and past occurred in relaxing and
suppressing the worries and fears (Way of Life 222). The spiritual exercise of death thus worked
to clear away the fears as opposed to trying to place them within a conception of universal
Reason. “Epicureanism asserts that the soul does not survive the body, and the death is not an
event within life” (222). Pleasure in the Epicurean sense is not associated with hedonism. Rather,
spiritual and physical exercises work to clear away and cause of anguish. Those things that cause
us anguish are fear of the gods, unsatisfied desires, and “the moral uneasiness caused by the
concern to act out of perfect purity of intention” (222). Thus, the most pleasurable orientation to
time is going to be the present moment which carries the least worry. As Hadot rendered it,
Epicureanism stripped down the priority of desires to those that “are indispensable for the
continuation of our existence” culminating in the three categories mentioned above – naturalnecessary, natural-unnecessary, and not-natural-not-necessary (222). The sense of the primacy of
the present moment was developed in Epicureanism to such a degree that the experience of
pleasure was understood to stand outside of the constrictions of time (222).
This is different from the example of the Stoics, the Platonic and Neoplatonic
philosophies of striving. Epicureanism held that the experience of pleasure is itself perfect and
attainable in the present moment. Happiness is the antidote to the two primary causes of anguish
in the ancient world, worry of the past, and worry of the future. Happiness can only be found in

68

the present moment and the Epicurean has certain methods for achieving happiness; satisfaction
of desires. The exercise of death both imparts the urgency and brings attention to the possibility
of immeasurable pleasure in the present moment (Way of Life 224-225). With this perspective of
death, life and a moment of pleasure seems to be of “infinite value” (226). Epicurean spiritual
exercise of death thus revealed the infinite and complete value of the present moment and
learned to live as if it were the last and welcome pleasure as if it were the first experience (225226). As with the Stoic exercises, striking maxims were used to keep the knowledge to hand,
cultivate attention, and further meditative practice
“While we were talking, jealous time has fled. So seize the day” (Horace qtd in Way of
Life 224).
“Believe that each new day that dawns will be the last for you: Then each unexpected
hour shall come to you as a delightful gift” (Horace qtd in Way of Life 225)
“I have had all the pleasure I could have expected” (Horace qtd in Way of Life 225).
Happiness 162, 104-105
The exercise of death, like examination, attention, meditation, and dialogue, concentrates and
expands the soul in an exercise of wisdom.
Hadot has explicated other spiritual exercise in his scholarship, such as “reading” and
“accomplishment of duties” and given detailed accounts of the exercises of the Stoicism of
Marcus Aurelius in the Inner Citadel and of Neoplatonic exercises through the life of Plotinus in
Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision. The exercises highlighted here, along with physics
(addressed in the next chapter), are those to which Hadot repeatedly returned as the underlying
commonalities across all the schools, thus further contextualizing a contemporary reading and
engagement of ancient philosophical discourse. Continuing to situate an understanding of the
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phenomena of spiritual exercises, Hadot addressed the links between ancient philosophical
spiritual exercises and spiritual exercises of Christianity.
Christianity and Spiritual Exercises
Hadot’s scholarship is subtle and complex exhibiting both depth and breadth. Arnold
Davidson broadly characterized Hadot’s scholarship as possessing that “rare combination of
prodigious historical scholarship and rigorous philosophical argumentation that upsets any
preconceived distinction between the history of philosophy and philosophy proper” (Introduction
1). This quality of Hadot’s scholarship is on display as he outlines the fate of ancient
philosophia—the inextricable intertwining of an existential choice of a way of life, the practice
of spiritual exercises, and philosophical discourse—as it enters the Middle Ages and encounters
an emerging Christianity being presented as a way of life (Ancient 253). Though tenuous the
attitude of philosophy as a way of life has not gone completely dormant. This section does not
provide an exhaustive review of the history of philosophy and Christianity. This section marks
the major touchpoints in Hadot’s account that furthers an understanding of how the phenomenon
of spiritual exercises became more commonly associated with religion, specifically Christianity
in the West.
Christianity presented itself in its infancy as, “a way and a choice of life—a life
according to Christ—which implied a specific discourse” (Ancient 253). Not the least of those
presentations being the flexibility of meaning with the word logos (Ancient 238). Christianity
was able to define logos as a mediator between the eternal and the temporal, “between God and
the World” (Ancient 237). Being able to define Christianity as a philosophy had the benefit of
being able to be understood within the Greco-Roman environment. In the Christian deployment
of the term, the Logos of reason and discourse became incarnate in the person of Jesus the Christ.
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Living a way of life in accord with reason became living a way of life in accord with the life and
teachings of Christ (Ancient 239). The exegetical explication of texts following the argument
from authority is another example.
The schools of Christian philosophy engaged in similar exercises and in similar contexts
as the schools of ancient philosophy. For example, consider the interaction between a master and
disciples working toward wisdom engaging exercises such as dialogue, meditation, attention, and
the exercise of death. Christianity as a way of life borrowed much from ancient philosophy.
However, Christianity becomes distinct in the monastic phenomenon wherein a person or group
of persons drew away from the community to “attain Christian perfection through the heroic
practice of Christ’s evangelical advice and the imitation of his life” (Ancient 242). In the
monastic exercises rigorous dietary restrictions were practiced along with emphasis is placed on
being attentive to one’s self and the relation to the overarching order of the universe, i.e., God’s
Kingdom. Hadot set out a detailed account of the heavy influence exerted on the way of life of
Christianity by the practices of the schools, especially those of the Neoplatonic. Augustine of
Hippo (354 – 430 CE) is perhaps the most well-known example of the influence of Neoplatonic
philosophy influencing the early formation of Christian philosophy and theology (Ancient 250252). The rise of the universities and a thriving Christianity the Middle Ages saw the decoupling
of philosophy as a way of life and philosophical discourse.
In the Middle Ages as in antiquity, the social structures and the philosophical schools
were intimately interrelated (Ancient 259). The philosophical schools shaped the “conception of
philosophy” in a social structure by delimiting its place and purpose (259). By the Middle Ages
the ways of life particular to the ancient schools, such as Epicureanism, had mostly fallen out of
practice while others, such as the Stoic and Platonic practices were adapted and “absorbed by the
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Christian way of life” (Ancient 254). Yet the philosophical discourse remained and continued to
be widely used in helping to reconcile human reason with the revealed truths and doctrine of
Christianity. This reconciliation occurred in the newly formed universities and cathedral schools
in the 13th century CE whose primary purpose was to train young men for service in the Church.
Philosophy, then, became associated with the exercise of philosophical discourse and dialectic
for the purpose of preparing a monk for theological study, and a life lived in the spiritual
exercises of the Church regulated and codified in the liturgy. From this Hadot has located the
beginning of a conception of philosophy as a manipulation of discourse undertaken in a
professional environment (Ancient 260).
Conclusion
This chapter has extended the discussion begun in chapter two by further examining
Hadot’s understanding of spiritual exercises practiced in the different schools and their
fundamental commonalities. Chapter two grounded the discussion on philosophy as a way of life
of the philo-sophos guided by the model of the man of wisdom, the sage. This chapter turned to
Hadot’s explication of the lived exercises of the practitioner.
This review of the phenomenon of spiritual exercises began by further situating them in
the context of philosophia. In that context practicing spiritual exercises was identical to living a
philosophical life. This is consistent with the practice of acknowledging those as philosophers
who did not write any ‘philosophy’, e.g. Socrates, Plotinus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius
before his Meditations were widely available.
Hadot has given several definitions for spiritual exercises. The two definitions of
“voluntary personal practices intended to cause a transformation of the self,” and “exercises
designed to ensure spiritual progress toward the ideal state of wisdom, exercises of reason that

72

will be, for the soul, analogous to the athlete’s training or to the application of a medical cure”
highlight the voluntary, transformative, and therapeutic function of the spiritual exercises with
the ancient historical moment (Ancient 179-180; Way of Life 59). The spiritual exercises
functioned as a therapeutic by responding to the human condition—“a state of unhappy disquiet”
or of “alienation, dispersion and unhappiness” (Way of Life 102; Ancient 198). The disruption of
the soul’s movement toward wisdom was continually hampered through the human condition,
especially one’s passions. The transformative potential of the exercises could be realized only
through daily practice. Preceding taking up these practices was the already-made existential
choice of a way of life. The exercises confirmed this presence in their practice.
The next section reviewed the commonalities of exercises across the schools: attention,
meditation, dialogue, inner discourse, and training for death. The exercises overlap with each
other in exercising two movements soul in coming to self-consciousness: bringing attention to
itself and to expanding the self toward a “cosmic consciousness” (Way of Life 85). For example,
as meditation brings attention to the present moment—a concentration of the self—the
inexhaustible value of the present moment opens onto a cosmic view—an expansion of the self.
The final section addresses a potential issue in understanding spiritual practices from a
contemporary historical moment: the close association of spiritual exercises with religion,
specifically Christianity in the Western Tradition. Hadot provides a subtle and complex
treatment of the de-coupling of philosophical discourse and philosophy as a way of life through
the rise of universities and a burgeoning Christianity. As the way of life practiced fell away or
was subsumed in Christian spiritual exercises the philosophical discourse remained becoming the
handmaiden to theology in the university structure of courses. Through his rendering of spiritual
exercises Hadot brought his readers to an awareness “of philosophy not only as a concrete,
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practical activity but also as a transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving the world”
and to highlight the recurrences of this attitude throughout the history of philosophy (Ancient
270).
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CHAPTER 4
Nature Loves to Hide
Dark-matter physicists work at the boundary of the
measurable and the imaginable. They seek the
traces that dark matter leaves in the perceptible
world. Theirs is hard, philosophical work, requiring
patience and something like faith: ‘As if’ – in the
analogy of the poet and dark-matter physicist
Rebecca Elson – ‘all there were, were fireflies /
And from them you could infer the meadow.”
(Macfarlane 57-58)
For the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, the ever-incomplete task of orienting oneself in
the lifeworld and social complex is intertwined with an understanding of his relation to nature
and the cosmos (Arneson 77). Garnet Butchart argues that “communication . . . is the mode and
means through which human being makes sense of the experience of having-to-be, its
ontological abandonment to language as sovereign” (12). As people are abandoned to language
so they are also abandoned to inhabitation of the terrestrial and celestial universe.
Humankind’s relationship to nature and the cosmos is mutually formative. Robert
Macfarlane describes the mutually formative relationship in the context of the vast terrain
beneath the surface of the earth, “The underland is vital to the material structures of
contemporary existence, as well as to our memories, myths and metaphors. It is terrain with
which we daily reckon and by which we are daily shaped” (Macfarlane 13). The Earth epoch of
the Anthropocene is characterized by the formative impact that human action has on the contours
of the Earth contributing to experiences of disjointed time and place (75). Nature and cosmos
thus influence human discourse as personal and social ways of life change to respond to shifting
ground that was once thought to be permanent raising questions, anxieties and fears over past,
present and future (13-15).
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Spiritual exercises and their efficacy as therapeutics work to bring peace to the
philosopher’s dispersed thoughts through training of inner discourse (and dialogue) in practice
for the moment of action/interaction with others as part of a field of terrain and as a part of the
larger cosmos. As meditation and attention to the present moment work to concentrate the soul,
both practices simultaneously lead to the soul’s expansion, transcending the ego achieving a
view from above (Ancient 189; Citadel 118).
Taking a view from above opens the philosopher to see the grand context against which
his actions seem infinitely small. However, this view also opens him up to see himself and others
as part and expression of the Whole. For the Stoic especially his existential choice to exercise his
uniquely human capacity for choice to bring his reason in accord with universal Reason is
motivated by a love for humankind as his perceptions, desires, and actions, as well as his inner
and external discourse, are framed in recognition of and for interaction with the expression of
universal reason in others (Happiness 117-119; Citadel 311-312).
Coming to the view from above is supported by an understanding of the philosopher’s
place in and the operations of nature and the cosmos. Physics, or inquiry of nature and the
cosmos, was itself considered a spiritual exercise insofar as it aided the formation of the “inner
attitude” (Way of Life 59). Pierre Hadot has shown that the philosopher assumes the human
person in the whole, the mind and body is part of nature and the cosmos and part of the process
of becoming, or what generally is referred to with the Greek word phusis.
A study of the cosmos and of humankind’s relationship to it are inextricably intertwined
in Hadot’s rendering of philosophy as a way of life. Hadot works this theme throughout his
scholarship, especially in the volumes on Plotinus (Plotinus) and Marcus Aurelius (The Inner
Citadel). However, he provides a full-scale exercise of his approach to the phenomenon of
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philosophy as a way of life in The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature
(2004, English 2006). The Veil of Isis traces the Heraclitan aphorism “Nature loves to hide”
through historical moments. This becomes the jumping off point for Hadot’s description of the
two attitudes that humankind has taken in relation to nature: The Promethean and the Oprhic.
In broad strokes the Promethean attitude understands nature to be a keeper of secrets.
Nature’s secrets are those that undergird its operations. These operations are thought to work
from a repeatable logic that can be expressed in mathematical or mechanical terms. Experiments
force nature to reveal its logic so it can be harnessed for humankind’s use. The Orphic model on
the other hand understands the secretes of nature to be best understood as a song, discourse,
and/or poem whose proper reception comes by way of contemplation. “Nature’s language is not
a discourse in which the words are separate from one another. What natural phenomena reveal to
us are not the maxims of formulas of Nature but configurations, sketches, or emblems, which
require only to be perceived” (Veil 203). Both approaches to humankind’s relationship to nature
agree that nature and the cosmos held an unknowable aspect that could be revealed. The only
difference being the process of witnessing that aspect. With the physical sciences increasingly
taking on the role of observing, measuring, predicting, and explaining the appearance and
operations of physical phenomena, “poets and philosophers” turned—rather re-turned—their
attention to understanding the “mystery of being” that tracks more closely with an ancient
concept of phusis (Veil 318, 314).
Coming to an understanding of the mystery of being, nature and the cosmos is integral to
the formation of the inner attitude as it supports the philosopher in transcending his individual
egoist perspective coming to a view from above. From a view from above the concerns and
actions of routine life are placed into the perspective of the whole and universal Reason.
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Meanings of those interactions can then be renegotiated in the mode of communication in
humility with others also abandoned to the terrestrial and celestial realms.
The Development of Phusis
Phusis underwent a transformation from a mixture of meanings to being associated with
an absolute that “designates the process of formation or its result, taken in general or an abstract
way” (Veil 19). Plato made the shift and designated the pre-Socratic “investigations on nature,”
which took into account the convergence of the elements—earth, fire, water, air—that occur
“spontaneously” or “without the intervention of thought” in their processes, for instance the
changing of the seasons (32). In the Platonic vision of the universe the Soul was primary as “the
movement that moves itself” (22). The “blind” processes of nature, of which the result may be
visible but not the process itself, are not the primary and are subject to the process of phusis (22).
Hadot credited Plato with making the distinction that was to have everlasting
consequences for understanding the relationship between nature, art and human-being. “For
[Plato], phusis is precisely an art as well, but one that is divine: ‘I would suppose that the works
said to be of nature are the works of a divine art, and those that men compose with them are the
work of a human art’” (Veil 22; Plato Sophist 265e3). As the processes of phusis are not
disclosed and are of the order of transformation they cannot amount to a science for Plato (Veil
23). Human art—shipbuilding, pottery, metal work, etc.—is also a movement that transforms the
materials that is initiated by the artist and imposed on the materials, a process which can be
known. The tensions in the analogy of understanding nature as the “art of nature” and its relation
to human art is a constant theme throughout all historical moments. The relationship has ranged
from one of opposition to one another to a (return) to identification of human art with the “art of
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nature” (23). Hadot situated Aristotle’s understanding of nature and art as a guiding analogy
while simultaneously setting out clear boundaries of how nature and art are unalike.
Nature and art were similar for Aristotle insofar as both nature and art are processes by
which “matter” is “molded and formed” (Veil 24). Significant differences emerge quickly in
further trying to compare the two. These differences are in the initiation of motion, the ‘location’
of the form toward which the process strives, relationship with reason, and the force with which
the process works. For the work of art, the process of transformation is initiated and imposed on
the materials, the form is ‘located’ in the thoughts of the artist, thus external to the matter being
molded. Bringing his form toward its end the artist stops and reasons his way through the
operations and any obstacles or unforeseen movements that arise in that process. Matthew
Crawford in The World Outside Your Head describes the complex planning and visualizing
sessions of glassblowers, which can here serve as an example of the Aristotelian description of
the process of art. The glassblowers undergo a detailed planning session on the intended
movements of each artist and the overall form to be achieved before they begin to mold the glass.
Throughout the process they continue to communicate and reason together with one another as
they work in giving shape, in accord with their already agreed upon vision, to the constantly
moving materials (131-134). The work of human art involves a certain amount of force to bring
about the transformation to meet the model: “Art is imposed on matter with violence” (Veil 24).
According to Aristotle the processes of nature work differently
Hadot described Aristotle’s definition of nature as “a principle of inner motion inside
each thing. Each concrete individual has within it a concrete nature that is proper to its species
and is the principle of its natural motion” (Veil 23). In nature, then, the transformation of
matter—person/animal/plant—is not imposed by an external force, but rather is initiated and
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brought to the its proper telos, to which the matter is already oriented, by virtue of the fact that
that movement is proper to the form (Veil 24). What is initiated in the philosophical discourses of
Aristotle is the analogy of nature as the “more perfect art” as it perfectly performs all the steps in
the method of the artist (25). Hadot marked these steps as the emergence of the idea that nature
behaves according to a method. “This idea of a method proper to nature was to play a very
important role in the scientific representations of all of Western thought” (25). The Stoics, for
Hadot, drew from the exercises and discourses of the Greek schools in coming to a guiding
vision of the cosmos.
Hadot wrote, “One can say that Stoicism was born of the fusion of three traditions: the
Socratic ethical tradition, the Heraclitean physical and ‘materialistic’ tradition, and the dialectical
tradition of the Megareans and of Aristotle” (Citadel 73). These three parts are interdependent in
the Stoic philosophical way of life—understanding one’s place in the cosmos and one’s
relationship to nature and to others was integral in acting ‘appropriately’ in that moment when
called upon to do so. That moment is, “at once multiple and unique—which is the exercise of
physical virtue, ethical virtue, and logical virtue” (Citadel 80-81). Stoic philosophy posits a
universe that is in constant and continuous transformation that has its beginning and end in the
“original fire” (Citadel 74; Veil 25). All things are located in the originary fire and are
“engendered” in the direction of phusis which “proceeds systematically and methodically” in the
cyclical return to the originay fire (Veil 25).
As with Aristotle the Stoic vision of the cosmos locates the “principle of motion” to be
both a part of the larger reality of things and within each thing (Veil 25). The universe goes
through periodic cycles, emerging from and returning to the original fire. Hadot showed the
continuing transformation of the meaning of phusis as an “invisible power” that initiates and
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directs transformation and the coming to be of all things (26). Phusis along with “Nature, God,
Providence, and divine Reason” are all present and identical in and with the original fire (26).
Once the cycle of the universe is begun again, Nature—phusis—sets about its work, a work that
is brought about from within and always directed toward the continuation of the cycle of the
universe in accord with Universal Reason (Veil 26; Citadel 75). Phusis in the Stoic vision is
identified with both the original formation of the universe and with every point in its
transformation and return to the original fire (Veil 26). The Stoic with this vision of the
movements of the Whole could understand himself and others as part and expression of the
Whole. He was better able to gain more ‘adequate’ representations of phenomena—physical,
cosmic, other people—as he discerned what actions would be good for himself and the
community insofar as they were in accord with universal Reason.
The Secrets of Nature and the Mystery of Being
Contemplation of nature and the cosmos, taking the view from above, or in Aristotle’s
school the observation of, reflection on, and discussion of the observations had a formative
purpose (Ancient 88). As with Socratic dialogue “for Aristotle the discussion of problems was
ultimately more formative than their solution” (88). The same problem discussed from different
perspectives was a training and practice of collaborative research in seeking knowledge as part of
a community. This itself was living the philosophical life of Aristotle’s school (87-88).
A key moment in Hadot’s development of the transformation of meaning of the
relationship between humankind and nature was the identification of nature as phusis. This
prepared the way for the personification and divinization of nature (Veil 26-27). Accompanying
this shift is a decline in the formative purpose of collaborative research as a spiritual exercise as
part of a community/communicative way of life.
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Hadot traced the twists and turns in meanings of phusis and the aphorism “Nature loves
to hide” throughout historical moments. On the tail end of the ancient moment the idea of the
secrets of nature begun to take hold. Explanations of nature that identify the gods as the causes of
visible phenomena—such as earthquakes, thunderstorms, the changing of the seasons—meant
that these events were at the mercy of the capricious directives of the divine. Already within
antiquity the meaning of phusis had been identified with the invisible, yet regular and methodical
force behind and/or guiding the transformation. The invisible force of phusis understood in
Antiquity morphed into the concept that nature had secrets to withhold or reveal. Evidence of
this emerges in late antiquity but becomes widespread in the Medieval moment. That nature held
secrets sets up an opposition between humankind and nature. “the idea of secrets of nature
always presupposes an opposition between the visible, what appears, or the phenomenon, and
what is hidden beyond that appearance, or the invisible” (Veil 33). The “idea of secrets of nature”
as a guiding construct for interpreting and understanding our collective terrestrial and celestial
habitation is built on this fundamental opposition between the invisible secrets of nature and
humankind (33).
Hadot identified the tradition of the secrets of nature as integral to the processes and
methods by which those secrets could be revealed. Here is marked a transition in the
understanding of phusis as being divine and unknowable for Plato, and invisible yet regular for
Aristotle. For example, the Platonic understanding that nature had mysterious properties that
were carried in each physical phenomenon.
In the Middle Ages the process of revealing took place by the human hand with the help
of the “pseudo-sciences” of magic and alchemy (Veil 35). “As the objects [the secrets of nature]
of philosophical physics, but also of the pseudo-sciences in antiquity and the Middle Ages, they
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were to become in this way the object of the new physics, mathematics, and mechanics” (35).
Since Nature has the prerogative to hide or veil its secrets, philosophers have taken two
approaches. One was to ignore the invisible secrets of nature as beyond our understanding and
therefore of no concern. Hadot associated this with Socrates and the Skeptical Platonic tradition
notably of Arcesilas (315-240 BCE) (91). In this tradition, turning away from these concerns was
a simultaneous turning toward the affairs of the philo-sophos the administration of the city and
conducting a moral life (91). For these schools “there is no ‘physical’ part of philosophy, since
physics is precisely the study of nature (phusis)” (91-92). The other approach believed the
secrets could be revealed and were the purposes of the sciences and philosophy. In the ancient
tradition this is seen in the philosophy of Antiochus of Ascalon (125-68 BCE) for whom the
inquiry of physical philosophy included “‘nature and secret things’” (92). The Promethean and
the Orphic approaches to the secrets of nature were both developed within the latter general
approach.
The Promethean and the Orphic attitude held a pre-understanding of the relationship
between humankind and nature:
“If man feels nature to be an enemy, hostile and jealous, which resists him by
hiding its secrets, there will then be opposition between nature and human art, based on
human reason and will. Man will seek, through technology, to affirm his power,
domination, and rights over nature.
If, on the contrary, people consider themselves a part of nature because art is
already present in it, there will no longer be opposition between nature and art; instead,
human art, especially in its aesthetic aspect, will be in a sense the prolongation of nature,
and then there will no longer be any relation of dominance between nature and mankind.
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The occultation of nature will be perceived not as a resistance that must be conquered
butt as a mystery into which human beings can gradually be initiated.” (Veil 92)
Hadot placed Prometheus as the patron of this attitude. In Greek mythology Prometheus stole
fire from the gods giving it to humankind bringing along with it the improvements of
“technology and civilization” (95). The Orphic approach considers humans already a part of
nature. The latter approach Hadot placed under the ‘patronage’ of Orpheus, whom in Greek
mythology seduced and coerced all things, human and otherwise, through music and song (96).
Hadot cautioned readers to understand the distinction between the Promethean and the Orphic in
similar terms as the Stoics undertook the distinction between philosophic discourse and the
moment of acting philosophically (Citadel 80-82). While the two orientations are opposed to
each other they are only separated for Hadot’s overall purpose of setting out the progression of
humankind’s relation with nature. Hadot made clear that the two orientations are both “equally
essential” and often found to co-appear—comingled or appear successively—in the same person
or in the same experiment or discourse (Veil 98).
For Hadot the Orphic and Promethean continue to co-appear up to the present moment.
The Promethean and the Orphic are both frameworks for orienting oneself in the lifeworld and
social complex (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77). The Promethean framework privileges
‘power’ and ‘dominance’ as interpretive framework for relations between human being, nature
and the cosmos. The Orphic model privileges ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ for relations
between human being, nature and the cosmos.
Promethean
Within the Promethean framework knowledge is gained through power in the form of
mechanical and technological tools used to extract nature’s secrets. Knowledge is considered of
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itself to be power in the sense that knowledge of the secrets of nature allows one to bend nature
to the will and purposes of humankind (Veil 101). The Promethean approach to all of nature
carries with it the potential for an interpretation of all of nature, including other people, as
potential tools for use in some end, be that end knowledge for knowledge’s sake or for a
political, militaristic, or economic end..
Consistent with the nature-as-hostile approach is the presence of mechanics in ancient
Greece, the model of which experimental sciences are the inheritor (102-103). Situated in this
approach, the object of mechanics is to “trick” or divert the normal course of affairs to benefit
the practical needs of humankind and otherwise alleviate ever-present human suffering (102).
Mechanics in antiquity rested on the assumptions or “logoi of nature” itself—in other words the
means by which to trick nature to give up her secrets were inherent in the reasoning of nature
itself (103). For example, the construction of an aqueduct that diverts the course of nature or the
construction of a siege machine that is used as an instrument of power, to work, requires the
deployment of knowledge based on mathematics and physics. Hadot noted that mathematics and
mechanics flourished across ancient Greece and Rome; most closely associated with these
developments was the Pythagorean school—especially Archytas of Tarentum (428-347 BCE)—
and under the patronage of the Ptolemies in Alexandria (104). In addition to ‘tricking’ nature by
using nature via mechanics is ‘tricking’ as the phenomenon of magic.
Tricks of magic shared the endpoint of mechanics; to force nature to reveal its secrets in
order to act on nature for the purposes of benefitting or satisfying human interests (Veil 106107). In the magical approach to manipulating nature, the fundamental position was “that natural
phenomena are brought about by the invisible powers—gods or demons—and that it is therefore
possible to modify natural phenomena by forcing the god or demon to do what one wants to
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accomplish” (107). Other natural phenomena were used such as plants or animals in rituals that
were intended to in some way influence the god or demon by calling on it by its particular name
(107). The tradition of magic continues into the Middle Ages under the phenomenon of natural
magic. Natural magic differs from magic in that it holds that the “occult virtues” of natural
phenomena are capable of being known by humankind (109). In other words, no demons/gods
were required. The secrets of nature were thought to be extracted or put into motion through an
understanding of the occult properties/qualities/movements of the plants/animals/cosmos and
their interactions (109).
A primary example and culmination of this literature is the work of Roger Bacon
(1219/20-1292 CE) in On the Secret Works of Art and Nature (1260). Hadot painted Bacon as a
figure that lies at the intersection of the traditions of natural magic and mechanics as forebearers
of contemporary experimental science in one sense and completely removed from that
intersection in another. On the one hand Bacon “sketched the program of an ‘art that uses nature
like an instrument,’” that would garner much better results than the magic of the demons/gods
(Veil 115; Bacon qtd in Veil). Bacon could also be thought of as that employing an art of nature
to “transform [the world] and place it in the service of mankind” (Veil 116). On the other hand,
Bacon’s vision and assessment of the tools of natural magic have to be situated within his
environment and context as an Oxford professor and Franciscan working on the assumption that
the appearance of the Antichrist was near, thus the transformation of the world was “to hasten
the conversion of the entire world to Christianity” (115). This particular understanding of phusis
allows for an understanding of the purpose of all inquiries into nature and the cosmos as
participatory in phusis as God’s plan for the world. This understanding aligns with an
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interpretation of interactions with others in a community as essentially missionary that is
coherent with a Christian worldview. In the 16th and 17th centuries magic gave way to machine.
With the advent of the work of “Francis Bacon, Descartes, Galileo and Newton” (all
working in the late 16th to 17th century CE) the Promethean attitude of dominating the earth was
to experience a decisive move in the concretization of the scientific method and rigorous analysis
of sensible data (Veil 123). The development of mechanics allowed for further observation and
exploration, for example, the development of lenses and the microscope and the telescope. This
moment of the late 16th through 17th centuries saw the scientific revolution flourish with three
trends that bolstered and extended the metaphor of nature as a machine.
First, knowledge was now limited to the demonstrable and repeatable and constituted a
turn away from using ancient authors as authorities to support one’s conclusions. This in turn
was closely linked to the second trend in this moment, which was the “democratization of
knowledge” (Veil 124-125). Access to knowledge no longer required years of study of ancient
manuscripts or initiation into magical rituals. This democratization also accomplished a division
of labor as observation and experimentation could be carried out by groups of researchers
working together (124-125). To wit, “Francis Bacon in his Novum Organum and Descartes in his
Discourse on Method consider that the method they propose is an instrument that enables any
mind to accede to scientific knowledge” (125, emphasis added). The third trend Hadot attributed
largely to Galileo made mechanics—the study of the movements and/or workings of natural
phenomena—synonymous with mathematics (Veil 125).
As mechanics was the model and practice of putting the laws of nature to work for human
purposes, Galileo’s instruments that were used for the further observation of nature were
developed using the mathematical descriptions of the ancients (125-126). “Beginning with this
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decisive turn toward the mathematization of nature, the way was open for the possibility of the
evolution of science toward modern physics” and, “The scientist therefore operated like an
engineer, who had to reconstruct the gears and functions of the machine known as nature” (128,
126). In this vein the invisible forces of nature, identified with phusis as the invisible force that is
part of or consistent with the engendering and formation of the natural phenomena of the visible
world came to be identified with nature having secrets. The secrets are discoverable and can be
represented in mathematical form which in turn can be used to recreate through the fabrication of
artificial machines the natural ‘mechanics’ of the “great machine of the world” for service to the
interests of humankind (129).
Orphic
The Orphic framework privileges ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ over ‘power’ and
‘opposition’ for understanding and practicing in and through communication the relationships
between human beings, nature and the cosmos. The question remains the same in the Orphic
model, ‘how is knowledge, or rather the secrets, of nature to be understood?” In this model
knowledge takes shape as a “physics of contemplation” represented through the modalities such
as painting or other “pictorial arts,” philosophical discourse, or the poetic discourse (Lenoble qtd.
in Veil 95,155). As the Promethean model developed tools useful in coming to know the secretes
of nature, the Orphic model is equally limiting; the only ‘tool’ is the faculty of perception (Veil
155). The Orphic model approaches the secrets of nature in the understanding that one is already
a part of it, interpreting or re-presenting nature through various modalities of the human arts is
participation in the secrets of nature. This “physics of contemplation” is consistent with physics
practiced as a spiritual exercise as in the case of Plato, Aristotle, and the Epicureans and the
Stoics as its end was to support the philosopher in living a good life. Within this approach, much
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more so than the Promethean, is emphasized “mankind’s existential and ethical relation to nature
and to existence” (Veil 95, 200). This model and approach begin with the positions of Plato,
Aristotle, the Neoplatonists and the Stoics all of whom affirm that the secret processes that bring
the universe into being are not able to be known; “Whether in the domain of terrestrial bodies,
which are subject to becoming, or of celestial bodies, we must be content with what is
approximate, for we reside very far away and very low within the universe” (Veil 161). What
was most important was engaging in spiritual exercises, in the cultivation of “equanimity of soul,
absence of need, and indifference to indifferent things” assisting the philosopher in orienting
himself in the cosmos (Ancient 222). This orientation in the cosmos aided him in acting morally
in the face of the existential demands of the “customs and conventions of daily life” (Way of Life
58).
Ancient physics was conceived and constructed in the exegetical model working out of
the argument from authority (Veil 163). For example, Hadot looked to the early descriptions of
the movement of the stars. Believing the movement of the stars to be of divine origin they had to
be circular because that shape is regular and perfect (163). Yet the appearance of their movement
was irregular and seemingly without reason. This model allows for the emergence and
engagement of simultaneous and varying explanations of a single phenomenon that would
resolve at the intersection of the theoretical and sensible (162). Contemplation as opposed to
extraction is the mode of access to nature unveiled. “In this case, the truth under discussion is a
determinate truth that is unveiled: the enigma is solved, and there is no longer anything to search
for” (178). Important to note that this is not opposed to research and investigation. Rather, within
the Orphic mode of approach research took place within the context of a spiritual exercise.
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As a spiritual exercise in Stoic philosophy physics was a practice of understanding and
contemplating the cosmos so to better align oneself with the movement of universal Reason. This
helped one to cultivate a disinterestedness in those matters over which the practitioner had no
influence—such as the engendering, creation, and movement of the universe. In Plato and
Aristotle this is a pleasurable exercise. For Stoicism and Epicureanism (though differently)
contemplation of the cosmos helps the practitioner bring serenity to the soul (Veil 184-186; Way
of Life 222). An ethics of objectivity and disinterestedness becomes definitional of the Oprhic
attitude of contemplation of nature. “Just as ethics in not choosing any other end than virtue, and
in wanting to be a good person without seeking any particular interest, so science demands that
we not choose any end other than knowledge, and that we seek knowledge for itself, without any
other utilitarian consideration” (Veil 185-186). Whereas the Promethean model broadly
understands nature to act in a rational, economical, and logical manner the Orphic model
generally understands nature as “joyful, prodigal, and exuberant” therefore privileging aesthetic
perception (200). 4
Aesthetic perception was a favored model for understanding, representing, and
participating in the secretes of nature in the Orphic approach. When the burdens of utilitarian use
and the “conventions and customs of daily life” are stripped away from one’s perception the
practitioner is then able to perceive the secret of nature that has itself has always been “in broad
daylight” which is “the movement by which nature makes itself visible” (Veil 215). In the Orphic
model the distinction between art and nature is closed; nature is thereby able to be known
through the aesthetic experience as it occurs in various forms—philosophic discourse, poetry,
The Orphic and Promethean, while opposed, cross and co-appear at many times throughout historical moments.
Thus while Aristotle and the Stoics acknowledge a universal Reason that guides the purposes of nature, they both
also acknowledge that appearances are sometimes without reason. Thus, “Nature did not always aim at usefulness,
for instance, when she produced the peacock’s extravagant tail” (Veil 196).
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art, music, etc. (218). Aesthetic vision and participation unveils the secrets of nature in allowing
the artist/poet/philosopher to view the apparent “forms”—such as “polarity and ascent,” and
“spiral and serpentine line” by which nature operates and also by opening up a chance at
becoming “immersed within Nature’s creative impulse” which would allow entry into the secrets
through identification with Nature (220, 222, 218). Hadot identified the work of Goethe as both
central to understanding the Orphic model and as a turning point in the transformation of nature
as the ‘mystery of being.’
The philosophers and the poets of the present moment are the inheritors of the Orphic
approach to understanding the secrets of nature. Hadot marked Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as
the beginning of a trend to understand the secrets of nature as “mysteries in broad daylight” (Veil
260). For Goethe, all that can be discovered of natural phenomena is in plain sight, all that is
needed to see it is to train the senses and to remove the mistaken belief that there is a ‘reality’
behind the appearance (253).
“For Schelling, Heraclitus’ aphorism ‘Nature loves to hide’ means that Nature originally
represents a resistance to evolution, insofar as it is a will to remain within itself. ‘Nature’s
modesty’ was to become the mystery of being, and this mystery was distressing and
terrifying. Goethe and Schelling thus seem to [Hadot] to be at the origin of a tradition in
which there is an impenetrable mystery of existence that provokes anguish. The goal is
no longer to vanquish the difficulties and obstacles that Nature opposes to our knowledge
but to recognize that it is inherent in nature—or the world, or being-in-the-world, or
Being—to be inexplicable, so that one of the essential dimensions of human existence
will henceforth be both wonder and anguish, the ‘sacred shudder,’ as Goethe and Kant
would say, in the face of unfathomable mystery and enigma.” (Veil 303)
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The general effort and project of observing and explaining physical/material/natural or visible
phenomena has been given to the technology and experimentation of science and could be
considered the inheritors of the Promethean tradition of unveiling nature (Veil 318). Astronomy
is an example of this is the field-switch. Astronomy—the study of the movements of the stars
and planets—was initially a conjectural science on which the discourses were probable based in
the understanding that the secret processes were not able to be known by humans, such as in the
Timaeus. Hadot posited that with Galileo and Kepler “Astronomy and physics met” combined
under ‘nature’ and thus the province of “verifiable experimental science” (164). On the same
token, the philosophers and poets of his contemporary moment—Hadot included Schelling,
Goethe, Rilke, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in his account—are re-turning in their discourse
and poetry to paths new and ancient in experiencing phusis as the “inexplicable surging forth of
reality” (314).
The Orphic and the Promethean frameworks function together “in that act—at once
multiple and unique” which is the moment of living out a vision of the cosmos as part of the
social complex (Citadel 82). Physics as the coming to awareness that one and others are part and
expressions of the Whole, and what that means for self and others, is negotiated through relations
of communication (Happiness 96). For example, Robert Macfarlane’s Underland (2019) opens a
new understanding of the cosmos through investigations into the world beneath our feet.
Macfarlane’s insights are gained from Promethean observations and experiments conducted in
tunnels built and sites excavated for the purpose of mining precious metals and other elements.
As well, his insights are combined with Orphic descriptions of the root systems that connect all
trees in a forest—the “wood wide web”—that can be used to gather and deliver nutrients from
other trees to nurse a failing one back to health (87). Macfarlane’s relationships with self, others,
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place and time are renegotiated in embodied communication as he and those with him gain a
contemporary ‘view from above’ by going low.5
Physics as a Spiritual Exercise
Arnold Davidson captured the depth and breadth of spiritual exercises when he stated,
“The art of living demanded by philosophy was a lived exercise exhibited in every aspect of
one’s existence” (Introduction 21, emphasis added). This includes the human conditions of being
abandoned to language and to terrestrial and celestial habitation (Butchart 12). Philosophy as a
way of life was a life of exercise.
Physics as a spiritual exercise or “the realization of the presence of the world and of our
belonging to the world” of, with, and for others in relations of communication assisted the
philosopher in taking the view from above. This allows for the renegotiation of meanings of
actions and interactions within an interpretive framework of a universal belonging (Happiness
96).
Hadot summarized this relationship of the spiritual exercise of physics with the Stoic way
of life exhibited in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius:
“We must, then, not only act in conformity with the theorems of the art of living and the
fundamental dogmas, but also keep present to consciousness the theoretical foundations
which justify them. This is the ‘science of Nature,’ because, in the final analysis, all of
life’s principles merge in the knowledge of nature. Without this, the formulations of
dogmas will become devoid of sense, no matter how often they are repeated.” (Citadel
42)

Macfarlane recounts his personal conversations with researchers, guides, and friends as he visited and explored the
sites.
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In other words, the efficacy of the spiritual exercises, thus the philosophical way of life of the
school are dependent on an operative vision of the cosmos, the formation and continual
imagining of which is itself a participation in the Logos or the All. This section turns to Hadot’s
oft utilized examples in explicating physics in this manner. The first example is Plato’s Timaeus
and the second is the Stoic example in which Hadot found the most fully developed and
practiced form of physics as a spiritual exercise (210).
Plato’s Timaeus
The approach of the Orphic model was in the understanding that one was already
embedded within nature thus providing a framework for interpreting relations with nature and
the cosmos privileging ‘community’ and ‘collaboration’ (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77).
Across the schools and in varying degrees, human art was understood as both representation and
participation as one becomes “immersed within Nature’s creative impulse” (Veil 218). One such
development of the orphic model was in the conception of the universe as a poem (205).
Participation in the universe is a recruitment of one’s full being as he recruits the rational and the
irrational in and through relations of embodied communication with the purpose of orienting self
with others in nature and the cosmos. In other words, this interpreting and participating in poetic
creation was a spiritual exercise.
Within the framework of a spiritual exercise Hadot characterized the Timaeus as “an
artistic game that imitates the artistic game of the poet of the universe known as the divinity”
(Veil 201). The state of wisdom for the Platonist was achieved in the separation of the eternal
part from the temporal part, the soul from the body. Socrates again served as the model in
choosing the authentic life in death over the continued existence of the body (Way of Life 94).
What was called for in the life of practice was a quelling of the passions and shedding one’s
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individuality in and through an identification with the Logos (95). Practicing this in the spiritual
exercises of inner discourse, dialogue, and especially of death, the practitioner achieves a lucid
vision from the universal perspective, and “greatness of soul” (95,97). “[T]he whole of the
philosopher’s speculative and contemplative effort becomes a spiritual exercise, insofar as he
raises his thought up to the perspective of the Whole and liberates it from the illusions of
individuality” (97). Contemplation becomes participation as through human art the philosopher
imitates the creative force and rhythm of the cosmos.
Hadot placed Plato’s Timaeus under the category of “theological physics” (Veil 39).
Remember that for Plato the study of the natural processes of development, or phusis, did not
reach the rigors of a science because the causes and movements of it were only known to the
gods, and because it dealt with subjects and processes that were in “perpetual transformation”
(23). The starting points of physics then, were observations that were not able to be proven as in
hypotheses, engaging in descriptions of the cosmos was an attempt at presenting a “likely” and
“reasonable” demonstration (159,160). “Whether in the domain of the terrestrial bodies, which
are subject to becoming, or of celestial bodies, we must be content with what is approximate, for
we reside very far away and very low within the universe” (161). As noted above, this perpetual
transformation allowed for the flourishing of several explanations for a single phenomenon, such
as the creation of the world (161).
The closest thing we have to achieving knowledge in this arena is in discourse. The
discourse must match the subject. The Socratic dialectic had the following features: question and
answer, requiring assent of one’s partner to a proposition before proceeding to search for clarity,
and the inclusion of a crisis point. These all had their purpose for Socrates to bring his dialogue
partner’s soul to the twofold awareness of the philo-sophos. However, an essay of the origins of
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humankind in the Timaeus finds appropriate the discourse of myth or “likely fables” that bring a
diversionary joy to the philo-sophos and his partners. The setting for the Timaeus takes place in
the setting of a festival for Athena and in praise of the city (Veil 182). In this type of discourse,
inextricably linked were, “play, celebration, and the search for divine secrets . . . For Plato, at
any rate, human play responds to divine play” (183). The play of conjectural discourse carried
out in the spoken word on the origins of the cosmos and humankind is an imitation and a
participation,
“But a man who has given his heart to learning and true wisdom and exercised that part
of himself is surely bound, if he attains to truth, to have immortal and divine thoughts,
and cannot fail to achieve immortality as fully as is permitted to human nature. . . There
is of course only one way to look after anything and that is to give it its proper food and
motions. And the motions that are akin to the divine in us are the thoughts and
revolutions of the universe . . . When that is done we shall have achieved the goal set us
by the gods, the life that is best for this present time and for all time to come.” (Timaeus
90d)
The Timaeus then is both a discourse and a poem, and is poiētic, or a participation in the creative
force of the play of the universe imitated in the poetic form in this case. The secrets of nature can
be known in matching the divine part of one’s self through discourse suited to match the divine
dance. Hadot has noted the similarity in the Stoic practice of physics insofar as it displays the
theme of identifying with that which is beyond the egoist self.
The Stoic Discipline of Desire
Hadot illumined the Stoic vision and practice of the philosophical way of life in his
translation and interpretation of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius in Hadot’s book The Inner
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Citadel (1998). In that work Hadot situates Marcus’ Stoic practice in the teaching of Epictetus
(50?–135 CE) who was highly regarded as a philosopher in his own time (Citadel 59). The four
volumes of the Discourses of Epictetus that have made their way through to the present historical
moment were recorded by his student/disciple Arrian of Nicomedia, for Epictetus himself had
not written anything (60). It is through Epictetus’ vision, practice and exposition of the
disciplines of the Stoic system that the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius makes sense as a way of
life (59). “Human reason is an emanation or part of this Universal Reason. It can, however,
become obscured and deformed as a result of life within the body, owing in particular to the
attractions of pleasure” (76). The exercise of Stoic philosophy was an exercise in a way of life
aiming to bring back into coherence one’s human reason with universal Reason (76).
Physics as spiritual exercise takes shape within the Stoic distinction of the “fundamental
principle” between what is and is not within our sphere of influence (Way of Life 85). What
humans can influence are what are designated “acts of our soul” as they are not dependent on
other constraints and are considered acts of free choice (Citadel 83). Coming to awareness of the
fundamental distinction between what does and does not depend on us illumines in the self the
hēgimonikon, “the guiding principle,” or “the principle which directs all being. This is that
principle of thought and judgment which makes us independent of the body, and the principle of
liberty” (49). The hēgimonikon is that within the self that both resembles and participates as part
of the All.
The acts of the soul are consistent with the three actions that do depend on the person: to
judge or not judge, to desire or not, and the impulse to act (Citadel 83). Outside of these actions
of the soul are those things which are not dependent upon us. “Epictetus lists our body, honors,
riches, and high positions of authority—is everything that depends upon the general course of
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nature” (83). The three disciplines of assent, desire, and action work together to bring
“equanimity to the soul” by training perception/judgements, desire, and the impulse to act
(Ancient 222).
The disciplines of assent, desire, and action each had a purpose in habituating the
individual toward living a good life. With the majority of what occurs in the universe out of the
reach of influence of the human person, the good toward which the Stoic could work was in
forming the inner attitude to intend to do the good in all situations (Citadel 179). The study of
physics, then, has as its end a moral purpose. Briefly, the discipline of assent corresponded to the
faculty of judgement as it assents, or not, to the images that occur to our soul that come through
the senses (84). This in part forms the inner discourse, so the exercise of discerning and clearing
away the influence of the passions on those representations assisted in forming the inner attitude
of detachment or objectivity (44). The discipline of desire works to discipline one’s reason to
come aware of, and to cohere and consent to the will and actions of universal Reason (141).
Within the human realm—“the customs and conventions of daily life”—demand one to act in
relation with other human beings, who in due course will provoke the passions (183). The
discipline of action is to keep to-hand the vision of the “common Reason” of “human Nature” at
home in all of us and act in its service in interactions with others, thus maintain the coherence of
the All (183).
The human desires can be exaggerated beyond the boundaries of what depends on us,
causing us frustration and disruption of the soul (Citadel 137-138). Remembering that for the
Stoic the only good is moral good, the only evil is moral evil. Therefore, that which should be
desired is the good. With those things that do not depend on us we must remain indifferent which
takes shape in neither desiring nor fleeing from the magnitude of indifferent things (138). The
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three disciplines approach the whole human being in the overall endeavor to choose the moral
good by choosing to perceive, desire, and act in coherence with universal Reason (138). “Above
all, the discipline of desire in Marcus is related first and foremost to the way in which we are to
greet the events which result from the overall movement of universal Nature, which are produced
by what Marcus calls the ‘exterior cause’” (Citadel 138; Meditations VIII, 7 qtd. in Citadel 138).
The exercise of the discipline of desire works to cohere human reason through acceptance and
consent to the occurrences in the realm of those phenomena which are indifferent to us, the cause
of which comes from outside the self. The discipline of desire in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations
works to accept and work to desire the conditions and events that are occurring to himself in a
particular existential moment. This emerges out of a principle of Stoic physics that “the cosmos
is but a single living entity, endowed with a unique consciousness and will” (Citadel 141). All
events which we encounter—“whether I am ill, or lose my child, or am the victim of an
accident”—occur and implicate the whole of the cosmos (141). This is because all phenomena
and events have been interwoven with the All since “the most ancient of causes” (Meditations
qtd. in Citadel 140). The current moment can be understood as Destiny insofar as this moment is
occurring as a result of the unfolding of the pattern of causes which are the cosmos (140). This
assumes a universal Reason that guides this process, of which the human “guiding principle” is a
reflection and takes its place as part of the pattern.
For the Stoic philosopher there is a fundamental principle that all of reality coheres with
itself. Following on this intuition the philosopher is able to “perceive love of self and accord with
oneself in each movement of a living being as much as in the movement of the universe as a
whole, or in the perfection of the sage” (Citadel 141). The Stoic love that Hadot described here is
characterized in a relationship of mutuality: the Whole (or All) loves each of the parts (nature,
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animals, humans, celestial phenomena, etc.), each of the parts loves the other, and the parts love
the Whole (142). Continuing with the image of interwoven patterns, Hadot places “to love” in
context of everyday language use in the ancient world as carrying the meaning “to be
accustomed to” indicating a sense of ‘fittingness’ or ‘habituation’ between each of the parts
(142). In the relations between parts and the All there is “harmony” such that all that happens to
the parts benefits the All, while “everything that is ‘prescribed’ for each part is, almost in the
medical sense of the term, ‘prescribed’ ([Meditations] V, 8) for the health of the Whole, and
consequently for all the other parts as well” (142). Disciplining desire means to re-place the
moment or event occurring in the present moment within the perspective of the All or the Whole.
In the same movement the philosopher also becomes aware of the presence of the Whole within
that moment or event (142). In refusing to accept the moment or event as given in the Whole, the
philosopher breaks up ‘the cohesion’ of the All. On the contrary, accepting these circumstances
means to accept this event as being present and an exhibition of the will and the love of universal
Reason (the All) has for its part—the philosopher. Bringing one’s reason into coherence with the
All—bringing oneself and the All to health—means to identify one’s will with that of the All and
to will the events as they are (142). Through the ever-growing self’s awareness of itself—“that
infinitesimal point within the immensity”—through the discipline of desire transformed through
and becomes identical with universal Reason (182).
Conclusion
This chapter addressed how inquiries into nature and the cosmos are integral in the
formation of frameworks for orienting oneself in the lifeworld and social complex (Arnett and
Holba 9; Arneson 77). Physics when practiced as a spiritual exercise brought about “the
realization of the presence of the world and of our belonging to the world” of, with, and for
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others in relations of communication (Happiness 96). With physics supporting the spiritual
practice of taking a view from above, routine concerns and interactions were brought into the
perspective of being parts and expressions of the Whole wherein meanings of the human
condition abandoned to this place and time can be renegotiated with others. In Hadot’s
scholarship this theme had been present throughout all his works. However, a full-scale excursus
took shape in his final published book, The Veil of Isis: An essay on the History of the Idea of
Nature (2006). In the image of Pierre Courcelle, one of Hadot’s mentors, Hadot framed the work
by tracing the development of meanings of the Heraclitean aphorism “Nature loves to hide” (x,
Kahn 33). This began with the evolution of the meaning of the Greek work phusis to the ‘secrets
of nature’ and up through the present moment to the ‘the mystery of being.’
Phusis began as a general term for Pre-Socratic “investigations of nature” that marked the
conception of a process of development or formation/transformation (Veil 32). With Plato, the
meaning of phusis became aligned with that of a divine art (22). Thus formed the relationship
between nature and art that framed humankind’s relationship to nature throughout historical
moments. For Plato, phusis or the operations and development of nature were a divine art that
could not be known. Aristotle marked a significant distinction between human art and nature. In
human art the principle of transformation is external to the material. Transformation involves
“violence” insofar as it is forced upon materials (24). Phusis in nature is initiated and directed by
an “inner motion” and form (23). In both cases the processes of phusis were invisible, regular
and methodical. Hadot traced this to the development of the idea that nature held secrets.
The idea that nature held secrets also involves an opposition. Secrets are held back from
others and are tightly guarded. This led to the development of the personification and divination
of nature that was concurrent with attempts at getting nature to reveal those secrets. Revealing
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these secrets was the purview of philosophy and science. Hadot characterizes the attempts at
revealing the secrets of nature as Promethean or Orphic. The two attitudes are not a strict
division, but rather “equally essential” in the investigations of nature and are often found
together in the same person and attempts at understanding (Veil 98).
The Promethean attitude is based in an understanding of the relationship between
humanity and nature to be generally hostile. Through technological and mechanical means the
researcher will forces nature to give up its secretes so they can be used for the purposes of
humankind. The Orphic attitude is based in the idea that humanity is a part of nature. The secrets
of nature can be known through human art insofar as human art – the poem, the painting, the
philosophical discourse – is a participation in the same creative and generative process of nature
(Veil 92). Hadot found that in the current moment the function of observing, explaining and or
theorizing regarding natural and visible phenomena has been largely co-opted to the inheritors of
the Promethean attitude, the ‘hard’ sciences. The poets and the philosophers of the present
moment are the inheritors of the existential aspect of the cosmos that gives witness and
participates in the “the inexplicable surging forth of reality” (Veil 314). The Promethean and the
Orphic continue to co-appear as frameworks of interpretation for orienting oneself in the
lifeworld and social complex (Arnett and Holba 9; Arneson 77) . The Promethean framework
privileges ‘power’ and ‘dominance’ whereas the Orphic privileges ‘communal’ and
‘collaborative’ for understanding the communicative relations between human beings and nature
and cosmos.
The final section of this chapter expands on the phenomena of physics practiced as a
spiritual exercise. This section reviewed Hadot’s explication of how physics functioned as a
spiritual exercise through his two most used examples, the Platonic dialogue Timaeus and
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Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. In the Timaues the practice of physics was highlighted as
conjectural exercise that brought a diversionary pleasure in the shape of poiētic play and
participation in the creative impulse of the universe through the spoken word thus forming and
re-forming the inner attitude of all participants.
Through the Meditations the discipline of desire was closely associated with the
development of the inner attitude of being indifferent to indifferent things, which facilitated the
Stoic in re-placing his actions in the context of the Whole. Macfarlane displays a contemporary
understanding and practice that resonates with this Stoic attitude. In Macfarlane the metaphorical
view from above is taken from ‘below’ and is integral in negotiating meaning in and through the
mode of human communication in the Anthropocene moment.
As Macfarlane demonstrates in Underland (2019) human relationships of/in
communication are influenced by the contours of the earth and cosmos we inhabit. As the
contours of the earth are transformed in the Anthropocene epoch humans undergo disjointed
experiences of place and time. (75). Negotiation of meaning and formulating responses in human
communication to the present terrestrial conditions involves understandings of our relationship
with nature and the cosmos. In re-placing the current circumstances with the perspective of the
All the philosopher becomes aware of the vastness of the All present in the world and others.
Human communication is thus (re)oriented toward the expression of the All in others.
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CHAPTER 5
Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy of Communication
“That there would be room once again in
our contemporary world for philo-sophers in
the etymological sense of the word, that is,
seekers of wisdom. They would . . . search
not for happiness—it seems that that is no
longer fashionable—but for a life that is
more conscious, more rational, and more
open to others and the immensity of the
world.” (Happiness 112)
Pierre Hadot has repeatedly pointed out that philosophy as a way of life is inextricable
from the existential conditions of the person, the community, and the cosmos. As such, his work
is directly connected to human communication. A guiding question and theme, “Is modern man
still able to understand the texts of antiquity and live according to them?” runs throughout
Hadot’s engagement with ancient philosophy (Way of Life 278). Throughout his writings Hadot
reveals a holistic philosophy of communication: it is a discourse that leverages ideas and
practices from ancient philosophy for the formation of “interpretive frameworks” for navigating
meaning in the present historical moment (Arnett and Holba 9). The philosopher—a seeker of
wisdom—engages in spiritual exercises for the purpose of transforming his entire being—mind,
body, soul—toward the model of wisdom as embodied in the model of the sage. The sage model
as ideal guides the philosopher in the ever-incomplete task of orienting themselves in the social
complex to include a vision of the cosmos (Arneson 77).
In explicating Hadot’s philosophy of communication, the first section of this chapter is
dedicated to setting a picture of the contemporary conditions of human communication. The
‘big’ questions of meaning in life emerge in and through the banal conditions of everyday life, to
live is to be “embodied, to be in community, and for that reason, to be communicative” (Butchart
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5). Questions such as “how do I live?” “What does death mean for me and for my loved ones?”
emerge at inconvenient times demanding a human response (MacIntyre 125).
The second section of this chapter outlines Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication
in four elements framed as Hadot’s response to his own question, “Is modern man still able to
understand the text of antiquity and live according to them?” (Way of Life 278). The four
elements for a philosophia of the present moment include: 1) an enduring philosophical attitude
of eclecticism, 2) an updated model of a sage, 3) the spiritual exercise of being in the present
moment, and 4) recognition of corporeal/linguistic expressivity as the condition(s) for/of
philosophy as a way of life.
To conclude the 2nd section, I outline a holistic communication ethics drawn from the
works of Hadot. Hadot understood ethics to be inextricable from the broader existential
phenomenon of philosophy as a way of life. The practice of spiritual exercises as philosophy
involves the transformation of the practitioner’s being in working toward the level of being of
the sage (Happiness 177). Philosophia, in other words, was a practice of self-transformation at
the level of being. To outline a holistic communication ethics of self-transformation I turn to
Hadot’s critique of Michel Foucault’s rendering of aesthetics of existence. The section concludes
by turning to Arnold Davidson and the beginnings of an extended conversation between Foucault
and Hadot.
Describing the Contemporary Historical Moment
Hadot interpreted ancient philosophical discourse in the context of production. His
contributions to understanding human communication in the contemporary moment must be
situated in the conditions of the present historical moment (Arnett and Holba 12). This section
approaches the conditions of the contemporary moment in their anthropological, cultural,
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communicative and terrestrial aspects. The work of Matthew Crawford on the human capacity
for attention, Zygmunt Bauman on a culture of the ‘hunter,’ and Robert Macfarlane serve to
paint a picture of the conditions of the contemporary human communicator attempting to orient
himself and find meaning in the “multidimensional composition of human relationships” that is
the social complex (Arneson 77).
Attention
Crawford is the author of Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work
(2009) and followed up that work with The World beyond Your Head: On Becoming an
Individual in an Age of Distraction (2015). Crawford’s project in The World beyond Your Head
is an exercise in philosophical anthropology aimed at tracing the scaffolding undergirding the
current “age of distraction” (8). In the “age of distraction,” the human faculty of ‘attention’ is
difficult to develop (8). Yet, attention is precisely that faculty which “joins us to the world”
(131). Where attention is placed indicates what a person values. Crawford observes that the
content of the attention is nearly irrelevant. Rather, “Our distractibility seems to indicate that we
are agnostic on the question of what is worth paying attention to—that is, what to value” (5
original emphasis). In other words, the stimulation itself is of value and not the content. This
leads to a situation of persons perceiving that they have gained liberation from traditional
societal structures (religious, geographical, and civic) awash in choices with a “cognitive
environment” characterized as “by turns anxious, put-upon, distracted, exhausted, enthralled,
ecstatic, self-forgetting” (World 8). Autonomy values freedom and removes us from the authority
structures that help us navigate that freedom.
Responding to the question “How should I live?” involves asking how the ideal person
(e.g., Socrates, Machiavelli’s prince, the saints, the rugged American male, the perfect picture of
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femininity, etc.) takes action in this situation/life. Crawford identifies a tension in the present
historical moment between the ideal Western autonomous self and objects that are external to the
mind including other people (World 26). The autonomous self strives “to secure its freedom by
rendering the external world fully pliable to its will . . . this [is] accomplished by treating objects
as projections of the mind” that are duly pliable to the will of the mind (Crawford, World 26). On
the other hand, objects external to the mind are perceived as restraints to the freedom of the
autonomous self (26).
The primary objects that constrain the ideal of Western self are “things,” “inheritance,”
and “other people,” as Crawford identifies in the major divisions of his book (World 26).
Crawford identifies the self in the present historical moment as being “saturated” in the mental
projections carrying out the business of life in a “highly mediated existence” (26). In Crawford
the pliability of mental projections has folded back on the self so that “we ourselves have been
rendered pliable—to whoever has the power to craft the most bewitching representations or to
control the portals of public space through which we must pass to conduct the business of life”
(27). Crawford notes that these two states of existence, a pliable self and the enlightenment ideal
of autonomy, are at odds with our fundamental “situatedness” in the world (26).
We are born into a world, environment, culture, cosmos, and language that is always
already in existence. To learn and to attain freedom is to allow oneself to be “led out” (World
127) under the authority of linguistic structures, social structures, and the knowledge to hand of
the long-time practitioners (e.g., masters of a craft, elders, educators). In an environment
saturated with enticing projections, there is little time to develop one’s capacity for attention
(127–128).
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A fundamental problem for human communication in the present moment emerges in this
tension between learning new things and autonomy. Attention is developed through learning
which requires acknowledgement of our linguistic situatedness with others in the world. The
ability to attend to things is a faculty that is both developed through and required for human
communication. The autonomous self does not value this self-discipline, and the world of
enticements can keep this fundamental activity of being human severely underdeveloped. With a
severely reduced capacity of shared narrative ground for being in communication, responding to
questions such as “How should I live?” becomes an exhausting task (Crawford 127; Butchart 1011). In this situation, is it any wonder that people attempt to move on quickly when the passion
and abrupt intrusion of questions about the meaning in life emerge in daily interactions
(MacIntyre 125)?
Bauman’s construct of “liquid modernity” resonates with Crawford’s description of the
tensions in both freedom and attention. For Bauman, ‘culture’ refers to “a set of preferences
suggested, recommended and imposed on account of their correctness, goodness or beauty” (5).
At the beginning of the historical moment of the Enlightenment, culture was “missionary” in the
service of guiding all of humanity toward an ‘enlightened’ universal condition where people of
the lowest classes were to be freed from the rule of “prejudice and superstition” for the purpose
of continuing the advancement of society(6). Missionary culture soon assumed an educational
mode and relationship that was:
“a planned and expected agreement between those possessing knowledge (or at least
confident of being in possession of it) and ignoramuses (or those thus described by the
confident aspirants to their education); an agreement furnished, incidentally with only
one signature, unilaterally endorsed, and realized under the exclusive directorship of the
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newly formed ‘educated class,’ seeking the right to fashion the ‘new and improved’ order
rising from the ashes of the ancient régime.” (Bauman 9)
The missionary culture soon brought new life and dimensions by spreading through colonization
in the United States coupled with new social evolutionary theories. The burden of the cultured
was to “convert the rest of the inhabitants of the globe” to the social order and ‘enlightened’
culture of the Western developed nation, e.g. Great Britain (9). Institutions and bureaucracies
were duly set up in the new territories to assist the mission and establish “the intended product (a
populace turned into a ‘civic body’)” (10). After a missionary culture is in place, a nation’s
culture then shifts from a missionary agent—in the form of educators, priests—o a conservative
force to maintain the “civic body”—such as a justice system (10).
The Enlightenment project and the conservative maintenance stages of culture are
characterized by societal assumptions about the task. Bauman offers the transition to “‘liquid
modernity’ alongside ‘postmodernity’, ‘late modernity’, [and] ‘second’ or ‘hyper’ modernity”
(11). Liquid modernity is marked by open-ended stimulation for the purpose of occupying a
person’s attention. Culture is marked not by the content of the al products, but rather how wide
one’s tastes are and how much one can consume (Bauman 1-3). “Liquid modernity” describes
the condition of “compulsive and obsessive ‘modernization’, as a result of which, like liquid,
none of the consecutive forms of social life is able to maintain its shape for long” (Bauman 11).
The impetus of culture then is moved from the societal task to the realm of personal choice and
personal responsibility, thus making choice the central and “unavoidable duty of life” (12).
For an individual living in a “liquid modern” culture this condition of “constant change”
becomes the norm. During the Enlightenment, the ‘good’ rested in achieving a state of
refinement or education for all human beings across cultures. Mission work and forced education
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were judged to be necessary for the process of creating an ‘enlightened’ civic body. The goal in
liquid modernity is people’s continual participation in the never-ending hunt for stimulation and
constant access to another choice (Bauman 23). Bauman here points to the constant shifting
norms of fashion, be it clothing, art, or digital platforms of interaction. The person in the hunt—
each of us—must constantly track the ever-shifting symbols denoting belonging. This moves
persons to acquire and consume the ‘next’ before the current pursuit comes to an end. The thrill
of the hunt through the constant stimulation must be kept up. Movement becomes essential, and
the game becomes one not of societal action taken toward an “enlightened” condition, but of
keeping up or surviving in an ever-changing environment (24). The self as hunter in liquid
modernity is in “the pursuit of constantly elusive fashion” (Bauman 30). The continual hunt
“does not give sense to life. . . . It merely helps to banish the question of life’s meaning from our
minds” (30). Reflection on these questions takes one away from the hunt and arrests one from
moving on to the next stimulation: reflection is a death sentence.
Intermittently, an event momentarily sideline’s the hunter—a significant injury, loss of
income, death of a loved one, etc. Filling the vacuum left by the hunt and its stimulation are the
questions of meaning of a life, primarily, “How should I live?” Bauman paints a bleak picture of
this space:
When such an opportunity finally presents itself, that is at moments of dropping out of, or
being excluded from the hunter’s way of life, it is as a rule too late for reflection to
influence the course of one’s life and the life of those around. It is too late to object to the
‘actually existing’ shape of one’s life, and certainly for any questioning of its sense to
bring practical results. (30)
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The problem for human communication is that learning to live in liquid modernity prizes the
individual hunter’s way of life in which the persistent questions of meaning are constantly kept
at bay. As Macfarlane explains, “untimely surfacings” mark and present experiences of
disjointed time and place.
Untimely Surfacings
Macfarlane’s work displays a combination of analytic and poetic ways of understanding
one’s lived-experience. Macfarlane’s most recent work, Underland: A Deep Time Journey
(2019) sees the Orphic and Promethean attitudes intertwine as he writes in an attempt to
approach the Anthropocene epoch (13).
“[T]he Anthropocene should be considered a new Earth epoch, on the ground that
‘mankind will remain a major geological force for many millennia, maybe millions of
years to come.’ As the Pleistocene was defined by the action of ice, and the Holocene by
a period of relative climatic stability allowing the flourishing of life, so the Anthropocene
is seen to be defined by the action of Anthropos: human beings, shaping the Earth at a
global scale.” (Underland 75)
Characteristic of the Anthropocene is the occurrence of disturbing change at the planetary level
where both time and place are disrupted. “‘[C]risis’ exists not as an ever-deferred apocalypse but
rather as an ongoing occurrence” (14).
Examples that mark disjointed time and place are the phenomena Macfarlane terms
“untimely surfacings” (Beneath). For example, the appearance of Arctic methane deposits
emerge with the thawing of the permafrost, “the imprints of ancient structures—Roman
watchtowers, Neolithic enclosures” come into view in Britain from aerial views, and a Cold War
era American military site in Greenland that was once thought to be safely enclosed beneath the
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ice cap is emerging with its “hundreds of thousands of gallons of chemical contaminants” is reemerging (Underland 14). As the ground under our feet is displaced so emerges the immense
sense of “deep time” (15).
Macfarlane describes “deep time” as the “dizzying expanses of Earth history that stretch
away from the present moment” and is “measured in units that humble the human instant: epochs
and aeons, instead of minutes and years” (Underland 15). Rather than freezing action in the face
of a vast picture of time Macfarlane argues that engaging “deep time” spurs us onto “reimagining [the present moment]; countermanding its quick greeds and furies with older, slower
stories of making and unmaking . . . bringing us to consider what we are leaving behind for the
epochs and beings that will follow us” (15). The urgent disjointed present condition appears in
the illustrative example of sealing and storing “radioactive uranium pellets encased in iron, then
encased in copper” in Yucca Mountain above a fault named Ghost Dance (7). The half-lives of
the uranium are projected to be millions of years:
“The timescale of the hazard is such that those responsible for entombing this waste must
now face the question of how to communicate its danger to the distant future. This is a
risk that will outlast not only the life of its makers but perhaps also the species of its
makers. How to mark this site? How to tell whatever beings will come to this desert place
that what is kept in this rock sarcophagus is desperately harmful, is not of value, must
never be disturbed?” (7, original emphasis)
Macfarlane gives voice to Hadot’s rendering of a lived physics. As those responsible for the
Yucca Mountain site are working out the problem of marking meaning for the future they are
simultaneously working out the meaning of this site in and through communication for the
present moment at the exposed/opening lines of self, other, community, and cosmos (Butchart
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136). Macfarlane dives beneath the surface investigating the ‘underlands’ of the earth, vivifying
the Anthropocene epoch in a way that opens the possibility of orienting ourselves
corporeally/linguistically in the life world with others in accord with a renewed vision of the
cosmos.
The picture Crawford, Bauman, and Macfarlane paint of the current historical moment is
that the questions continue to emerge but contemporary communicators are left without personal
motivation and competence for reaching out to others, stimulation is valued over content, and
people find themselves without time and without models for how to reflect and engage the
ongoing and inherent process of responsivity in a situation and responsibility to others in the
social complex (Arneson 30). Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication assists present-day
communicators in finding resources to develop attention and respond to the questions of the
human condition corporeally and linguistically in the lifeworld.
Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy of Communication
Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic as he attends to the health of one’s
whole being. By ‘whole being’ he means that philosophy practiced as a way of life in the ancient
model was therapeutic for the inextricably intertwined body, mind, soul, cosmos, and
community. Debra Hawhee reminds us that the now perceived hard lines between ‘segments’ of
this whole was a later introduction by scholars. In the ancient practice, these were more fluid in
the ancient practice such that philosophical instruction at Plato’s Academy took place in the
gymnasium (Hawhee 4). Philosophia, then, was the result and the ongoing confirmation of an
existential choice to live in a particular way of life defined by the practice (askēsis) of spiritual
exercises.
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The spiritual exercises, such as meditation on death, attentiveness to the present moment,
achieving a view from above, and dialogue, are educative. As such, spiritual exercises are
intended to form the practitioner to the “fundamental inner attitude” and required the “entire
spirit, one’s whole way of being” (Way of Life 59, 21). As in the example of Alcibiades and
Socrates in Plato’s Symposium, the experience of wisdom—coming to the awareness of one’s
unknowledgeable state, incoherence of personal and communal action, and desire toward
wisdom—calls for the application of reasoned logos, passionate desire and formative potential of
persuasive speech carried in and through the spoken word.
Socrates was a midwife whose dialectical and erotic irony opened his dialogue partner to
the risk and fear of exposure of one’s own lack of wisdom. Going forward in the conversation,
Socrates took on the responsibility for his partner by bringing his dialogue partner to the point of
crisis—the point at which the person becomes a living problem for himself—which for Socrates
marked the beginning of awareness and health.
Socrates, as well as many others recognized as philosophers during antiquity, were
recognized for their way of life, not for any works, if at all, they wrote. The relationship between
written philosophical discourse and philosophia is a Stoic distinction that Hadot revealed is
exemplified in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. As hypomnēmata (notes written to and for
himself) they were specially and vividly formulated ‘dogmas’ of the fundamental Stoic
principles by which Marcus lived his life. In writing them and in speaking them he re-embodied
them, thus rekindling his intention and choice of life to judge, desire, and act on himself and with
others in a way that was coherent with universal Reason. Philosophy as a way of life was a
corporeal/linguistic interweaving of the therapeutic, the personal, and the communal expressed in
the lifeworld and social complex (Arneson 25).
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Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic. He approaches philosophy as
therapeutic because embodied practice is rooted in a choice made in response to existential
conditions and the recognition of a lack of wisdom—a response to ‘how do I live well?’—
motivated in a desire toward an ideal wisdom in practice. Hadot relies on the model of the sage
for the purpose of engaging the incomplete and therefore possible task of orienting oneself in the
social complex as part of and an expression of the cosmos.
Living and Communicating Philosophically
Hadot’s philosophy of communication is brought to life as a philosophia for the present
moment. This is outlined in four characteristics: the fate of the philosophical attitude up to and
including the current historical moment, a sage model for 2020, attention of the present moment,
and task of the philosopher. To live philosophically is to exhibit linguistic/corporeal expressivity
of the dense tenets of communicative engagement enmeshed in the everyday life of the social
complex. This incomplete task is made possible as one lives in and through the “meaning-full
experience” of human communication (Arneson 25).
Enduring Philosophical Attitude and Practice
The phenomenon of ‘philosophy’ has been one of the primary phenomena associated
with wisdom or knowledge in the Western tradition. Hadot’s investigation of the contours of
philosophy’s context of production brings into relief the bonds of philosophical discourse that in
the ancient context were tethered to philosophy as a way of life that was carried out in a context
of primary orality. In other words, philosophy as embodied was essentially communicative. On
several occasions Hadot explained the phenomenon of philosophy as occurring between two
poles: one that privileges the creation and shaping of philosophical discourse for the sake of
itself as the primary purpose, the other one privileges living a good life placing philosophical

115

discourse in service of this purpose (Happiness 56-60; Ancient 260). In explicating philosophia
Hadot pointed to the disconnect in the present moment between the phenomenon of ‘philosophy’
and the capacity to offer a way of living or at least resources for responding to 21st century
conditions as presented above. This picture is furthered in the disparity between “philosophy and
the teaching of philosophy” that Hadot experienced in his own education (Way of Life 278). This
led Hadot to wonder whether or not philosophy as a phenomenon has become perceived to be a
luxury.
The luxury of philosophy is the perception that in the face of human “concerns, their
sufferings, their anguishes, the perspective of death that awaits them, and awaits those they love”
philosophical discourse of the present moment appears as “vain chatter and ridiculous luxury”
(Happiness 188). Though moved to the side in Hadot’s rendering of the development of the
phenomenon of systemizing discourse philosophy and the concurrent emergence of the
university, the attitude of philosophy as a way of life has remained present throughout his works
(Ancient 254-255; Happiness 55-56). Using askēsis, or a transformational practice, as a marker
Hadot frequently comments that the works of Soren Kierkegaard, Michel de Montaigne,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Henri Bergson,
Michel Foucault, and Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein display the continuance of the concept
of philosophia. Hadot read ancient philosophical discourse as an integration of the ideas and the
literary genre, and he read Wittgenstein—a philosopher whose works are most associated with
analytic philosophy—as practicing the same integration (Introduction 17).
Hadot associated the apparent structureless form of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations (1953) as functioning therapeutically. “Wittgenstein continues [from the Tractatus
to the Investigations] . . . to devote himself to the same mission: to bring a radical and definitive
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peace to metaphysical worry. . . [Philosophical Investigations] wished to act little by little on our
spirit, like a cure, like a medical treatment. The work therefore does not have a systematic
structure, strictly speaking” (Wittgenstein 973 qtd. in Davidson Introduction 17-18 emphasis
added). Hadot found Wittgenstein’s investigation of language games helpful as Hadot himself
investigated the language games—rules and structures of meaning in context of
production/utterance—of philosophical discourse inancient philosophy as “ways of life”:
“[I]t was in relation to language games that I first had the idea that philosophy is also a
spiritual exercise because, ultimately, spiritual exercises are often language games, in
which one tells oneself a phrase to provoke an effect, whether on others or on oneself,
hence under certain circumstances and with a certain goal. Moreover, in the same
context, Wittgenstein also used the expression ‘form of life.’ This also inspired me to
understand philosophy as a form or way of life.” (Happiness 135)
With the help of Hadot’s approach to interpretation, and the recognition of the philosophical
attitude embodied by scholars mentioned above, we have come to a richer understanding of
ancient philosophical discourse and its practice within the context of the contemporary moment.
The philosophical attitude continues, so what of practicing the spiritual exercises bereft of the
context and community of the schools of antiquity.
The Sage in 2020
The community of practitioners, the philosopher’s school, was essential for the spiritual
development of the individual philo-sophos in the ancient context. As discussed in chapters two
and three, this format acknowledged the primacy of the formative capacity of the embodied
spoken word for the spiritual progress of the practitioner, which is the primary goal of
philosophy. Bereft of the ancient schools and masters of philosophy, how can one “hasten to the
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philosopher to hear him speak, question him, and carry on discussions with him and other
disciples in a community that always serves as a place of discussion”? (Way of Life 62). Reading
‘alone’ the contemporary seeker of wisdom will become aware of his lack of wisdom and desire
for it by following the models of those mentioned above who continued the philosophical
attitude in their historical moment. “Montaigne, Goethe, Nietzsche . . . too, were alone, but in
accordance with their circumstances and innermost needs, they chose the ways of life of ancient
philosophy as their models” (Ancient 277). In other words, the essentials are available and can be
adaptable to meet current conditions of the need to train the capacity of attention and to address
the ever-emergent questions of meaning in life.
Borrowing from Nietzsche, Hadot gained the view that the schools and subsequent
traditions of philosophical discourse act for the present-day reader as “experimental laboratories”
of the experiences and consequences that the various ancient ways of life have to offer
(Nietzsche qtd. in Ancient 277-278). Hadot encouraged contemporary readers to adopt the
attitude of eclecticism, in other words, students are able to benefit simultaneously from both an
Epicurean and/or Stoic model in approaching the conditions of the present moment (Ancient
277). This is so because conditions change and philosophy as embodied is therapeutic insofar as
it addresses the conditions of the lived-body in the lifeworld and social complex (Arneson 77).
Experiments of the ancients provide time-tested and honed models for practicing stepping away
from the hunt (Bauman), developing attention (Crawford) to the moment, and in communication
with others develop responses to the questions of meaning. In and through communication one
orients oneself in the life world and social complex through internal and external discourse and
dialogue. The Cynic, Neoplatonic, and especially Stoic and Epicurean approaches to wisdom are
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found outside the ancient context of the schools and are practicable for seeking wisdom in the
present moment.
When the outdated “cosmological and mythical elements” of the schools are
“transcended” the fundamental attitude of approaching the search for wisdom becomes primary
(Ancient 278; Citadel 309). Hadot posited, “these models [Cynic, Neoplatonic, Stoic, Epicurean]
correspond to fundamental attitudes which all human beings find necessary when they set about
seeking wisdom” (Ancient 278). The models are finite and universal, “which are found in various
forms, in every civilization, throughout the various culture zones of humanity” (278). As we
have seen, the attitude, existential choice, and consequent way of life of a school was modeled in
the figure of the sage.
According to Hadot the model of the sage for the present moment must model and inspire
the ongoing orientation of the practitioner’s embodied, therefore communicative and communal,
way of life (Happiness 117). Hadot’s own attempts at living the Neoplatonic maxims of Plotinus
as he was writing the book on Plotinus (Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision 1963) allowed him to
come away acknowledging that an emphasis on separation of the soul and body did not meet the
needs of the present day. Rather, “Since 1970 on, I have felt very strongly that it was
Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of men and women of our
times, as well as my own” (Way of Life 280).
Stripping the model of the sage down to the essential characteristics and responsive to the
current conditions Hadot outlined a contemporary sage-model characterized by “cosmic
consciousness,” “inner peace,” and an increased capacity for the “love of mankind” (Happiness
117). The “love of mankind” is the motivation in all the schools to make and re-make the choice
of a way of life (Ancient 220). The second marker of the sage is an audacious cosmic vision that
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keeps the All or the Whole or universal Reason in mind (Happiness 117). Motivated with a
vision, the sage reaches out to others to attempt to relieve them from the two primary anguishes
of life—anxiety and fear—by guiding them to contemplation of the same cosmic vision which
motivates him. Keeping the vision of the whole in mind, the sage has transcended a partial egooriented vision as he attains a view from above that puts his actions and life in a humbling
perspective that likewise births in the soul a freedom from those fears which equates to an inner
peace (117-118).
Hadot wrote that the love of mankind and inner peace must contend with “revolt
grumbling inside” as the contemporary philosopher (philo-sophos)—the one seeking wisdom
following the example of the sage—views the full landscape of human suffering, such as human
trafficking, the opioid crisis in the United States, war-torn regions and oppressed populations,
and the effects of the Anthropocene epoch on current and future generations (Happiness 119). In
love the philosopher cannot turn away from the human suffering all the while struck by his
“powerlessness to reform anything” (119). For in the Stoic sense, the love of mankind refers to
the realization that “no being is alone, but that we are parts of a Whole, constituted by the totality
of human beings as well as by the totality of the cosmos” (Citadel 311). In other words, the
fundamental human condition is not isolation, but rather we are in-relation with others and are
thus already communicative (Butchart 134).
Loving mankind and the cosmos and bringing our intention into coherence with
universal, Reason is also loving the part of the whole that we are. Thus, bringing inner peace to
oneself through the spiritual exercises of attention, dialogue, and meditation is inseparable from
bringing other beings into coherence with reason because all are already in an affective,
formative, thus communicative relationship with and as the Whole (Butchart 136). Differently
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than the road of detachment or indifference as in the ancient era to bring peace of mind, the
modern philosopher must be concerned “to act well without being misled by hatred, anger, or
pity” (119). Hadot was adamant on this point, “I nevertheless believe that without inner peace,
no action can ultimately be effective” (Happiness 119). For only the person or persons who have
formed the inner attitude in the spiritual exercises of being authentically present to oneself—
meditation and attention—can bring their whole being to be present with others in dialogue and
in living philosophically (Way of Life 91).
The Present Moment
Hadot had several conversations with Jeannie Carlier and Arnold Davidson and they
ended up being some of his final conversations on his own thought, as he died shortly thereafter
on April 24, 2010 in Orsay, France. The published collection of these conversations appeared
under the title The Present Alone is Our Happiness (2011) indicating the prominent position this
universal spiritual attitude figured in ancient philosophy and in Hadot’s diagnosis and
prescription for philosophers (philo-sophos) in the present moment. As seen in chapter three of
this project the spiritual exercise of being attentive to the present moment was fundamental to
living philosophically. Attentiveness to the present moment was intimately tied to the therapeutic
function of the spiritual exercises for both gathering and focusing the self and its expansion
(Ancient 189; Citadel 118). Attention to the present moment—a pillar of practice for the
Epicureans and the Stoics—was deployed to overcome the fear and anxiety of the future and the
past (Way of Life 87).
Tied to this exercise in coming to realize the abundance of the present moment was the
exercise of meditation on one’s own death which brought one to realize the “value and
seriousness” to the moments in a life (Ancient 193). The ancient philosophy as a way of life

121

responded to a conventional life that was “inauthentic” and “darkened by unconsciousness and
harassed by worry” as one’s inner discourse was dispersed (Way of Life 83). As it was then so it
is now: “Today, we are even more inwardly divided than was Plotinian man” (Plotinus 113).
What we might call ‘routine’ concerns of the daily life—having food, shelter, work, health care,
concern for children and/or parents—are compounded in the present moment by conditions to
which both Crawford and Bauman give voice. Particularly the valuation of stimulation over
content and an underdeveloped capacity for attention, and of being responsive to the
corporeal/linguistic expressivity of/with others in human communication amidst a ‘liquid
modern’ culture of the hunter that disincentivizes reflection. Hadot’s description is consistent
with theirs as he relays in closing out an essay on the present moment,
“[I]t was not in order to satisfy some historical or literary curiosity, but to describe a
spiritual attitude: an attitude which, for ourselves and for modern man in general,
hypnotized as we are by language, images, information, and the myth of the future,
seemed to us to provide one of the best means of access to this wisdom [of the present
moment], so misunderstood and yet so necessary. The call of Socrates speaks to us more
now than ever before: ‘Take care for yourself.’ This call is echoed by Nietzsche’s
remark: ‘Is it not the case that all human institutions’ – to which we might add: ‘as well
as the whole of modern life’ – are intended to prevent mankind from feeling their life by
means of the constant dispersion of their thoughts.’” (Way of Life 235)
Philosophy as a way of life exercised in attention to the present moment (e.g. in meditation), or
in the exercise of contemplation on death, opens for present day readers a way to “train ourselves
for that unique act of wisdom”—doing the good with and for others—as one moves through the
routine concerns of daily life to those that concern one’s whole being. A being that is abandoned
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to language, embedded as part of the cosmos and is in communication “the mode and means
through which human being makes sense of its experience of having-to-be” (Butchart 12-13).
For the ancient and the modern philo-sophos the task carried out in communication is never
complete.
Philosophy as a Way of Life:
The Incomplete Task of Corporeal/Linguistic Expressivity
Transformation of the practitioner’s “whole way of being” begins in a lack of wisdom
which opens and keeps open the possibility for seeking wisdom, i.e., living philosophically as a
way of life (Davidson 21). The completion of the philosophical task as modeled in the
myth/figures of sages is deemed by all philosophical models as nearly unattainable. The
impossibility of the task of becoming a sage, thus a perpetual philo-sophos, secures the ground of
transformation—or the ‘space’ where the task of philosophy is worked out and lived—as the
“lived-body” tethered to the life-world that is the “site of communicative tasks to be performed
by the embodied subject” (Arneson 24).
The philosophical task (seeking wisdom) is indivisible from the lived-body. As
embodied, philosophy as a way of life—seeking wisdom through spiritual exercises that form
and reform an embodied self in concert with an operative understanding of nature, the cosmos,
and self-in-relation with all—is communicative engagement in and through corporeal/linguistic
expressivity (Arneson 25; Butchart 5). For Hadot philosophy is learning “how to live a human
life” which is inextricable from the human condition (Happiness 188).
Philosophy as a way of life in the ancient world took shape as a “living conversation”
occurring “person to person” and “was not cut off from daily life” (Happiness 188). In other
words, philosophy as a way of life relied on and was carried out in and through a lived-body—
the ground for corporeal and linguistic expressivity (Arneson 23). Arneson articulates that,
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“Without a body-lived and a lived-body there is no communication—no self, no meaning, no
discourse, no community, no culture” (27). “Human communication” continues Arneson,
“intertwines the body with thought/language/expressivity in a phenomenal field. . . Meaning
arises in lived experience, which is created, negotiated, and shared with others in embodied
linguistic expressivity” (27). “Embodied linguistic expressivity” enmeshed in the life-world with
others is the condition of possibility for living philosophically, i.e seeking wisdom in the “living
conversation” of everyday life. For living philosophically in the present moment, it is a necessary
condition that philosophy as a way of life remain incomplete.
Hadot has variously noted the generative and inherent contradiction of the perfection of
the philosophical life/philosophy in daily life. “The drama of the human condition is that it is
impossible not to philosophize, and at the same time it is impossible to philosophize,” and again,
“it is precisely in this daily life that [the philosopher] . . . must seek to attain that way of life
which is utterly foreign to the everyday world” (Happiness 189, Way of life 58). For example,
experiencing a moment of corporeal/linguistic expressivity appearing to be in coherence with
universal Reason and the Whole while in the next moment confronted by the necessities,
passions, fears and anxieties that are inherent to embodiment. These remind and re-embody the
philosopher’s lack of wisdom.
A lack of wisdom, or a lack of identity with the corporeal/linguistic expressivity
embodied in the sage-model, is the opening revealing that “human essence is with” and that
“Com-muni-cation” indicates relation with other people as ontologically primary (Butchart 134).
A lack of wisdom is the necessary condition for living and communicating philosophically.
Socrates again serves as a model for ancient and the present moment.
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Aware of his own lack of wisdom Socrates turned to others in his search. His
conversations occurred as he walked in the city, rested outside the walls, in battle, at drinking
parties, and just before he drank the hemlock. Socrates and his dialogue partner(s) are in-relation
on the condition of the experience and awareness of a lack of wisdom and the desire toward
wisdom both of which are corporeally and linguistically expressed on the “terrain” of the livedbody as meaning is negotiated and renegotiated in and through human communication (Arneson
25). Following the conversation in Plato’s Symposium Socrates, to continue his search for
wisdom, turns again, necessarily, to the banalities of everyday life—washing himself and
conversing with others in the city—the communicative ground and means of the search for
wisdom.

Toward a Holistic Communication Ethics of the Present Moment
“As far as lived ethics is concerned, the point is obviously not to be content with an
ethical theory, but to practice it. For the Stoics, what matters is above all what they call
the duties, that is, the duties of everyday life. We thus have to deal with spiritual
exercises, or with what I call spiritual exercises, that is, practices intended to transform
the self, and make it reach a higher level and a universal perspective, thanks in particular
to physics, the awareness of one’s relation to the world, or thanks to the awareness of
one’s relation with the whole of humanity, which implies the duty of taking the common
good into account.” (Happiness 177)
Pierre Hadot preferred to situate his conception of ethics within what he calls a general
“existential interest” in ancient philosophy and philosophy as a way of life in the present moment
(Happiness 175). “[E]thical implies an evaluation concerning good and bad in actions, or in
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people, or in things” (Happiness 175). Hadot considered ‘ethical’ or ‘ethics’ to be inextricable
from the practice of philosophy as a way of life, and too limited a descriptor for the phenomenon
that was ancient philosophy and the concept of living it for the present moment. Pat Arneson’s
description resonates with Hadot’s understanding of the inextricable intertwining of ethics and
embodiment: “A person cannot separate herself from the ethical dimension of life; one’s ethics
are always learned and communicated both corporeally and linguistically with the power
dynamics of the social complex” (80). Ethics lived and “communicated corporeally and
linguistically” took shape as the spiritual exercises (chapter three) as they called on and
(trans)formed the practitioner and community at the level of being (80).
Chapter one reviewed Hadot’s historical context and intellectual development as he came
to the question, “is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity and live according
to them?” (Way of life 278). Hadot’s scholarship can be viewed as a sustained response to that
question. To that end his scholarship assists an understanding of ancient Greek and Roman
philosophical texts as support for exercising philosophy through embodied spiritual exercises.
Spiritual exercises, such as attention, meditation, and dialogue were inseparable from an
operable theory and vision of nature and the cosmos. This situated the philosopher and others as
members of the larger human community and as parts and expressions of the cosmos. Ethical
considerations are part of existential transformation of the self and others as members of the
human and cosmic whole.
For adopting and adapting ancient practices for the present Hadot prescribed an eclectic
approach. For example, a person in the present moment has access to and can choose from the
various models of philosophical life and attitudes toward wisdom—Stoic, Epicurean,
Neoplatonic, Buddhist, Christian, etc.—each addressing the present human condition—inflicted
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with anxiety and fear—bringing peace to the soul, acknowledging oneself and others as parts and
expressions of the All or Whole, and by attaining consciousness of the present moment and
thereby a consciousness of one’s own lack of knowledge and desire for it (chapter 5).
In chapter five I argued that Hadot’s philosophy of communication is holistic as it
addresses the embodied incomplete task of orienting oneself in the social complex and the
lifeworld through the therapeutic spiritual exercises that act in and through one’s
corporeal/linguistic expressivity attentive to temporal and terrestrial conditions. (Arneson 25).
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell present a figure of communication ethics that is a pragmatic
necessity in the contemporary historical moment (1). Their model of communication ethics
asserts that communicative practices protect and promote a construct of the ‘good.’ In a liquid
modern historical moment the many and various forms of the good are ever shifting and in
contention revealed in and practiced and expressed in human communication (Bauman 30).
Arnett, Fritz, and Bell foreground the necessity of engaging others in learning as minimal
agreement is worked out to meet, together, the needs of the existential moment (Arnett, Fritz,
and Bell (xi-xvii). This allows for a multiplicity of appropriate responses to existential
conditions. In the present moment this is poignantly demonstrated in the patchwork of responses
to the pandemic by the different states and communities in the United States. With a minimal
agreement of curbing the rate of the spread and protecting the national economy the responses,
the timing and specific restrictions of travel and prescriptions for cover have varied.
Organizations such as schools and other community organizations (e.g. athletic/health clubs) are
navigating instruction and interaction in the digital/online communicative environment—most
for the first time. In navigating emergent historical conditions Hadot contributes to a
communication ethics that learns from ancient models of philosophia.
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The ideal of the philosopher was filled-out in the myth/figure of the sage. In chapter 2, I
reviewed Hadot’s distinction between the philosopher and the sage. The sage is considered the
model of the school. For example, in the Stoic understanding the sage’s corporeal/linguistic
expressivity were part of the production of “all the events of the universe” because in complete
coherence with universal reason (Citadel 76). The sage was at a different and “higher level” of
being than that of the philosopher (Happiness 177). Coherent, thus already in accordance with,
without the possibility of presenting corporeal/linguistic expressivity other than universal Reason
(in the Stoic sense). However, the existence or attainment of the sage is an ideal that was
considered to be unattainable because unlike the sage the philosopher was subject, as we all are,
to the human condition of the passions and the responsibility of the everyday existence of life as
part of a community. Hadot identified the philosopher as the person that is simultaneously aware
of, 1) his lack of wisdom, and 2) his innate desire for wisdom (chapter 2). The way toward
wisdom was in the practice of the spiritual exercises which were expressed
corporeally/linguistically and worked to transform the practitioner’s level of being, in other
words, the transformation of the self.
In Hadot’s rendering of the differences between philosophical discourse and philosophy
lived as a way of life—philosophia—the existential exercise of the choice to live philosophically
gives birth to philosophical discourse which in turn leads back to the existential choice, as, “by
means of its logical and persuasive force, and the action it tries to exert upon the interlocuter—
[philosophical discourse] incites both masters and disciples to live in genuine conformity with
their initial choice” (Ancient 3, emphasis added). A theme central to self-transformation for
Hadot is the issue of cosmic consciousness and transcendent wisdom embodied/modeled in the
figure of the sage. Michel Foucault (1926-1984 CE) was similarly working with understanding
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ancient models of life in understanding self-formation. Unfortunately, Foucault’s premature
death did not allow for an extended conversation between he and Hadot. Hadot did write a short
piece on the convergences and divergences between Foucault’s aesthetics of existence and his
own understanding of philosophy as a way of life.
Hadot critiques Foucault’s conception of the spiritual exercises and techniques of the self
as “focused far too much on the ‘self,’ or at least on a specific conception of the self’ (Way of
Life 207). Hadot couches his critique of Foucault’s description of the practitioner finding a
certain amount of pleasure in the self in a mistranslation of the Greek based on the understanding
of the Stoic principle of joy. On Hadot’s interpretation, joy for the Stoic is not ‘found’ in the self,
rather it is found through virtue, which may or may not be pleasurable for the self. Referring to
the same letter of Seneca Hadot articulates that the text supports a reading that the Stoic finds joy
not in the self, but rather in “‘the best portion of the self,’ in ‘the true good’” (Seneca qtd. in Way
of Life 207). This is consistent with the Stoic view of the coherence of human reason with
Universal reason and each human being as part and expression of the Whole or the All. “The
‘best portion of oneself,’ then, is, in the last analysis, a transcendent self. Seneca does not find
his joy in ‘Seneca,’ but by transcending ‘Seneca’; by discovering that there is within him –
within all human beings, that is and within the cosmos itself – a reason which is a part of
universal reason” (Way of Life 207). We see here again, Hadot’s emphasis on the Stoic ‘way of
life’ as perhaps best suited for adaptation to the present historical moment. However, even an
Epicurean ethics called for physics as a spiritual exercise in combatting the fear of death and the
‘gods’ (208).
Hadot’s point of departure from Foucault’s conception of the “aesthetics of existence” is
the latter’s lack of connection through embodiment to the broader human community and the
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cosmos (Way of Life 208). “Such a cosmic perspective radically transforms the feeling one has of
oneself” (208). For Hadot the “psychic content” then of the “aesthetics of existence” and the
practice of spiritual exercises within a sense of the whole of the cosmos is going to be different.
Hadot’s critique includes also Foucault’s concept of “writing of the self” derived from the
spiritual exercise of writing down notions to give pleasure to the soul by recording the notes of
wisdom of the past. This would relieve the soul of its worries over the future by enjoying the
“possession of a past” collected in the “spiritual notebooks”—the genre of hypomnemata which
Hadot discusses as the same genre of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Citadel 24-25). This
point of departure is minor, yet influential for the practitioner’s understanding of the practice.
Hadot focused on the practices of the self in bringing attention to the present moment. In
chapter 3 I reviewed Hadot’s understanding of the spiritual exercises as bringing relief from the
fears and anxieties brought on through considerations of both the past and the future. Hadot’s
critique of Foucault’s interpretation of the spiritual exercise of writing “what-has-already-beensaid” has two points. The first is that Foucault’s rendering of the practice opens the way for a
(re)turn to a pleasurable past that simultaneously covers over the “fundamental philosophic
attitude” and purpose of being in the present moment (209). Second, Foucault’s rendering of
writing misses the specificity of what was written down in the ancient practice. “In other words,
when one writes or notes something down, it is not an alien thought one is making one’s own.
Rather, one is utilizing formulae considered as apt to actualize what is already present within the
reason of the person writing, and bring it to life” (210). These point to the fundamental
difference between Hadot and Foucault on the spiritual exercises for the present moment.
Hadot’s critique of Foucault serves to highlight Hadot’s conception of the holistic and
therapeutic value of the spiritual exercises, i.e. the embodied exercise of philosophical life.
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“Writing, like the other spiritual exercises, changes the level of the self, and universalizes it”
(Way of Life 211, emphasis added). Therapeutic, as the practices exercised and thus changed
one’s being; holistic insofar as the self recognizes itself and others as part of the whole of
humankind and the cosmos. “This is a new way of being-in-the-world, which consists in
becoming aware of oneself as a part of nature, and a portion of universal reason” (211)
“In this way, one identifies oneself with an ‘Other’: nature, or universal reason, as it is
present within each individual. This implies a radical transformation of perspective, and
contains a universalist, cosmic dimension, upon which, it seems to me, M. Foucault did
not sufficiently insist. Interiorization is a going beyond oneself; it is universalization.”
(211)
This discussion hinges on Hadot’s understanding of the ‘movement’ of self-transformation
occurring as an interior-to-exterior movement that is clearly characterized in ancient Stoic
spiritual exercise of taking the view from above (chapters 4 and 5). Briefly, the philosopher
brings attention to the self—reflecting on actions, reflection on death—in so doing coming to the
simultaneous awareness of her or his lack of wisdom and desire for wisdom. Simultaneous with
this awareness is the realization that one is but a part and expression of the All or the Whole.
Thus, the philosopher proceeds to a view from above with an operative vision of the cosmos and
his and other’s place in it. Cosmic consciousness and the transcendent myth/figure of the sage
are dimensions of practice of philosophy in the present moment for Hadot which is a divergence
from Foucault’s aesthetics of existence. Though significant, the differences between the concepts
of self-transformation only serve to highlight a shared project approached differently. Hadot
remarked,
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“To summarize: what Foucault calls ‘practices of the self’ do indeed correspond, for the
Platonists as well as for the Stoics, to a movement of conversion toward the self. One
frees oneself from exteriority, from personal attachment to exterior objects, and from the
pleasures they may provide. One observes oneself, to determine whether one has made
progress in this exercise. One seeks to be one’s own master, to possess oneself, and find
one’s happiness and freedom in inner independence. I concur on all these points.” (Way
of Life 211)
This shared project could be characterized as turning, again, to ancient models of life in help for
navigating the conditions of the present historical moment. With that in mind Arnold Davidson
approaches the beginnings of a dialogue.
Arnold Davidson poses a question at the intersection of Hadot and Foucault on the
mobilizing force of transcendent wisdom. “Is there an imminent equivalent of transcendent
wisdom? Can you have a relationship with yourself that has the strength and mobility of wisdom,
but without being transcendent?” (La Repubblica). Davidson’s question is thought provoking in
two ways. Firstly, in human communication scholarship Davidson’s question presents an
opening to extended conversation between Foucault and Hadot on philosophy, communication,
embodiment, ethics, practice and/or habitus, and community. For this project, Davidson’s
question raises the issue of motivation or mobility for choosing, over and again, to practice the
spiritual exercises toward the model of the sage.
In response to the question posed, Davidson looks to Foucault’s aesthetics of existence as
a path forward for living contemporary philosophy as a way of life. Echoing Hadot’s critique
from Philosophy as a Way of Life Davidson points out that Foucault’s aesthetics of existence can
readily be interpreted as self-aggrandizement—“the Californian cult of the self”(La Repubblica).
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Rather, Davidson points out that Foucault notes that this conception of the self-transformative
practices are intended to be married to a critical dimension that is not juridical. “According to
Foucault, the need for an aesthetic of existence is related to the need for a technique of the self, a
life technique that involves a new attitude towards ourselves, a critical attitude” (La Repubblica).
Disabused of the cult of the self, Davidson concludes that “our task is to rediscover history and
to invent the exercises for ourselves” (Lr ta Repubblica). The contemporary task outlined by
Davidson is helped along by Hadot’s rediscovery of philosophia and the corporeal/linguistic
practice of the spiritual exercises.
In posing the question Davidson noted Hadot’s continual reminders that philosophia is
only viable insofar as it addresses therapeutically human conditions of the present moment—
embodied thus subject to the passions, communal thus communicative and embedded in relations
of communication, lacking wisdom, and abandoned to temporal and terrestrial conditions. As the
conditions change so do the models of the sage, “I want to remind you that Hadot himself says
that a correct conception of the sage must take into account the new historical conditions” (La
Repubblica). In my reading of Davidson ‘the sage’ of Hadot in the contemporary moment
functions as a symbol for the attraction-force of transcendent wisdom in Hadot’s rendering of
ancient philosophical practice.
Motivation, or the desire to change is inextricable with awareness, love for humankind,
and cosmic consciousness (Ancient 220; Citadel 311). Ethics lived and “communicated
corporeally and linguistically” took shape as the spiritual exercises (chapter three) as they called
on and (trans)formed the practitioner and community at the level of being.
Corporeal/linguistic expressivity, awareness in/of the present moment, love for
humankind, and cosmic consciousness, as well as being at the core of Hadot’s holistic
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philosophy of communication, also serve to form an opening for an extended conversation and
development of a holistic communication ethics in our time. In my reading of Hadot an adapted
cosmic consciousness (via physics as a spiritual exercises) for the present moment does not
necessarily need to be tied transcendent wisdom—as in God, or gods—but rather a functioning
view from above that transcends the limits of self, but immanent in that it’s mobility factor is in
being responsive and responsible to one’s terrestrial surroundings and the larger world and the
community.
Conclusion
This chapter set forth Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication that attends
to the health of the individual and the community through the practice of spiritual exercises that
recruit and transform one’s entire being. A holistic philosophy of communication works at the
nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos; is ever-incomplete; and works with and in an
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all
communication” (Butchart 136). A holistic philosophy of communication is responsive to the
present moment that experiences increased levels of anxiety, with underdeveloped capacity of
attention for relational development with anything and anyone ‘outside our head’ in cultural
forms that privilege the hunt over reflection, and disjointed conditions of time and space. These
conditions make it difficult to recognize and form responses to the fundamental questions that
confront each of us: How do I live a good life? What does death mean? What purpose is there in
this life? Hadot’s work offers insight into adopting and adapting ancient philosophical attitudes,
working toward inner peace, attaining a view from above, and fostering a love of mankind all
born in the understanding that we are fundamentally in relation with others in human
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communication. The conclusion of this section outlined the beginnings of a holistic
communication ethics that foregrounds minimal agreement, love for humankind, cosmic
consciousness and attention to the present moment. Practiced together these are intended to
therapeutically exercise self and other in the uncertain conditions of the current moment.
So how do we practice? As simple and cliché as it sounds, we learn from Hadot that
living philosophy as a way of life in the present moment involves reading the ancients (of any
wisdom tradition), reflecting on one’s own communicative engagement in one’s relations, form
the intent to ‘do the good’ for oneself and for/with others, and acknowledging the presence of
others as we talk with them and work out meaning in the everyday embodied and earthly
situations of life.
Michael Chase, student, translator, and friend of Hadot wrote a memorial article on the
occasion of Hadot’s death in 2010. In it, he recounted several instances of Hadot’s own
engagements with students, friends, and strangers: “friendly, non-condescending” and “simple” ,
“self-deprecating” and “humorous” (Chase). One instance that stood out to Chase is a banal and
everyday example of living philosophy as a way of life.
“On one occasion, he invited Isabel [Chase’s wife] and me to lunch, along with half a
dozen others; we were to meet at his office at the Collège de France. We all showed up,
and Hadot began to lead the whole bunch of us off to the restaurant. In the hallway,
however, he came across a lost-looking young couple, obviously foreigners, and asked
them if he could help them. They were looking for the cafeteria, they told him timidly,
and Pierre Hadot, instead of merely giving them directions, insisted on accompanying
this unknown couple all the way to the cafeteria, leaving his ‘invited’ guest to twiddle
their thumbs.” (Chase)
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The search for wisdom, or responses to the questions above, occurs with others by risking the
uncertainty of communication in the everyday “living conversations” in line at the coffee shop,
at the farmer’s market, with colleagues and classmates, at the ballgame, at athletic practices
(Happiness 188). Reading Hadot is an invitation to live and communicate philosophically.
Arnold I. Davidson introduces Hadot’s book on Plotinus by framing the experience as
“Reading Hadot Reading Plotinus” (Plotinus 1). In reading Hadot’s work one is aware of two
ongoing and simultaneous processes. The first process is Hadot’s engagement of ancient
philosophical discourse as he practices writing and reading as a spiritual exercise for nourishing
his own spiritual progress. Reading Hadot is similar to what he says of reading the Meditations
of Marcus Aurelius, “it is extremely rare to find a person training himself to live and to think like
a human being. . . Marcus is talking to himself, but we get the impression that he is talking to
each one of us” (Citadel 313). The second process is the ongoing invitation for us, his readers, to
step out of the hunt and, with others in and through human communication respond to the
questions of life.
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EPILOGUE
Practicing a Holistic Philosophy of Communication & Communication Ethics
The first section of this epilogue provides a review of the chapters. The closing section
functions as an opening for future research and practice in human communication.
Review of Chapters
This chapter has introduced the life and work of Pierre Hadot. Hadot asks the question,
“is modern man still able to understand the texts of antiquity, and live according to them” (Way
of Life 278). Through this education under Paul Henri and Pierre Courcelle Hadot was exposed
early to the systematic work of Thomas Aquinas and the great mystics of the Catholic
Intellectual tradition. This put him in a position to read ancient texts within their own context to
revisit the phenomenon of ancient philosophy, or philosophia. Philosophia is an embodied way
of life, lived out in community of practitioners, that has attendant spiritual practices for the
intention of forming the “inner attitude” and orienting the practitioner in the life-world (Way of
Life 59). This way of life is an existential choice rooted in a view of the cosmos (Ancient 3). In
the present historical moment, the texts that have come to be understood as the texts of
philosophy were produced for the support of this initial choice of a way of life situated and were
not constrained by the purpose of the creation of a fully coherent system of thought.
Hadot’s understanding and practice of interpretation affirms the goal of working toward
objectivity in the process of interpretation. A person engaging with the text is certainly situated
in their own moment, however they can, with rigor, place the text in question back in its literary
genre, environment, and culture in working out what the author intended to convey aided by the
understanding that ancient rules of literary production were more codified than present, e.g.
Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations follow the guidelines for “notes for oneself” or the genre
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hypomnēmata as notes for support in practice (see ch. 3). While some mistakes are errors there
are some that have been shown to be fruitful in opening up gaps for new meaning. Hadot regards
these errors as “Creative mistakes” (Way of Life 71, 75). Perhaps the most consequential example
of the result of a creative mistake is the emergence of the distinction between infinitive “being”
and participle “being” from Plato’s Parmenides (Way of Life 75).
Chapter two reviewed the distinction between those who love wisdom (philosopher) and
those who have achieved a state of wisdom (sage). Hadot discusses this distinction in two booklength studies of philosophers; Plotinus (Neoplatonism) in Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision
(1993) and Marcus Aurelius (Stoic) in The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius
(1998). For Plotinus the sage-experience is fleeting and rare. For Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics
sage status had been achieved but only by one or maybe two people. However, progress toward
wisdom was possible as a condition of desiring. In the middle-way of lack, desire, and atopos—
“strange, extravagant, absurd, unclassifiable, disturbing” (Ancient Philosophy 30)—way of living
is most vivid in the received myth/figure of Socrates, the prototypical philo-soph of the Western
tradition.
Hadot drew attention to Socrates’ words and actions to show that care for the soul and
care for the public life are not mutually exclusive tasks. Socrates’ search for wisdom was to
engender souls that were awake to their own lack of knowledge. For Socrates, latent in all of us
is the desire to know and do the good. Socrates’s task then is to act as a midwife and help birth
the soul into awareness that one doesn’t know what one thought. As dialogue partner, Socrates
takes on the role of risk and responsibility of continuing the questioning at the point of crisis. In
the erotic sphere Socrates shifts from being the lover pursuing the young boy, to the beloved as
the boy chases after him. In both cases the interlocutor hides behind the mask of Socrates as both
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pursuits continue simultaneously. At the point of revelation, Socrates stepped aside, revealing at
once the interlocutor’s lack of knowledge and their love for the pursuit of wisdom (Way of Life
162).
Chapter three turned to Hadot’s explication of the lived exercises of the practitioner. This
review of the phenomenon of spiritual exercises began by further situating them in the context of
philosophia. In that context practicing spiritual exercises was identical to living a philosophical
life. This is consistent with the practice of acknowledging those as philosophers who did not
write any ‘philosophy’, e.g. Socrates, Plotinus, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius before his
Meditations were widely available.
The spiritual exercises functioned as therapeutic practices by responding to the human
condition—“a state of unhappy disquiet” or of “alienation, dispersion and unhappiness”—
emergent especially in the passions , e.g. wealth, power, food, sex, etc.(Way of Life 102; Ancient
198). The exercises confirmed the already formed choice to live a way of life. The exercises
common to the ancient schools of philosophy were: attention, meditation, dialogue, inner
discourse, training for death and physics (more in chapter 4). The exercises overlap with each
other in exercising two movements soul in coming to self-consciousness: bringing attention to
itself and to expanding the self toward a “cosmic consciousness” (Way of Life 85). Through his
rendering of spiritual exercises Hadot brought his readers to an awareness “of philosophy not
only as a concrete, practical activity but also as a transformation of our way of inhabiting and
perceiving the world” and to highlight the recurrences of this attitude throughout the history of
philosophy (Ancient 270).
Chapter four addressed how inquiries into nature and the cosmos are integral in the
formation of frameworks for orienting oneself in the lifeworld and social complex (Arnett and
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Holba 9; Arneson 77). Physics when practiced as a spiritual exercise brought about “the
realization of the presence of the world and of our belonging to the world” of, with, and for
others in relations of communication (Happiness 96). With physics supporting the spiritual
practice of taking a view from above, routine concerns and interactions were brought into the
perspective of being parts and expressions of the Whole wherein meanings of the human
condition abandoned to this place and time can be renegotiated with others. Hadot outlined the
relationship between humans, nature, and the cosmos by tracing the development of meanings of
the Heraclitean aphorism “Nature loves to hide” (x, Kahn 33; Veil of Isis)..
Emergent from the aphorism is the idea that nature held secrets, which sets up an
opposition between humans and nature. Revealing the secretes was the purview of philosophy
and the sciences. Hadot characterizes the attempts at revealing the secrets of nature as
Promethean or Orphic. The two attitudes are not a strict division, but rather “equally essential” in
the investigations of nature and are often found together (Veil 98). The Promethean attitude is
based in an understanding of the relationship between humanity and nature to be generally
hostile. Through technological and mechanical means the researcher will forces nature to give up
its secrets so they can be used for the purposes of humankind. The Orphic attitude is based in the
idea that humanity is a part of nature. The secrets of nature can be known through human art
insofar as human art—the poem, the painting, the philosophical discourse—is a participation in
the same creative and generative process of nature (Veil 92). Negotiation of meaning and
formulating responses in human communication to the present terrestrial conditions involves
understandings of our relationship with nature and the cosmos. In re-placing the current
circumstances with the perspective of the All (Stoic understanding of cosmos) the philosopher
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becomes aware of the vastness of the All present in the world and others. Human communication
is thus (re)oriented toward the expression of the All in others.
Chapter five set forth Pierre Hadot’s holistic philosophy of communication that attends to
the health of the individual and the community through the practice of spiritual exercises that
recruit and transform one’s entire being. A holistic philosophy of communication works at the
nexus of mind, body, soul, and cosmos; is ever-incomplete; and works with and in an
understanding of “human being as essentially an exposure that lacks a closed identity” and
“keep[s] sight of the opening, wound, or lack that remains at the heart of any community and all
communication” (Butchart 136). A holistic philosophy of communication is responsive to the
present moment that experiences increased levels of anxiety, with underdeveloped capacity of
attention for relational development in cultural forms that privilege the hunt over reflection, and
disjointed conditions of time and space. These conditions make it difficult to recognize and form
responses to the fundamental questions that confront each of us: How do I live a good life? What
does death mean? What purpose is there in this life? Hadot’s work offers insight into adopting
and adapting ancient philosophical attitudes, working toward inner peace, attaining a view from
above, and fostering a love of mankind all born in the understanding that we are fundamentally
in relation with others in human communication.
As simple and cliché as it sounds, we learn from Hadot that living philosophy as a way of
life in the present moment involves reading the ancients (of any wisdom tradition), reflecting on
one’s own communicative engagement in one’s relations, form the intent to ‘do the good’ for
oneself and for/with others, and acknowledging the presence of others as we talk with them and
work out meaning in the everyday embodied and earthly situations of life. Reading Hadot is an
invitation to live and communicate philosophically.
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Practicing Holistic Communication Ethics: An Opening
Across the United States most communities are now required to practice—out of
necessity—a form of social distancing that calls us to avoid gathering together. The necessity is
for protection of self and others in the uncertain conditions of a global pandemic to which 80,000
deaths worldwide are already attributed. The nature of COVID-19 is highly contagious and is
able to persist on surfaces for far longer than other viruses of similar genetic construction such as
influenza (World Health Organization). We are put in the position of having to practice a form of
‘social distancing’ in order to stop the spread or ‘flatten the curve’ of the infection rate. Other
restrictions include wearing a face covering in public and frequent hand sanitizing/washing.
‘Social distancing’ restrictions include maintaining a distance of six feet or two meters
apart from individuals which has necessarily caused the shutdown (or limited to take-out and
delivery service) of all locations that could be environments where the virus could easily spread.
This includes all schools, restaurants, bars/pubs, movie-theatres, barber shops/hair salons, and
community health organizations such as the YMCA and any business that is ‘non-essential.’ All
organized athletics and especially team sports, are considered non-essential and they certainly
qualify as places of potential spread of the virus. As a lead coach for a smaller community
rowing club that services a range of programs and people from middle school up to people in
their 70’s (there is one woman in her 90’s) I and the coaching staff (four people) are navigating
the uncharted virtual environment to find ways of practicing community in a time when the
primary purpose for gathering—rowing—is not able to happen.
Navigating the current moment through a holistic communication ethics begins in the
“minimal agreement” of responsibility for slowing the infection rate of COVID-19 and brings
the task of learning to the forefront (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell xiv). Combining this minimal
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agreement with the task of learning and a holistic communication ethics brings the spiritual
exercises of cosmic consciousness and attention to the present moment as therapeutics for self
and community as we attempt to meet the conditions of the current moment.
In the present moment questions arise that combine financial pragmatic concerns and
questions for philosophical reflection with human communication and philosophia as an entry
point. The rowing club currently has programming and is able to employ two full-time coaches
whose responsibilities include among others, facility and equipment maintenance, creation and
staffing of all programs, and recruitment. 6 All of these activities are born out of the organizing
activity of rowing on the water, travelling, and competing against other clubs in the region. The
financial uncertainty comes with the possibility of not being able to generate income hrough
summer rowing opportunities. Income from the summer programming serves as the backbone for
the annual budget.7 Without the income from summer programming it is a possibility that the
club might not be able to support the same level of programming or coaching once the state and
then club deems it safe to gather again.
Coexistent with the financial uncertainty are the questions that resonate with individuals
and with the community of the rowing club; “What is the form of a club without its primary
reason for organizing?” “How do we practice this community virtually?” “What is best for the
organization and its members?” as a coach I ask, “What is my purpose?”. The personal and
community questions come out of an acknowledgement that for many, if not all, of our club
members rowing is a practice that is an exercise in human flourishing.

The rowing club is just one of numerous organizations experiencing similar conditions, so I will speak of the club
at which I coach as a specific example of a general situation in hope that it contributes to learning and responding to
the current conditions.
7
This financial setup is common to most rowing clubs throughout the United States.
6
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Rowing is an embodied, thus communicative and communal practice that brings people
together in nature and a common purpose. Thus considered, rowing can be a contemporary form
of a spiritual exercise when practiced with intent: it is therapeutic as it exercises one’s whole
being, it is communal, brings attention to the present moment, and exercises one’s relation to
nature and the cosmos. As with the spiritual exercises as outlined by Hadot the exercises are
interwoven with each other and overlap in practice.
Firstly, to achieve the purpose of rowing well with others an individual rower must take
care for herself. She must perform the technical aspects of the rowing stroke well, she must take
responsibility for her physical health—hydration, nutrition, weather appropriate clothing, etc.—
and the equipment and seat assigned to her in the boat. However, she is only one part of the
whole. Moving a boat well together the personal care and awareness must open up to an
awareness of the whole. Once aware, she recognizes others in the boat calling forth both
responsibility and responsivity with and for others in and through corporeal/linguistic expression
(Arneson 29).
Secondly, rowing well together calls for attention to the present moment. Rowing is a
sport that is done outside on a body of water in narrow boats (about hip-width from gunwale to
gunwale), In addition to being responsive to her teammates in the boat the rower and the boat is
responding to the natural conditions. Wind, water, sun, rain, snow, temperature are all conditions
the boat and the rowers toward which the boat and the rower must be responsive. Recreational
and commercial boat-traffic creating wake, debris floating in the water, the speed and direction
of the flow of the river, and other obstacles such as navigational buoys and bridge abutments are
all a part of the ‘field’ that rower is interacting with. To be able to respond and row well, the
rower must be present with herself and the others in the boat. She must set aside the anxieties
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and fears of the past and the future—work, school, family, financial—that will call her attention
away from exercising her whole embodied being in this moment with others. The third way in
which rowing can be practiced as a contemporary spiritual exercise is potentially as an opening
into understanding and exercising one’s being in relation to the cosmos.
Hadot notes that the practice of philosophy in the lived spiritual exercises is a,
“transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving the world” and to highlight the
recurrences of this attitude throughout the history of philosophy (Ancient 270). In the
contemporary moment Robert Macfarlane demonstrates and documents this in Underland
(2019). Visiting spaces and witnessing phenomena in the structures deep in the earth beneath our
feet with others Macfarlane shows how the relations of human communication and societal
practices shift in response to our engagement with nature and the cosmos (13-15). The rower
changes surfaces as she steps into the boat and helps shove the boat off the dock. With the
change in the ‘ground’ under her feet, her perceptions change. In combination with others, in the
present moment, physical exertion, and inhabiting the world differently on the water
therapeutically exercises her being in self and community transformation.
In chapter 5, I presented an outline of what a holistic communication ethics in the present
moment could look like. The outline started is based in the idea that ethics are inseparable from
corporeal/linguistic expressivity. Ethics is lived and worked out in the lifeworld and social
complex. To that end, Hadot addressed ethics as intricately a part of lived philosophy as an
exercise of being. Practicing a holistic communication ethics in the present moment understands
that human being, as embodied is communal and communicative. Practicing ethics then, is a
fundamentally a therapeutic exercise of being in an through corporeal/linguistic expressivity. A
holistic communication ethics protects and promotes living and doing the good with and for
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others through self-transformation on the model of a sage. This includes an expanding love for
humankind and cosmic consciousness. This in mind, questions emerge; how do we practice a
holistic communication ethics in the present moment that necessitates physical distance from
each other and separation from the therapeutic spiritual exercise of rowing and the organizing
principle that brings club members together?
At this moment, the coaches and club members have more questions and uncertainties
than responses to the conditions. What I offer here is a picture of our attempts at a response
through the perspective of a holistic communication ethics that protects and promotes the ‘good’
of embodied community, attention to the present moment, and cosmic consciousness. It is an
ever-incomplete task that acknowledges multiple possibility as the conditions shift daily.
Similar to other rowing clubs across the country the coaches and the club are offering
times for meetings through video conferencing, such as Zoom and Google Hangouts. In the boat
the rower learns to take of herself through attention and practice of the responsibilities of her
position in the boat. This brings her to an awareness that she is only part of the boat and that her
practices move her to awareness, responsibility, and responsivity with other practitioners
attempting to practice a similar life.
We have held two styles of online meetings. The first is where we have each other on the
screen while we complete a communal workout. The second is a lecture/discussion on rowing
technique, nutrition, college recruiting, and other points. Without the spatio-temporalcommunicative feedback from others and the conditions of rowing together in the boat, we
attempt through online meetings to recreate the personal-to-communal movement, though
differently.
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The capacity for practicing attention to the present moment in the form of rowing is what
suffers most in the virtual environment. Though different for each rower the practices of rowing
physically call the rower to attention, assisting in coming to the realization of the inexhaustible
of the present moment—the walk into the boathouse, the warmup run, or shoving-off from the
dock combined with that first stroke of the day. Our attempts at a partial response have been to
schedule individual meetings with all the junior (ages 14-18) rowers and those of the adults that
want them. The purpose here is to check-in on training questions, and how each is handling the
transitions in school and family/home life. These check-ins serve functionally to bring attention
to the absence of the practice in the present moment and talk about it with each other. In place of
the usually practice, in the current time the conversation about the absence is a linguistic
expression that acknowledges the corporeal absence of the practice.
For Hadot, cosmic consciousness occurs through practicing the spiritual exercise of
physics, or inquiries into nature and a practitioner’s relationship to it. The practitioner is able to
reorient his interpretive frameworks in perceiving others as parts and expressions of the whole—
the whole of the human community, and the whole of the cosmos. This, again, happens as one
begins with attention on the self as he recognizes the part of himself that is and participates in the
all or whole of nature and the cosmos. This realization expands as it recognizes in others the
same part of the whole, community and cosmos.
As the rower steps into the boat and shoves-off onto the water, her relationship to the
surrounding area is changed. By exercising this different perspective the rowers can see herself
and others as part of a bigger picture in the terrain they usually inhabit. Though shutting down
the club meant keeping us away from rowing as a spiritual exercise it was the appropriate action
to take. Simply, taking the view from above, the risk was too great and if being closed helps the
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spread in even a small way, it is the appropriate action to take for the good of the whole club,
community, and cosmos.
Implications for continued research
The sketch above is a short sketch of directions for future human communication
research. Hadot’s work can bring additive insight to the ongoing scholarly conversations in
communication and hermeneutics, organizational communication, and interpersonal
communication.
Hadot’s unique approach to the interpretation of texts was reviewed in chapter one. Hadot
revealed ‘philosophy as a way of life’ by re-placing texts in their own historical moment, literary
genre and environment/culture of production. In referencing the rhetorical and literary rules of
composition with an understanding of the practices of the philosophical school of which it was a
part, Hadot gains a perspective on the limits that bound the author. These includes a society that
continued to privilege orality. Approaching texts of philosophical discourse Hadot argues that
jettisoning objectivity as such from historical method has allow for the development of
interpretive practices resulting in “genuine aberrations” pointing to Hans-Georg Gadamer
specifically (Nietzsche 76). Starting with Gadamer’s description of Gadamer’s description of
hermeneutics as, “understanding and interpretation . . . have to do with the basic relationships of
human beings to each other and to the world” and that philosophia is grounded in the “living
words and daily interchanges” drawing out an extended conversation between Hadot and
Gadamer on hermeneutics and historical consciousness has potential to contribute to issues of
interpretation, human communication, and understanding (Gadamer 157).8

A consequence of this specific discussion would be to develop further the human communication-ontology
relationship in Hadot.
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Definitions of ‘community’ in Hadot’s work are specific to the Greek and Hellenistic
schools (see Ancient) and general when referring to a ‘community of practitioners’ when
referring to small groups of master and students (such as the Stoics and Neoplatonist instruction
at the tail end of the ancient historical moment. However, the general concept of human
community and/or the cosmos is integral to the practice of the spiritual exercises. Developing
Hadot’s concept of ‘community of practitioners’ can be fruitfully put into conversation with
organizational communication scholarship, particularly literature of the communicative
constitution of organization (CCO) paradigm.9 For example, a fruitful project would be a
continuation of the sketch above on the intersection of a holistic communication ethics and
questions of the shifting contours of a ‘community of practitioners’—a rowing club—from the
perspective of the communicative constitution of organization.
Hadot’s description of dialogue as a spiritual exercise may contribute to the conversation
in interpersonal communication. In the ancient practice of philosophia, dialogue was a specific
practice. Dialogue was entered into between master and student or between two students.
Importantly dialogue could only occur if both interlocuters agreed to undergo the process. For
Hadot, Socrates serves as the model as he first gains the assent of his interlocutors before leading
them to awareness of their own lack of wisdom. As a spiritual practice dialogue and “inner
discourse” (simply for Hadot the words one says to oneself) were intertwined with practicing
“authentic presence, to oneself and to others” (Way of Life 91). Authentic presence with others
was conditioned through practicing authentic presence in dialogue with others, and conversely
being able to be present with others in dialogue resulted from practicing authentic presence with

For example see François Cooren. Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation and Ventriloquism
(2010).
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oneself by training one’s inner discourse (91). In the ancient model of life embodied presence
was assumed as the primary mode of interaction between people. Hadot’s scholarship could
contribute to ongoing conversations regarding intersubjective intentionality and authenticity in a
communicative environment saturated with digital technology. 10 This conversation would be
especially timely as interpersonal interactions are expressed through digital/virtual media so as to
prevent the spread of COVID-19.

See for example Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why we Expect More from Technology and Less From Each
Other (2012) and Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (2016) and Jeff Bogaczyk.
“Intersubjective intentionality, moral consciousness, and media ecology.” Review of Communication, vol. 17 (4),
2017, pp. 342-356.
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